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Arrow's theorem of the deductible: moral hazard and stop-loss in health insurance

Bibliographic reference Dreze, Jacques ; Schokkaert, Erik. Arrow's theorem of the deductible: moral hazard and stop-loss in health insurance. In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 47, no.2, p. 147-163 (2013)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/135143
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