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Market game in successive oligopolies

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Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean [UCL] Laussel, Didier [GREQAM, Université d'Aix-Marseille] Van Ypersele, Tanguy [GREQAM, Université d'Aix-Marseille] Zanaj, Skerdilajda [Université du Luxembourg]

This paper introduces a new approach to successive oligopolies. We draw on market games à la Shapley-Shubik to examine how successive oligopolies operate between downstream and upstream markets when the input price is determined by the action of all firms, downstream and upstream both. This approach differs from the classical one as it allows us to consider downstream firms that exercise market power both in both downstream and upstream markets. We perform a comparison of the market outcome with each scenearios as well as welfare analysis.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article) – Article de recherche
Access type Accès interdit
Publication date 2013
Language Anglais
Journal information "Journal of Public Economic Theory" - Vol. 15, no.3, p. 397-410 (2013)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. ((United States) Hoboken)
issn 1097-3923
e-issn 1467-9779
Publication status Publié
Affiliation UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Links
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Bibliographic reference Jaskold Gabszewicz, Jean ; Laussel, Didier ; Van Ypersele, Tanguy ; Zanaj, Skerdilajda. Market game in successive oligopolies. In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol. 15, no.3, p. 397-410 (2013)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/134838