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Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information

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Mauleon, Ana [FUSL] Vannetelbosch, Vincent [UCL]

We consider Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns on the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent having stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party's relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article)
Access type Accès libre
Publication date 2013
Language Anglais
Journal information "GAMES" - Vol. 4, no.3, p. 329-338 (NaN)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher MDPI AG (Postfach, CH-4005 Basel, Switzerland)
issn 2073-4336
Publication status Publié
Affiliations UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
USL-B - Centre de Recherche en Economie (CEREC)
Links
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Bibliographic reference Mauleon, Ana ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information. In: GAMES, Vol. 4, no.3, p. 329-338 (NaN)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.3/131322