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Dynamical Models Explaining Social Balance and Evolution of Cooperation

Bibliographic reference Traag, Vincent ; Van Dooren, Paul ; De Leenheer, Patrick. Dynamical Models Explaining Social Balance and Evolution of Cooperation. In: PLoS One, Vol. 8, no.4, p. e60063 (2013)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/128517
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