Motivational Processes

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ABSTRACT

Motivation and cognition have often been seen in opposition when it comes to explaining prejudice. Similarly, more social versus more cognitive approaches often tend to be disconnected from each other. This has led to the adoption of a dominant framework that obliterates the strong connection between these aspects. To overcome this limitation, we analyse prejudice from the perspective of the basic human needs, that is, to know and to control, to be connected with others, and to have value. These integrity concerns provide a rich analytic tool allowing us to appraise a vast array of theoretical and empirical contributions. Although these integrity concerns constitute powerful factors leading to the emergence of prejudice, we suggest that the same concerns must be used if one wishes to fight prejudice.

SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT INTEGRITY CONCERNS?

This chapter is about motivation in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. The construct of motivation encompasses a large array of phenomena ranging from transient and specific goals of an individual to chronic and global needs characterizing all humans. Motivation also concerns explicit and controlled objectives, or unconscious and diffuse preoccupations. Finally, motivation may stem from the person's own initiative or from the operation of external forces. This chapter considers all of these cases and refers to motivation in a general way. However, because motivational forces underlying prejudice are more than goals, especially conscious and internally-driven ones, we speak of integrity concerns. This term does justice to the breadth of the concept both in process and content. Importantly, we do not refer here to the state of tension directly associated with the experience of prejudice. Although prejudice is an affective state that fuels people's chauvinistic behaviors down the line, we concentrate on integrity concerns insofar as they constitute efficient or final causes of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination.

Motivation and cognition have always been viewed as an odd couple and are often suspected of leading independent lives, a perspective embraced by contemporary dual system models (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). However, motivation and cognition have also been envisioned as intertwined and working hand in hand so as to best serve individuals. Within research on intergroup

relations, motivation has traditionally been viewed as the main cause of bias and prejudice and, indeed, motivational accounts are at the heart of an impressive number of efforts (Spencer, Fein, Zanna & Olson, 2002). After a long period characterized by the cognitive revolution, needs, goals, and other vested interests have gained new respectability in the eyes of scholars interested in issues of intergroup relations (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). In short, cognitive processes have ceased to be viewed in opposition to motivations. While acknowledging perceivers' *partial* appraisal of their social environment, current research also aims at better understanding the motivational factors underlying people's *partisan* view of the social world. This convergence is palpable both in matters of theoretical positions and of methods. The outcome is the emergence of a rich picture of social perceivers, one in which appraisal of the world is affected as much by reality constraints, which Allport (1954) called 'the light without', as by what Allport labeled 'the light within', which we referred to earlier as integrity concerns (Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005).

The first section of the chapter assesses the early contributions on the role of motivation in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. A classic two-dimensional view is used to organize the research traditions: Whereas the first dimension opposes those views for which prejudice originates inside or outside perceivers, the second distinguishes whether or not conflict underlies the emergence of intolerance and bias (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). The second section reviews several empirical efforts suggesting that this two-dimensional view fails to provide an accurate picture of the complexities of phenomena. The third section presents an alternative framework that integrates contemporary theory and research by building on the basic human needs. Although these needs can individually, but also sometimes in combination, foster prejudice, these 'integrity concerns' can also be used to fight bigotry and intolerance. A final section provides suggestions for future work.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the early days of research on prejudice, motivation was a key theme (Brewer & Brown, 1998). Disliking members of other groups was seen as a deeply engrained response, a gut reaction, in most social perceivers. Using modern terminology, bigotry and chauvinism were means to self-regulate in response to deficiencies of the self. In their classic motivational approach, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) singled out the intra-psychic conflict experienced by individuals in response to beloved parents who, at the same time, were exceedingly punitive because they were over-vigilant with respect to the dominant norms and rules. This clash between love and admiration on the one hand and frustration and hatred on the other was thought to lead to prejudice against those considered to be out of line. In short, a tormented ego resulting from dysfunctional child-raising practices could find salvation in derogating different and fragile others (but see Glick, 2002). Theoretical difficulties and empirical limitations led to questioning of this work on the so-called 'authoritarian personality' but this approach inspired generations of researchers and has recently been revisited with such constructs as right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998).

Allport (1954) was also among the first to suggest that prejudice is not only a course adopted by twisted minds relying on unwarranted generalizations but that stereotyping is grounded in a basic, unavoidable, categorization process. Categorization is a prerequisite for human thinking for it gives meaning to new experiences. It facilitates learning and guides people's adjustments to the social world. By abstracting sensory inputs, categorization allows individuals to quickly interpret, and react to, their environment. The problem is that categorization prevents people from perceiving some aspects of the world: idiosyncrasies are overlooked. Categorization impoverishes experiences, leading to a host of perceptual, judgmental, and memory biases.

By emphasizing the normality of people's faulty perceptions, Allport claimed the study of prejudice and stereotyping as part of mainstream social psychology. Researchers thus oriented their efforts towards clarifying the role of cognitive processes in the formation, use, and modification of stereotypes. Within one generation, cognitive processes became the guilty party and, indeed, almost the sole focus of interest (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Hamilton, 1981). Inspired by the growing popularity of views linking cognition to affect and mood but perhaps even more by the challenge posed by social identity researchers (Tafjel & Turner, 1979), students of social perception soon realized that cognitive processes were not the end of the story. Motivation and, more generally, affective processes could simply not be ignored in order to account for the prevalence of prejudice (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993).

Replacing the 'cognitive miser' perspective, the 'motivated tactician' view gave motivation a new role that was the exact opposite of its mission in the psychodynamic tradition (Fiske, 1998). Motivation was now seen as an asset, fostering defiance towards quick and stereotyped responses and closer scrutiny of the specificities of the information (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Several versions of this view still populate the research market, namely the work on the impact of egalitarian goals (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Monteith, Sherman & Devine, 1998; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel & Schall, 1999) and motivation to avoid stereotyping (Amodio, Harmon-Jones & Devine, 2003; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998, 2001).

Two other lines of work posited instead the social origin of prejudice. One, decidedly conflict-based, promoted the view that stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination occur because individuals belong to groups that compete for limited resources. Only when groups need to cooperate to achieve common goals do intergroup relations improve. For these advocates of the realistic conflict approach (Levine & Campbell, 1972) or simply opponents of individualistic approaches (Sherif, 1967), interdependence combined with status differences between groups predicts intergroup responses. To the extent that hostility toward members of other groups depends on the way people appraise the structural features that regulate intergroup relations, these efforts are a legacy of Lewin's phenomenological approach.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), and their heirs also see the social dimension as central to the emergence of bias (for a recent review, see Yzerbyt & Demoulin, in press). Individuals see themselves, and are seen by others, as belonging to certain groups. As a consequence, aspects of who they are, along with their worth, derive from group membership. The focus here is on the group in the individual rather than the individual in the group. As such, this approach to prejudice represents an ingenious blend between the three perspectives presented above. Categorization in groups, along with the cognitive simplification it creates, joins with individuals' concern for a positive self-esteem. On top of these factors, the structural features of the social system shape people's perceptions of the intergroup situation, determining reactions toward members of other groups. Whereas social cognition and social identity approaches initially agreed on the pivotal role of categorization processes, they diverged on the impact of motivation. Whereas motivation is a springboard to redemption in social cognition, it fuels stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in the eyes of social identity theorists.

Clearly, the role of motivation is most explicit in the psychodynamic individualistic approach and the social identity theories. In their more recent typology of prejudiced motivations, Jost and Banaji (1994) refer to these two views as addressing ego- and group-threat, respectively. At the same time, motivation also assumes a clear role in some of the other views, be it the motivated tactician approach (Fiske, 1998) or the conflict theories (Brown & Hewstone, 2005).

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of new ways of conceptualizing prejudice and the role of motivation. It is now widely assumed that stereotypes and prejudice are largely disseminated and characterized by a high level of inertia. At the same time, only a limited amount of research has been directed at uncovering processes responsible for deep-grained intolerance. In line with Crandall and Eshelman's (2003) distinction between what they call 'genuine prejudice' on the one hand and the expression of bias on the other, the bulk of contemporary work is on factors that moderate the release or suppression of prejudice (Shelton & Richeson, 2006). The next section reviews a series of empirical efforts that point to the factors contributing to stereotyping and prejudice and also reveals the limits of the classic typology presented earlier. In the following section, we then provide an alternative integrative framework, proposing that integrity concerns often foster prejudice but can also, at times, prevent the emergence of prejudice.

THE RELEVANT LITERATURE: EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE ROLE OF MOTIVATION IN STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE

Contemporary researchers clearly abandoned the sharp distinction between individualistic and social approaches on the one hand or between conflict and nonconflict approaches. For instance, even when studying so-called deep individual differences, the tone has decidedly changed from a 'trait' approach to an 'attitude' approach, with some room given for the impact of situational determinants and more transient factors that lead people to fall back on, or avoid, their chauvinistic beliefs. Similarly, the social cognitive approach has examined the consequences of attacks on the image of the self on the emergence of prejudiced reactions. Finally, factors such as conflict and power have become even more explicit in social identity approaches. In this section, we illustrate

the richness of current efforts by dwelling on a series of illustrative studies. The section focuses on the three most prolific lines of work among the four quadrants, namely the individual/conflict approach, the individual/nonconflict approach, and, finally, the social/nonconflict approach.

Turning to the individual conflict approach first, Duckitt (2001; see Chapter 2 by Duckitt, this volume) proposed a model that combines the early work on the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950) and more recent efforts on the role of personality factors in the emergence of prejudice (Altemeyer, 1998; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Perceptions of threat to the social order, a notion reminiscent of the idea of symbolic threat (Sears & Henry, 2003), or to the privileged position of the ingroup, a notion related to the idea of realistic threat (Esses, Jackson & Armstrong, 1998) in intergroup threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), stimulate the adoption of various beliefs and attitudes (embodied in such scales as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and social dominance orientation (SDO) respectively). These beliefs and attitudes then trigger feelings of prejudice. Eventually, these emotional reactions materialize into manifestations of ingroup favoritism and outgroup discrimination. Duckitt's (2001) model sits comfortably within current conceptions of prejudice in which appraisals impact behavior through the emotional experience they trigger. It also provides room for both large-scale and slow determinants, such as life-long socialization practices, and for specific and short-term causes, such as rapid changes in the information regarding the social environment or modification in the particular power position that people occupy. By enriching the traditional approach encountered in differential psychology with the situationist perspective characterizing social psychology, Duckitt's (2001) model bridges the gap between the individualist (personality) and social (realistic conflict) motivations underlying prejudice.

A remarkable illustration of the power of social factors in orienting people's perceptions of their world, with direct consequences

for the adoption of certain attitudinal beliefs and the expression of prejudice, can be found in the work by Guimond and colleagues (Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov & Duarte, 2003). These authors showed that SDO, that is, the belief that certain groups ought to dominate other groups in society and that equality is to be avoided, is affected by the specific major that people select in college (Guimond et al., 2003: Experiments 1 and 2). Not only did Law school students manifest higher levels of SDO than psychology students at the outset of their university trajectory, confirming the idea that people high in SDO are attracted to powerful professions, but SDO scores of law students increased over the years of study whereas those of psychology students decreased. Even more strikingly, Guimond and colleagues (2003: Experiment 4) showed that a simple manipulation assigning participants to a high power as opposed to low-power role influenced SDO levels. In all of these studies, SDO mediated the impact between power and prejudice. Such findings (Danso & Esses, 2001; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003) suggest that SDO is best seen as a set of beliefs that proves sensitive to strategic interests emerging in a dynamic context of intergroup relations (Turner & Reynolds, 2003). In a similar vein, researchers have examined other ideological orientations thought to generate prejudice. In particular, conservatism has long been linked to prejudice because it entails a strong faith in personal responsibility for one's negative outcomes whereas the propensity to blame the victim appears less strongly engrained among liberals (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002). Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) recently argued that political conservatism is best seen as motivated social cognition, serving a range of ideological (e.g., group-based dominance), existential (e.g., terror management) and epistemic (e.g., intolerance of ambiguity) motives.

The social cognition tradition also evolved to include factors that were initially neglected. People may sometimes feel that their self-worth is being questioned and such situations may promote bias and intolerance in how

information is processed. In one illustrative example, Kunda and colleagues (Kunda, Davies, Adams, & Spencer, 2002) conjectured that, when confronted with an individual who fits multiple categories (e.g., an Asian doctor), people may choose to appraise this target using one of several categorical bases (e.g., doctor or Asian). The selection of a particular category depends upon the way the interaction unfolds. If the target somehow 'frustrates' the well-being of the perceiver or counters self-enhancement goals, the more derogatory category (e.g., ethnicity) will impose itself whereas the more flattering category will be inhibited. Of importance too, stereotype activation effects may be brief (Kunda & Spencer, 2003) and stereotypes may not be applied as the interaction proceeds unless some event (e.g., a disagreement) triggers a need for people to fall back on their *a priori* views. That social perceivers may go back and forth to stereotypes as a function of their relevance is consistent with the view that stereotypes are used when they prove useful in guiding perceivers' behavior.

Personal threats or frustrations may influence judgments even when only incidentally related to the interaction. Fein and Spencer (1997) showed that people who learn that they failed rather than succeeded at a test express more disparaging judgments when the feedback provider is member of a stigmatized category. Moreover, the more negatively the threatened individuals rate the target, the better they feel. Clearly, an individual whose self-integrity is being questioned, whether or not in the context of the interaction, turns to stereotypes as a means of recovering from the frustrating episode.

The above work makes it tempting to conclude that low self-esteem people are more likely than high self-esteem people to stereotype, to be prejudiced, and to discriminate. The picture is more complex. Chronic low self-esteem people are reluctant to express prejudice whereas high self-esteem people are often more expressive in their dislikes for other groups (Aberson et al., 2000). In line with a variety of self-projection conceptions of group identity (Gramzow & Gaertner,

2005; Krueger, 2007; Otten & Wentura, 2001), individuals high in self-esteem may also be expected to favor their ingroup more easily because they project their own characteristics, and thus their sense of self-worth, on other ingroup members. This issue is reminiscent of the debate among social identity theorists about the causal relation between self-esteem and ingroup bias. The proposition that successful discrimination enhances self-esteem has received substantial empirical support (Verkuyten, 2007; for reviews, see Aberson, Healy & Romero, 2000; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998), but there is not much evidence for a direct impact of low self-esteem on bias and prejudice.

Although stereotyping and prejudice may be instrumental in attaining some desired states, upholding a simplified, partisan, and often derogatory view of other people and groups often constitutes a motivation in its own right. Perceivers sometimes devote considerable cognitive resources in order to *save* their current views. Similarly, research on stereotype change has emphasized the active role that perceivers play in keeping their preconceptions intact (Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Yzerbyt, Coull & Rocher, 1999). All in all, social cognition research confirms that perceivers are motivated to maintain their stereotyped beliefs, creating considerable mental inertia. In fact, stereotypes are likely to be even more resistant if they survive a stage of thorough examination during which perceivers actively reaffirm them. This means that stereotypes can emerge in two rather different contexts. Besides being handy interpretations of the evidence, susceptible to being abandoned or modified whenever more attention is devoted to the stimulus information (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), they may also result from a thorough rationalization process, thereby becoming deeply rooted beliefs likely to resist most contradictory facts (Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005). These conflicting views that motivation can either decrease stereotyping or fuel the preservation of prejudiced conceptions permeate contemporary views (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). One remarkable evolution in modern work though is the role afforded to automatic and unconscious processes, which we examine in the next section.

The social identity tradition also suggests the complex nature of phenomena by stressing the role of motivation in the emergence of prejudice. Not surprisingly, numerous studies examining the impact of identity threat (for a collection, see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999) and of relative deprivation (for a recent review, Walker & Smith, 2002) show that prejudice emerges when people feel that their group's status or identity is threatened. Relative deprivation theory stipulates that people feel deprived and dissatisfied when they experience unfavorable comparisons between their current situation and, for example, their past situation or the current situation of others. Group relative deprivation refers to the perception that a group that one identifies highly with is deprived relative to an outgroup. Group, but not personal, relative deprivation is thought to be related to intergroup variables. Recently, Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, Meertens, van Dick, and Zick (2008) tested this proposition using three large-scale European surveys. Both personal and group relative deprivations were stronger among low status individuals and correlated with a sense of political inefficacy. But only group relative deprivation was a proximal correlate of prejudice and fully mediated any relationship between personal deprivation and prejudice (Tougas & Beaton, 2001).

Unexpectedly, recent studies also reveal that prejudice may result from success, economic prosperity, or relative gratification, the opposite of relative deprivation (Dambrun, Taylor, McDonald, Crush, & Meot, 2006). In this context, prejudice functions to justify the economic and social superiority of those who are dominant. In other words, when people occupy a dominant position, they translate this advantage into flattering stereotypes for themselves and derogatory stereotypes of less successful groups, mobilizing beliefs to justify their superior social position (Kay, Jost, Mandisodza, Sherman, Petrocelli, & Johnson, 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 1997; see also, Morton, Hornsey & Postmes, 2009).

As the work reviewed in this section suggests, the typology opposing individual and group interests on a first dimension and social conflict versus more cognitive perspectives on a second dimension fails to capture the complex role of motivation in the emergence of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In the next section, we offer an alternative view of the motivational antecedents of prejudice along with empirical evidence that supports it.

INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK: THE ROLE OF INTEGRITY CONCERNS

Considering the basic needs or 'core motives' that typically govern social behavior provides a fruitful way to look at the role of motivation in stereotyping and prejudice (Fiske, 2004; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, in press). In line with the idea that core motives influence people's beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in a wide variety of social settings, we propose that people's 'integrity concerns' – which engage a variety of core motives – fundamentally shape stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination.

First, people have a basic need to understand and control their world. That is, they want to believe that what they 'know' about the world is firm and sound, motivating them to see the world as congruent with their expectations. Much early social cognition work, that is, attribution theories and balance theories, are rooted in the notion that people construct social knowledge to feel that they can understand, predict, and control their environment. Once people have secured a comprehension that seems functional, they will stick to it. To the extent that knowledge is socially validated, bias (or the lack thereof) will likely be affected by people's assumptions about what others around them profess.

Of course, the informational value of others hangs on who they are, which brings us to another integrity concern driving people's prejudice: Perceivers are likely to be biased against others in response to the need to belong, also sometimes called the need to feel connected (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fiske, 2004). This concern is linked to the unmistakable reality that humans, as social animals, depend on others and are finely tuned to the reactions of others. In this respect, people's attachment to significant others represents a powerful force in leading people to adopt particular beliefs. Over and over, normative preoccupations promote dominant, often derogatory, views about outgroups. When people fear the vicissitudes of social exclusion (Williams, 2007) or contemplate their own mortality (Greenberg, Koole & Pyszczynski, 2004), they are quick to conform and boost the values that they see as distinguishing their group from other groups.

A third and final integrity concern, long linked to prejudice, is people's desire to have a positive view of themselves and their peers (Crocker & Knight, 2005; Swann, 1987). This need to have value is at the heart of an enormous amount of theoretical and empirical work. Obviously, research examining the impact of individual characteristics such as self-esteem as well as the efforts aimed at uncovering the role of group membership and social identity in prejudice falls under this umbrella.

We now outline empirical findings that illustrate the role of these three integrity concerns in the emergence of prejudice. The three main classes of concerns – to know and to control, to belong and to connect, and to have positive value – all clearly play a role in the emergence of prejudice. At the same time, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are often, if not always, over-determined. Does this all mean that prejudice is an unavoidable consequence of the existence of integrity concerns? We do not think so. In a final subsection, we outline the various ways by which these concerns can also be exploited to fight bigotry.

Integrity concerns and prejudice: The need to know and to control

Being in a state of uncertainty is unpleasant and people are therefore quick to rely on, or stick to, information that clarifies their course

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of action. This concern for knowledge and mastery represents the main (but not only) concern responsible for people's tendency to see individuals as simple instantiations of the stereotype of their group and the related propensity to see groups as homogeneous entities. That is, social categorization represents a prime tool for satisfying the need for mastery because it buys perceivers an enormous amount of information about others at a very low cost. One obvious explanation for people's reluctance to abandon their stereotypic beliefs is thus that they are not willing to question their *a priori* views that have generally served them well in the past. As a consequence, confirmation of hypotheses and even Pygmalion effects (i.e., self-fulfilling prophecies) are commonplace when it comes to stereotypic beliefs (Klein and Snyder, 2003).

One admittedly subtle way by which people perpetuate their *a priori* conception of groups is selective use of language. For instance, the linguistic category model (LCM, Semin and Fiedler, 1988), distinguishes four levels of language abstraction. Descriptive action verbs (DAV) are descriptions of an action with reference to a specific object and situation; they are context dependent (e.g., John kisses Angela). Interpretative action verbs (IAV) are interpretations of an action. IAV refers to a specific object and situation but goes beyond a mere description (e.g., John is comforting Angela). State verbs (SV) refer to a mental or emotional state, with reference to a specific object but not to a specific situation. They are independent of context (e.g., John loves Angela). Adjectives (ADJ) are highly abstract person dispositions. ADJ make no reference to specific objects, situations, or context (e.g., John is romantic). The LCM thus offers an ideal and indeed unobtrusive instrument to tap dispositional inferences. Building upon the LCM, Wigboldus, Semin, and Spears (2000) predicted and found that people rely on more (versus less) abstract language to describe and communicate information that was consistent (versus inconsistent) with their stereotypic expectations (Wigboldus & Douglas, 2007).

Tajfel (1981) suggested that stereotypes enable differentiation between groups, supply an explanation for the existing state of affairs, and provide people with a justification for their behaviors toward outgroup and outgroup members (Yzerbyt, Rocher & Schadron, 1997). Similar positions can be found in current approaches that examine factors shaping the content of intergroup stereotypes (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske et al., 1999). For instance, according to the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 1999), the characteristics that are typically selected in order to portray groups and group members are best considered as cognitive appraisals that feed into emotional reactions and behaviors tendencies (Cuddy et al., 2007). Fiske and her colleagues (1999) provided impressive empirical evidence for the fact that stereotypic depictions are organized around two dimensions. The first, warmth, is responsive to the nature of the interdependence and level of cooperation between the groups and thus refers to people's expectations regarding others' intentions toward them. The second, competence, is sensitive to the differential hierarchical positions of the groups in the social system and has to do with the extent to which people think that others can act upon their intentions. This research on the fundamental dimensions of social perception (Abele & Wocziszke, 2007; Fiske et al., 2007; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt & Kashima, 2005) confirms but also specifies how social perceivers capitalize on stereotypes in order for group members to simultaneously secure the social system and provide value to their own group (Kay et al., 2007).

Integrity concerns and prejudice: The need to feel connected

The need to feel connected also promotes stereotyping and prejudice. It has long been suggested that social norms exert a huge impact on the way people embrace and propagate derogatory beliefs (Minard, 1952; Pettigrew, 1958). More recent work suggests that people support the views allegedly shared

within their group as a means of coordinating their social behavior and securing group membership (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, Reynolds, & Eggins, 1996; Sechrist & Stangor, 2001).

For instance, Stangor, Sechrist and Jost (2001) told participants about the beliefs held by other individuals (i.e., ingroup members) regarding African Americans. This information was either systematically more favorable or more unfavorable than the stereotype participants thought was shared within their ingroup. Participants showed a more positive (negative) stereotype when they learned that relevant others held a more favorable (unfavorable) stereotype. Focusing on stereotype change, Carnaghi and Yzerbyt (2007) investigated the effect of stereotypes held by a prospective audience on participants' reactions to a stereotype-disconfirming group member. Their Belgian participants learned about a stereotype allegedly held by an ingroup or an outgroup audience about Belgians and then received information about a Belgian who disconfirmed the stereotype. As predicted, the deviant was seen as less typical when he violated the stereotype held by an ingroup than by an outgroup audience. Also, participants' stereotype about Belgians was more similar to the one held by the ingroup audience. A mediational analysis confirmed that participants subtyped the disconfirming member in order to embrace the stereotype advocated by the ingroup audience. These findings emphasize the role of people's concern for the way their beliefs match those of a beloved group.

Integrity concerns and prejudice: The need to have value

Last but not least, the need to have value is a powerful force leading to the emergence of bias in favor of the ingroup and against the outgroup. Although ethnocentrism, a notion initially proposed by Sumner (1906), has always been the focus of much research, ingroup bias became a dominant topic of research among social psychologists after Tajfel and colleagues (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971) reported their minimal group paradigm findings. Despite the fact that all factors known to trigger group favoritism, such as knowledge of group members, common fate, competition, etc., had been stripped from the experimental setting, their participants countered the norm of fairness and expressed bias in favor of their ingroup. This unexpected pattern proved extremely robust and constitutes the cornerstone of one of the most fruitful lines of research on intergroup relations (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; for a recent review, Yzerbyt & Demoulin, in press).

Other findings emphasize the combined impact of the need to have value and the need to know on information processing. The so-called ultimate attribution error constitutes a good illustration (Pettigrew, 1979). Researchers have proposed that the need to control their social environment leads perceivers to prefer dispositional over situational explanations to account for other people's actions (for a review, see Gilbert, 1998). For example, perceivers tend to assume that a person who lashes out must have an 'aggressive personality' rather than have been provoked. This is known as 'correspondence bias' or the 'fundamental attribution error.' But in intergroup situations, the need to have value intrudes, such that people preferentially use dispositional explanations for positive behaviors of ingroup members and negative behaviors of outgroup members, but prefer situational explanations of negative behaviors of ingroup members and positive behaviors of outgroup members. As further evidence of the subtle role played by language, Maass (1999) found that people select more (versus less) abstract linguistic forms to communicate about positive (versus negative) ingroup behaviors and negative (versus positive) outgroup behaviors.

Another example of the combined impact of the need to see one's group in a positive light and the need to know comes from the recent work on the ingroup projection model (IPM; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). According to the IPM, group members tend to perceive their own group as more prototypical of the

inclusive category than the outgroup, at least if both the ingroup and the superordinate category are psychologically relevant for the self (i.e., high identification) and positively evaluated. Hence, the IPM claims that people who belong to a group tend to generalize typical ingroup characteristics to the superordinate category, i.e., they project ingroup features (the prototype) onto the inclusive category. Not surprisingly, the more group members perceive their ingroup as relatively prototypical of the superordinate category, the more negative are their attitudes towards an outgroup.

The motivation not to be prejudiced

As much as integrity concerns may fuel bias, they may also be mobilized to minimize the impact of prejudice. There are several versions of this idea in contemporary research. For example, several researchers noted that the global decline of explicit, blatant, or so-called 'Jim Crow' racism can be attributed to the fact that new norms have been established and that people are keen to think of themselves as being in line with the current zeitgeist. As a result, social perceivers may not agree with stereotypic views as readily and definitely not discriminate against members of stigmatized groups as easily as when dominant norms promoted bigotry and derogatory opinions toward outgroups. Unfortunately, this does not mean that racism, sexism, ageism, and other 'isms' have disappeared (see Chapters in this volume by Dovidio et al.; Glick et al.). For some, the old ways have been truly abandoned in favor of genuine open-mindedness. For others, however, tolerance is less authentic because of lingering feelings of discomfort and dislike. In such cases, bias takes on more subtle forms and people embrace various routes to rationalization of prejudice.

The theory of modern racism (McConahay, 1986) and the related approach of symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2003) hold that people resolve the conflict between their egalitarian goals and their negative feelings about minorities by claiming that discrimination no longer exists (Swim et al., 1995).

While endorsing equality (of opportunity) as an abstract principle, modern racists see their hostility to anti-discrimination policies as being based on rational grounds such as issues of fairness and justice. Modern racists think that they are treated unfairly and feel deprived. Closely linked to modern racism, the construct of subtle prejudice was developed to study prejudice against ethnic groups in Europe (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Compared to modern racism, one belief that is also associated with subtle prejudice is the exaggeration of cultural differences. Although modern or subtle racism scales correlate with old-fashioned and blatant racism scales, respectively, these scales tend to uncover useful variability among individuals and this variability can then be linked to discrimination.

According to the work on aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), the dissociation between supporting an egalitarian value system while at the same time experiencing negative feelings towards minorities as a result of socialization encourages people to deny the existence of any unflattering emotional reactions and pretend that members of minority groups only evoke positive feelings. The desire to appear unprejudiced, combined with the experience of discomfort and fear, leads aversive racists to avoidance and disengagement. When contact cannot be prevented, they opt for ambiguous behaviors or overcompensation. Negative feelings towards minorities can also leak out in subtle and rationalizable ways. The resulting behavior is not so much 'anti-minority' but subtly biased in favor of the dominant group. Ambiguity sometimes serves the purpose of avoidance. In a classic study, Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and Mentzer (1979) had nondisabled participants chose whether they wanted to watch a movie alongside a disabled individual or next to a nondisabled individual (both were confederates). When participants thought that the exact same (versus a different) movie was being played, they chose to watch the movie slightly more often (versus almost never) in the company of the disabled individual.

In the absence of good reasons to discriminate, people exercise scrupulous censorship over their discriminatory responses and try their best to suppress their derogatory beliefs (Monteith, Sherman & Devine, 1998). Suppression may be practiced to such an extent among some low prejudiced people (Monteith, Spicer & Tooman, 1998) or people with chronic egalitarian goals (Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel & Schall, 1999) that it becomes efficient and even automatized. Still, for other people, attempts at suppression are not always successful, meaning that suppression may have paradoxical rebound effects and even increase prejudice (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne & Jetten, 1994).

Several individual difference measures gauge the motivation to control and suppress prejudice. Plant and Devine (1998, 2001) suggest that the desire to respond without prejudice stems from two sources: because prejudice conflicts with a personal belief system or as a result of social pressure. For Crandall and Eshelman (2003), the role of normative responses should not be downplayed. Provided the environment is arranged so as to minimize or even proscribe stigmatizing reactions, people develop an internal motivation to control prejudice. The more an individual has come to internalize the egalitarian norm, the lower the expressed prejudice will be, even on implicit measures (Amodio, Harmon-Jones & Devine, 2003). The interest of Plant and Devine's (2001) distinction is that violations against internal motivation should produce feelings of guilt. In contrast, failure in the case of external motivation should result in reactions of anger as well as threat regarding other people's reactions. Additionally, it has been shown that people high in internal motivation but low in external motivation respond in more positive ways, in some respects, than those high on both.

Dunton and Fazio (1997) combine internal and external motivation to control prejudice into a general concern with acting prejudiced that finds its roots in a pro-egalitarian upbringing and positive experiences with stigmatized people. Dunton and Fazio (1997) also point to

people's restraint to avoid disputes that stem from a prejudiced background and negative experiences with stigmatized members, which involves staying away from trouble and arguments with targets of the prejudice. Using a basic psychological distinction in regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997) and in light of their specific antecedents, the concern with acting prejudiced could be reformulated in terms of a promotion focus whereas the restraint to avoid dispute can best be reframed in terms of a prevention focus.

Even when prejudiced people would seem to be in control and act in a nonprejudiced manner, a sizeable share of their responses to the situation is less controllable and allows prejudice to 'leak out.' Dovidio and colleagues (Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002) found evidence for such dissociation, and thus a mix of cues disconfirming and confirming prejudice, when they asked their White participants to meet with Black confederates. Whereas participants' explicit prejudice was correlated with the friendliness of what they said (a controlled behavior), their implicit prejudice was linked to the friendliness of their nonverbal actions (an automatic behavior). In general, situations in which behavioral control is more difficult, such as when norms remain unclear or when the measures are unobtrusive may facilitate the materialization of prejudice. Recent research also confirms that the suppression of prejudice requires cognitive resources and factors that undermine people's mental energy allow prejudice to be expressed in behavior (Richeson & Shelton, 2007).

PROMISING AVENUES

Our review suggests that the role of motivation in prejudice is best understood as reflecting the same core motives (to know, to belong, and to have positive value) that underlie other human behavior. The need to belong and the need to have value are perhaps the two most widely recognized concerns that are likely to foster distrust and derogation. In contrast, the motive to know and to control

has long been overlooked as a concern in its own right. Because people have a basic need to feel that they master their environment and know what they are confronted with, they are not tempted to question their a priori beliefs. This means that substantial energy may be invested in trying to bring the information coming from the environment in line with stereotypic beliefs. That this concern should drive unwanted affective reactions and discriminatory behaviors should thus come as no surprise. As we hope to have shown, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination thus occur because biases often fulfill one or more of these three concerns.

But while such integrity concerns certainly bias perception, people still have to deal with situational constraints and the actual characteristics of the stimulus (i.e., reality also constrains perceptions). We are inclined to think, however, that reality constraints enjoy limited power in modifying people's conceptions. Clearly, stereotypic expectations can only be questioned to the extent that members of the stereotyped group provide a sufficient amount of evidence of disconfirming behaviors. However, the ability for social perceivers to confirm their beliefs, both through biased perception and through shaping their environment so that it matches or at least fails to question their expectations, cannot be underestimated. For instance, in a series of studies examining why people often do not want to have contact with outgroup members, Shelton and Richeson (2005) found that individuals explained their own inaction in terms of their fear of being rejected because of their race but attributed the out-group members' inaction to their lack of interest. Evidently, if people avoid contact in the first place, little can be done to correct misconceptions, the first of which is the very reason underlying the absence of contact. If people manage to overcome their reluctance to meet and interact with members of a stigmatized minority and if accumulated information contradicts the validity of whatever *a priori* beliefs are brought into the situation, people may eventually modify their views and abandon erroneous stereotypes. However, although factual information is important, no amount of information will suffice to counter old habits if individuals experience that their integrity concerns are being hurt.

Just as integrity concerns trigger bias, it is most important to rely on people's core motives in order to combat prejudice. Perhaps the most striking examples of the efficiency of such a strategy come from the rich line of work devoted to intergroup contact (for reviews, see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; see Chapter 33 by Tausch & Hewstone, in this volume). In light of the fact that people will be motivated to have value for their group, intergroup settings that stress the existence of a common ingroup at the same time that they emphasize the unique features of the different subgroups are the ones that are most likely to be conducive to successful intergroup contact experiences. In our opinion, this position dovetails nicely with the growing understanding that groups and categories are not to be banned by definition and that a multicultural approach is often more profitable than a color-blind approach (Park & Judd, 2005). Multicultural settings would seem to provide both the need to know and the need to have value while at the same time allowing for prejudice to recede. Obviously, research on these issues offer much promise and should be intensified. Along similar lines, the work on (extended) intergroup friendship and perspective taking that capitalizes on people's tendency to see some overlap between themselves and outgroup members demonstrates how the value attached to the self can go hand in hand to promote understanding and combat prejudice (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). More research on this front is definitely in order.

As the above reference to multiculturalism suggests, the need to belong could also be used as a lever with which new normative beliefs can be promoted. In other words, people's sensitivity for inclusion constitutes an enormously powerful factor leading to opinion change and approval of new ways of approaching other groups, in particular stigmatized groups (Yzerbyt & Carnaghi, 2007). As Lewin (1948) illustrated in his

classic research on people's food preferences: Change is best promoted by capitalizing on motivational forces, and in particular those factors that allow people to define together what reality ought to be.

CONCLUSION

At the end of this journey on the role of motivational processes in stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, it is possible to draw three lessons. The first is that cognition and motivation are definitely not to be considered in opposition when it comes to their impact on prejudice. The second is that the social and psychological forces that impinge on perceivers also work hand in hand to produce stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Together, these two messages allow one to question a typology that has long worked as an implicit framework. The third, and most important, lesson is that it would be scientifically wrong and plain foolish to equate motivation with prejudice. In the battle against intolerance, motivation is as much the enemy as it is an ally.

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