

# The Love Problem of a Student—Revisited: A Psycho-Ethical Map for Cases of Anima Projection

Niccolò Fiorentino Polipo, *Brussels, Belgium*

## Abstract

In its typical form, an “anima projection” is a psychic experience in which a heterosexual man is caught up by an intense, almost magical attraction for a woman. What sets these numinous experiences apart from a common “crush” is a pattern of specific phenomenological characteristics. Anima projections are particularly common in late adolescence and early adulthood, when they can cause a deep sense of disorientation. Little education exists for young men on how to deal with these experiences and to actualize the developmental opportunity that underlies them. In this paper, I frame anima projections as an ethical problem and outline a psycho-ethical “map” that is intended for use by disoriented young men, or by any practitioner who may be tasked with helping them navigate this challenge along the path of individuation. The map considers four solutions to the love problem: the “concretistic-literal”, the “fearful-avoidant”, the “rational-depressive”, and the “transitional-developmental” solution, and indicates the latter as the one that is conducive to optimal psychic development. Although developed with a focus on young men, the map may apply to other relations based on projection, regardless of age, sex, gender, or sexual orientation.

*Keywords:* adolescence, anima, ethics, Jung, love, projection, student

---

In this paper, I will make use of the term “ethical”, which is often used synonymously with “moral”, whereas I regard the two as referring to different realms. Thus, I shall start by defining both terms to avoid ambiguity. In my use of the term, *morality* refers to a source of answers to questions about what is permitted or prohibited. Moral problems are typically problems of duty or obligation, and moral questions can often be rephrased as: Is this line of action allowed or forbidden? Would I be breaking any rules, if I acted in this way? Morality finds the clearest expression in the Decalogue. Therein one finds a list of laws prohibiting certain classes of actions that, if committed by all, would make common living impossible. Morality typically expresses itself in negative form (e.g., “thou shall *not* steal”, “thou shall *not* kill”). It is

collective in nature and provides nothing more than an extrinsic frame for existence. I see *ethics*, on the other hand, as a source of answers to questions of meaning and orientation in life. Ethical problems are typically problems of disorientation, and ethical questions can often be rephrased as: What direction should I give to my life? What kind of person should I strive to become? Ethics has to do with the development of one's character and therefore, compared to morality, is more individual in nature. However, this does not mean that ethics, too, is not concerned with universals. An example is virtues, which are ethical ideals that a person can orient themselves towards. This act of *orienting oneself towards*, which I regard as the essence of ethics, can be compared to the orienting of a sunflower towards the sun, except that in the case of ethics, the act is a conscious one. Ethics has to do with the question of what *positively* to do with one's life (how to lead a good, happy or fulfilled life), within the extrinsic frame of conventional morality.

As is known, Jung repeatedly claimed that he was concerned with psychology, which is about what *is*, and not morality or ethics, which are about *ought* or *should* be. However, it has been extensively shown that analytical psychology, as Jung shaped it, is not only an empirical science of psychological phenomena, but also an "ethic", in the sense specified above of a source of answers regarding questions of meaning and orientation (e.g., Barreto, 2018). Most of the problems addressed in analytical psychology, and above all that of individuation, are not only psychological, but also ethical problems, which is why Colacicchi (2021) called Jung's system a "psycho-ethical model". In my review of Colacicchi's book, I have suggested that this model, nonetheless, needs to be developed *forward* (Polipo, 2021). By this, I mean that we need formulations to help us spell out the ethical implications that are implicit in Jung's psychology. The example I have in mind is Neumann's new ethic (1949). By explicitly talking about "ethics", Neumann inaugurated a new discourse in analytical psychology. But this discourse has to be developed further, especially considering that Neumann, as I discussed elsewhere (Polipo, 2020), limited himself to shadow projections, to the exclusion of other "psycho-ethical problems" commonly encountered along the path of individuation. Thus, in this paper, I wish to build on this literature to offer a psycho-ethical "map" for cases of anima projections, which are psychological experiences that, just like shadow projections, also raise questions of meaning and orientation. This map is intended for use by the disoriented individual while in the midst of the anima problem, or by any practitioner tasked with helping them navigate that stretch of the route. To outline such a map, I will first characterize the experience that anima projections consist in, especially as it occurs to young men in their student years. Then, I will highlight the ethical dimension of this experience, and outline four solutions that are available in principle to the problem it represents. Finally, I will indicate one of these solutions as conducive to optimal development from a Jungian perspective.

## The Phenomenology of Anima Projections

The concept of “anima projection” refers to a psychic experience that Jung took to be an empirical fact (1959, para. 114). Jung regarded this experience as archetypal, meaning that it is supposed to present itself across individuals, cultures and historical epochs with “a similarity and even a sameness of experience, and also of the way it is represented imaginatively” (1959, para. 118). Thus, to assess the utility of Jung’s concept, one should begin from a “phenomenology” of this experience (para. 119). In its typical form, an anima projection is a psychic event in which a heterosexual man is caught up in an intense, “almost magical” attraction for a woman (1921, para. 809). But what sets these numinous experiences apart from a common “crush” is a specific pattern of characteristics. In Table 1 I list some of these, as they can be derived from the literature (e.g., Jung, 1925, para. 339; 1927, para. 85), without purporting to provide an exhaustive list.

To substantiate this abstract description with a concrete example, let us consider Dante’s experience with Beatrice, which is often taken as a paradigmatic case of anima projection (Jung, 1921, para. 377; Sanford, 1980, p. 24). We find here all the relevant characteristics. About his first and fateful encounter with Beatrice, Dante writes: “From that time forward, Love quite governed my soul” (1265–1321/1899, p. 25) (*seizure*). Of that day, Dante remembers with special vividness Beatrice’s “crimson” dress (p. 24), and even in his dreams, she still appears in that “crimson raiment” (p. 148) (*hook*). Dante in fact sees Beatrice not only around the streets of Florence, but also in a series of visions, hypnagogic hallucinations, and dreams (*constellation*). These encounters arouse in him profound emotions, from absolute bliss to profound despair, such that all his senses are “overpowered” (p. 59) (*affect*). However, the encounters are inconstant, sparse, and unpredictable, leaving Dante wondering when he will be able to see Beatrice again (*elusiveness*). Still, Dante sees in the exchanges with her a series of meaningful connections with the symbolically-invested “number nine” (p. 120), as if these were predetermined (*destiny*). Beatrice appears to him as a “deity” (p. 25), “the youngest of the Angels” (p. 26), not “the daughter of a mortal man, but of God” (p. 26) (*otherworldliness*), and in this sense, the *fascinosum* aspect is predominant in his image of her. However, the idealization of Beatrice is counterbalanced by a return of the *tremendum* aspect in the figure of Love, who also populates his dreams, and appears as “a lord or terrible aspect” (p. 28) (*ambivalence*). Beatrice’s smallest sign of acknowledgment—her “salutation”—has the power to breed in Dante the greatest “sweetness”, or to possess him with deep “grief”, when denied (p. 47) (*dependency*). Dante feels compelled to start writing about his Muse: “There came upon me a great desire to say somewhat in rhyme” (p. 29) (*inspiration*). But he is so “given up wholly to thinking of this most gracious creature” that the “natural functions” of his body become “vexed and impeded” (p. 32) (*obsession*).

Table 1. Phenomenological characteristics of anima projections.

1. *Seizure*. Typically upon first sight (that is, before having the chance to know her personally), the man is captivated by the woman. The experience is comparable to falling under a “spell” from which one does not easily break out once formed and which can last for years to come.
2. *Affect*. Anima projections are highly emotional experiences. The interaction with the woman can arouse in the man an intensity of feeling that is unlike ordinary experiences and which can be felt to be overpowering. Affects can be both positive (e.g., bliss) and negative (e.g., despair).
3. *Ambivalence*. The woman typically appears to the man as having opposite qualities. She can be fantasized to be innocent and pure, but also cruel and mischievous, young and old, virginal and sensual. The whole experience is at once *fascinosum* (alluring) and *tremendum* (disquieting).
4. *Elusiveness*. The woman is typically perceived as being “difficult to catch”. In a physical sense, she is now present, now unavailable; she now makes an appearance, now disappears into thin air. In a broader sense, her mental life (what she thinks or feels) is mysterious and difficult to guess.
5. *Otherworldliness*. The woman is typically perceived as being “from another world”. She is fantasized to be not an ordinary woman but a goddess, an angel, a siren or another mythical creature. She can also be fantasized to be a creature who is not of today, but of an ancient past.
6. *Hook*. The man’s imagination is often caught by a physical detail pertaining to the woman—a part that assumes a special, often symbolic significance, and is, in this sense, “fetishized”. This may be a bodily characteristic of hers (e.g., Cleopatra’s nose) or rather an object that she wears.
7. *Constellation*. Following the encounter in real life, the woman typically “installs” herself in the man’s psychic life. She visits him in his sleep or waking fantasies (e.g., becomes the subject of a series of recurring dreams). He may think he has seen her in the crowd, when she is not there.
8. *Dependency*. The woman acquires a tremendous psychic influence over the man, such that a special kind of relation is established. Her smallest gesture can mean the world to him—a sign of recognition can elevate him to bliss, just as a sign of indifference can throw him into despair.
9. *Obsession*. Out of his passion for the woman, the man typically neglects other vital interests. He may neglect his duties, or even forget to attend to his physiological needs such as eating and sleeping. The man is consumed as if from a fire; the woman becomes his fundamental concern.
10. *Aliveness*. The encounter with the woman typically gives the man a new sense of vitality, as if commencing to live again. The experience is felt to be one of “awakening”, “coming to life”, “animation”—as if before that the man had been in a state of “numbness”, “sleep” or “deadness”.

(Continues)

- 
11. *Inspiration*. As a result of the encounter, the man typically experiences an increase in mental stimulation and creativity. If he has any artistic or intellectual talents, he may feel drawn to put them to work by representing or analyzing his experience. She becomes a “*femme inspiratrice*”.
12. *Destiny*. The encounter with the woman, as well as the other events that mark the unfolding of the story, are perceived as having nothing of the contingency and accidentality of ordinary relationships. The man has a sense that a “higher” or preordained meaning is attached to them.
- 

Upon meeting Beatrice, Dante feels that “the spirit of life” (p. 24) began trembling in him, and he describes the experience of meeting her (and then losing her to premature death) as leading him to a “new life” (*Vita Nova*), which has the meaning also of a spiritual awakening (*aliveness*).

### The Interpretation of Anima Projections

When most or all of the above characteristics are present in the relation between a man and a woman, a Jungian analyst may be inclined to think he has projected his anima onto her. But what is the “anima”? The concept of anima is one of the most debated in analytical psychology. Several post-Jungians have criticized it, notably from a feminist perspective (Kast, 2006), and in some cases have proposed a radical reconceptualization of it (e.g., Hillman, 1985). In this paper, my aim is not so much to “deconstruct” Jung’s concept but, as noted, to *build* on it from an ethical point of view. Hereafter, I will therefore limit myself to briefly evoking the meanings that co-exist in Jung’s “classic” formulation, which span from the personal to the transpersonal level.

At the personal level, we can differentiate between two main meanings of anima. The first is *anima as contra-sexual compensation*. In most societies, there are some norms by which men are expected to think, feel, and behave in a certain way, and likewise women. According to Jung, by striving to adhere to such norms and conform to an “ideal of manhood”, a man’s conscious attitude incurs a psychic imbalance (1927, para. 79). Jung gives the example of a man attaining the “masculine ideal” of “self-control”, but at the cost of a “repression of feeling”, as a stereotypically feminine trait: in doing so, the man neglects some psychic aspects that “are really part of him”, but which, being contrary to such gendered norms, become unconscious (para. 79). By virtue of the compensation principle, this imbalance would be compensated for through anima projections. Such psychic events would then be the projection by men of their own unconscious “feminine” aspects, with which they would not be in a position to have a relation *in themselves*. The second personal meaning is *anima as compensation for the outer attitude*. The anima, in fact, can also be seen as an image of all that is other or foreign, and thus a

personification of the unconscious *tout court*: a “soul image” (*Seelenbild*) (Jung, 1921, para. 808). From this perspective, then, what would be at stake in anima projections is not so much, or only, a man’s attitude towards the “feminine” in him, but towards his own unconscious processes: “all those vague, dim stirrings, feelings, thoughts, and sensations which flow in us” and which “constitute, in their totality, our perception of the life of the unconscious” (para. 801). A man’s way of relating to the carrier of the projection would thus mirror his “inner attitude”, as Jung also calls it, i.e., the attitude that he holds towards his inner life, and which stands in a compensatory relation to his “outer attitude” (or *Persona*), as the attitude that he holds towards external reality.

The personal meanings of the anima concept can help to explain Dante’s intense attraction for Beatrice, which would be interpreted as a form of longing to reunite with his neglected parts. But they can explain also the properly spiritual character of this attraction, for at stake here would be not just a man’s earthly impulses but, in a real sense, the salvation of his “soul” (see Jung, 1921, para. 377). While Jung suggests that it is particularly “the ‘he-men’” (1927, para. 79) and those who are identified with their *Persona* who are at risk of anima projections, we may also turn the picture around, and say that anima projections will be particularly common among men, like Dante, who, by virtue of a heightened “sensitiveness” (Rossetti, 1899, p. 15), may experience the *sacrifice* of the relation to their “feminine” aspects and their inner life as psychologically difficult to tolerate. At this personal level, an anima projection is thus an opportunity for psychic development. In fact, projection for Jung is not, as for Freud, a defence mechanism and thus a way in which the psyche conceals itself, but on the contrary, a way in which it *reveals* itself (Ribola et al., 2013, p. 32). Through projection, the unconscious takes shape in a way that allows consciousness to *have a relationship with it*. And it is through the detour of this external relationship that an individual may—not without some painful self-reflection—ultimately become conscious of his anima and take responsibility for it, instead of displacing it on another person. For Jung, this stage coincides with the withdrawal of the projection, i.e., the dissolution of the *personified version* of the anima. The man does not need a relation to a woman in order to have a relation to his soul, but can use the anima as a “function” that is operative in himself (Jung, 1928a, para. 349; see also para. 339).

At the transpersonal level, we can differentiate between two further meanings of anima. The first is *anima as mediatrix*. The anima is seen by Jung as an archetypal structure whose function is to mediate between consciousness and the unconscious. In this sense, the anima is a feminine figure found in manifestations of the collective unconscious, such as myths or fairytales, who acts as a “psychopomp” and guides man towards the discovery of the unknown. The second transpersonal meaning is *anima as the “archetype of life”* (Jung, 1959, para. 66, emphasis in original). Besides guiding man in the

discovery of the unknown in him (i.e., his unconscious), the anima is the one initiating him also to the unknown *in the world*—i.e., to life’s own mysteries. From this perspective, the anima’s seductive appeal is only a means to a greater end: to drag man forward and lure him “into life”, and not only life in its “reasonable and useful aspects, but into its frightful paradoxes and ambivalences” (Jung, 1951, para. 24).

At this transpersonal level, it is not a question of integrating the anima into consciousness, for while the personal aspects of one’s psyche can be made conscious, the archetypes, as structures of the collective unconscious, cannot (para. 40). At this level, the question is rather to pay heed to the “call to life” that underlies anima projections: embarking on a discovery of the inner and outer world and accessing the meaning that the anima can procure, while resisting that powerful allure which risks leading the individual astray. As Jung notes, while on the one hand the anima is a temptress, on the other “something strangely meaningful clings to her, a secret knowledge or hidden wisdom,” and only when one “grips with her seriously” one discovers that “behind all the cruel sporting with human fate there lies something like a hidden purpose which seems to reflect a superior knowledge of life’s laws” (1959, para. 64). That is why Jung considered the encounter with the anima, as the “*archetype of life*”, a prelude to the encounter with the Self, as the “*archetype of meaning*” (para. 66, emphasis in original). Let us not forget that it is Beatrice who will accompany Dante on the last part of his journey in the *Commedia*, to see God.

## The Love Problem of a Student—Revisited

In 1922, Jung read a paper to the students of the University of Zurich entitled “The Love Problem of a Student”. Despite what the title might suggest, Jung did not really deal with the problem of romantic love on this occasion; rather, he skirted around it, dealing with more practical issues, such as whether one should marry young. No mention of the anima is to be found here. This may be because in the early 1920s his theorization on the topic was still in the making. Or it may be because of the opinion, which Jung upheld also much later, according to which men in the first half of life would be able to “bear even the total loss of the anima without injury” for “[t]he important thing at this stage is for a man to be a man” (1959, para. 146). Be it as it may, in contrast to such hasty assessment, which sounds poorly thought-through to our modern ears, an important reason for revisiting the student’s “love problem” is that anima projections are particularly common precisely in the period that goes from (late) adolescence to early adulthood.

Most of the tribulations described by Dante took place following his second encounter with Beatrice at age 18, and the *Vita Nova* itself, as Rossetti (1899) put it, is “a book which only youth could have produced, and which must



chiefly remain sacred to the young” (p. 15). But besides Dante, there is no shortage of biographical and literary examples testifying to the essential *link between youth and love*. Petrarch was 23 when he met Laura, and so was Boccaccio when he met Fiammetta. Fiorentino Ariza was 18 when he met his “crowned goddess” (Márquez, 1985), and while we ignore the exact age of “young” Werther, Goethe’s own experiences with Charlotte Buff and “Frau von Stein” (Jung, 1959, para. 141) took place in his early twenties. Like the figures on whom the literary characters of Werther (or Jacopo Ortis) were modelled, more than a young man has taken his life to appease the sorrows of unrequited love that are so typical of this age—a circumstance that compelled Ovid to address his *Remedia Amoris* (ca. 2 AD/2001) to broken-hearted young men contemplating suicide, instructing them on how to “snap out of it”.

Anima projections are likely to be common during this phase of life for developmental reasons, as Jung ascribes to these events the function of helping young men separate from their mother (1951, para. 24). However, another reason for the incidence of anima projections in this phase of life, at least in Western modern individuals, may have to do with *student life* itself. Jung, in fact, identifies the anima with Eros, as the principle of relatedness, imagination and feeling, and opposes it to Logos, as the principle of discrimination, objectivity and intellect (1951, para. 29). But if this is so, then school itself, with its one-sided insistence on the development of Logos, may be among the causes of that psychic imbalance which calls for a compensation through anima projections. Through a similar dynamic as the one involved in the temptation of Saint Anthony, the “erotic” spark that young men dutifully blow off their books may return to them in the beam of light that hits a girl’s hair—and behold, a mythical creature now walks within the school walls. Contrary to the classic idea that “love is the passion of an idle [σχολαζούσης] soul” (Gibson, 2008, p. 79), it may be excessive studiousness that stirs the potion of Eros.

Illustrations of the *link between student life and love* also abound. Transformative high-school romances are a topos in coming-of-age novels (Vittorini, 1948). We can think, for instance, of Leo’s projection on Beatrice in D’Avenia’s novel (2010), which happens precisely against the oppressive background of the scholastic environment and almost as an escape from it. As Shakespeare (1507/2000) has Romeo say, “Love goes toward love as schoolboys from their books” (Act 2, Scene 2). But for a particularly fitting illustration of the erotic effects of excessive Logos, we can take Tomasi di Lampedusa’s story, *The Professor and the Siren* (1961/2002). A 24-year-old young man, fresh out of university and on his way to a promising career, is preparing the exam for an academic position in Greek literature. A friend leaves him the keys to his cottage in Sicily, where he can study in peace a few metres from the sea. The man, who has never been with a woman before (also due to “religious scruples”, p. 115, my translation), is rehearsing verses



in ancient Greek on a boat, when he has an encounter with a (real) siren, named Lighea—an encounter that he describes as both carnal and “spiritual” (p. 120). In this case, not only the isolation formed the ideal condition for an anima projection via an introversion of libido, but also the man’s struggle to prepare the exam (“I was studying like a dog,” p. 115). Not only the sun and the malnutrition, but also the “study of remote subjects” weaved around the man “an enchantment” that “predisposed him to the prodigy” (p. 117). Here, then, the link between student life and anima projections: as the young academic struggles to memorize all the forms of the optative, he sees his own Greek siren; as Leo is forced to paraphrase Dante for school, he sees his own Beatrice; as Leopardi is bent over his “well-worn pages”, his soul goes out to Silvia (1831/1917, p. 79). Nor does the link between anima and academic life seem to end with youth, for one of Jung’s classic examples of anima projection is the “highly esteemed *professor* in his seventies” who “runs off with a young red-headed actress” (1959, para. 62, emphasis added).

### Anima Projections as an Ethical Problem

Until now, I have focused on the positive aspects of anima projections: their role as developmental opportunities serving the purpose of individuation. But a projection is not only a happy suspension of the boundary between psyche and world. This experience can also feel like a *prison*, when the subject wants to break free from it, but discovers he cannot. A projection then reveals itself as a stubborn attachment that works, on the contrary, as the greatest *obstacle* to psychic development. As Jung notes, so long as libido uses projections as “convenient bridges to the world”, they serve a developmental purpose; but “as soon as the libido wants to strike out on another path”, projections can “work as the greatest hindrances” for they “prevent any real detachment from the former object” (1916/1948, para. 507). In fact, for Jung (1921), strictly speaking, a projection is not the psychic event *per se*, whereby a “subjective content” gets expelled “into an object” (para. 783). Rather, a projection “is properly so called” only when “the need to dissolve the identity with the object has already arisen”: only in such cases, when the withdrawal of the projection “has become desirable”, can we speak of projection (para. 783).

But at the same time, the fact that the subject has an *intellectual understanding* that a projection is at work and wants to get rid of it, is not sufficient to dispel it. Rather, what is needed for the libido to “flow back to the individual” (von Franz, 1980, p. 48) is a general ethical effort to repeatedly *orient oneself in a certain direction* and working towards it. Jung alludes to it when he writes that, for the purposes of working through a projection, “moral” as well as “intellectual exertions” are needed (1951, para. 39; see also para. 35). Similarly, von Franz points to it when she writes, even more explicitly, that anima projections are “an eminently *moral* and

practical problem” (1980, p. ix, emphasis in original), and that likewise their solution is a “difficult moral task” (von Franz, 1980, p. 48), which demands “wisdom” (p. 142) as opposed to mere intelligence. As can be seen from these passages, Jung and von Franz use “moral” where I would rather use “ethical”. But regardless of terminology, what is important is that they both recognize that the nature of the problem, and consequently its possible solution, touches upon a dimension that is not exclusively psychological. As I see it, anima projections are “ethical” (as well as psychological) problems because they constitute paradigmatic situations of disorientation along the path of development which confront the subject with the question: “What *ought* I to do?” This question is ethical because the subject is not asking what is permitted or prohibited. Rather, they are asking what they should positively do to navigate this disorienting experience.

Since, as noted, ethics concerns the question of the orientation of human *consciousness*, then it does not matter in this regard that the anima, as a psychic phenomenon, knows nothing about ethics. For ethical is rather the problem that the anima poses to consciousness. As Tomasi di Lampedusa puts it (1961/2002), Lighea is “[o]blivious to all cultures, unaware of any wisdom, disdainful of any moral constraint,” because, as a natural phenomenon, she is “a current of life without accidents” (i.e., a compensatory stream of libido); and yet, at the same time, Lighea is said to be part of “the wellspring of all culture, all wisdom, *all ethics*” (p. 122, emphasis added). The anima is the wellspring of all ethics because on the solution that the subject will give to the problem that she represents much of his future development will depend. To use an example, the answer that Freud gave to his projection on Gisela Fluss at the age of 16, which Silver (1991) interpreted as Freud’s “repudiation” of his own “femininity” (p. 455), is believed to have had far-reaching ramifications into the man’s adult life and even his scientific production. In this sense, love is a real “force of destiny” (Jung, 1922/1928, para. 198), for much of our outlook on life depends on the answer we give to its question. Jung does not single out the ethical aspect of love as I do here, but he lists it nonetheless among what he sees as the many faces of the love problem: “Love is always a problem ... [it] may be an ethical, a social, a psychological, a philosophical, [etc] ... problem, to name only a few aspects of this many-sided phenomenon” (para. 198).

Having qualified anima projections as an ethical problem, it becomes clear that it is not for the young man who is contentedly in love that it is important to offer some ethical guidance, but for the one who suffers, and for whom love itself has become a *problem*. Here Ovid meets Jung again, for the poet addressed his book to the same audience: “Let him rejoice in happiness, any eager man who loves and delights in love.... But any man who suffers badly ... shouldn’t die, if he understands the help that’s in my art” (ca. 2 AD/2001, p. 235). Similarly, Jung recommended his technique for working through the anima problem as useful only to those driven to it “by necessity” (1928,

para. 324). Let us consider, then, what kind of guidance could be offered to the young man in the grip of the anima problem, since this is the one who, more than his happy counterpart, is likely to turn to therapy for help. If these first experiences can be so disorienting, in fact, it is also because “there is no moral [i.e., ethical] education in this respect” (Jung, 1951, para. 35). But then, how to provide any education at all?

### A Psycho-Ethical Map for Cases of Anima Projection

Jung was against any easy prescriptivism. In his paper to the university students, he was careful to stress that love is “an intensely individual problem” and therefore “every general criterion and rule loses its validity” (1922/1928, para. 198). He saw no usefulness in any “moralizing talk”—“I am not here to tell you what ought to be done” (para. 207). Yet, at the same time, he admitted that, for any analysis to be made, some generalizations are necessary. Thus, one can still attempt “a discussion of the ‘average’ problem,” momentarily disregarding the fact that “the ‘normal’ person does not exist” (para. 206). Reminding ourselves that *each situation is unique*, let us attempt then an analysis of the ethical problem raised by anima projections.

The problem can be stated as follows: *What ought my “attitude” towards anima be?* This question is a declination of the more general one that lies at the centre of Jungian psychology: “What kind of mental and moral [i.e., ethical] attitude is it necessary to have towards the disturbing influences of the unconscious?” (Jung, 1916/1957, para. 144). In a previous paper, I reformulated this question in terms of *virtues* (Polipo, 2020). The notion of “virtue”, in fact, refers to a disposition of consciousness that, if maintained over time, is supposed to lead to optimal development. And as such, this notion translates that of “attitude” in a language that makes *explicit* the ethical dimension of the problem. In this previous work, in particular, I identified two virtues that, from a Jungian perspective, appear to be needed on the part of consciousness in dealing with the unconscious. *Vulnerability* refers to the virtue that is needed for consciousness to open itself up to the influence of the unconscious—not being defensive against it, but letting itself be influenced, changed, or transformed by it. *Incorruptibility* refers to the opposite virtue, namely, being able to resist the influence of the unconscious and differentiate oneself from it—using its symbolic meaning for the purpose of one’s conscious development, as opposed to taking it literally and getting lost in it. As I have illustrated with the example of Odysseus, these two mutually paradoxical virtues seem both necessary to the work of individuation. Odysseus lies no less than seven years with Calypso (*vulnerability*); yet, he is also able to renounce her offer of immortality and separate from her to continue his journey home (*incorruptibility*). Similarly, in his relation to the sirens, Odysseus chooses to keep his ears free from the wax

(*vulnerability*); yet, at the same time, he remains firmly attached to the mast, and is therefore able to survive the experience (*incorruptibility*). The need for such a paradoxical attitude is well summarized by von Franz’s dictum: in the case of anima projections, “Whoever cannot surrender to this experience has not lived [*vulnerability*]; whoever founders in it has understood nothing [*incorruptibility*]” (1980, p. 142).

On the basis of these two virtues, a psycho-ethical “map” can be created with four solutions to the love problem: one in which both virtues are absent; two in which only one virtue is present; and one in which both virtues are present. This approach of *mapping* a problem is similar to the one used by Jung in analyzing the ways in which consciousness can “react” to the unconscious: from being overpowered by it and credulously accepting it, to rejecting it, via the “ideal reaction”, i.e., “critical understanding” (Jung, 1928a, para. 254). Similarly, we can analyze the solutions that are available *in principle* to the anima problem, in order to identify the optimal one. Importantly, the reader should not understand these solutions as “decisions” that would be available for an individual to take at any given time, but as a map of the ethical problem at hand. For *psychological* reasons, an individual may not be able to switch to a different track than the one he is currently on. And yet, the map may still give him an *ethical* ideal to work towards. This distinction between the psychological and ethical levels can be compared to when a person is momentarily unable to forgive someone (say, because the offence is too recent), but their orienting themselves towards forgiveness as an ethical value may help them to “get there” in time. Again, ethics is not about where or how one is, but what one is orienting oneself *towards*.

In the map, the four solutions are placed within two “paths” (Figure 1) which, borrowing the terminology from Sanford (1980, p. 26), I call the “unconscious” and the “conscious” paths. Following the event of projection, in fact, there are two macro possibilities. One is that the subject is “naïvely




Figure 1. Four psycho-ethical solutions in cases of anima projection.

convinced” that the numinous qualities that he is confronted with “belong to the object” (Jung, 1916/1948, para. 507) (*unconscious path*). The other is that he realizes (or begins to realize, in or outside of therapy) that his experience has something important to do with *himself*, and not solely with the object (*conscious path*). Within each path, two solutions ensue.

## The Concretistic-Literal Solution

The “concretistic-literal” solution is the case where the subject exercises his vulnerability, but not his incorruptibility. Having taken the unconscious path, he is unable to differentiate between his anima and the recipient of the projection. Thus, his solution to the love problem is to try to *have* the object (to unite with her literally, concretistically), as a way to come into possession of those numinous qualities which he values. The subject seeks to recover his soul by seizing the object that has seized him. This may be regarded as the classic solution to the anima problem, and the one that a practitioner will be confronted with most often in the case of young patients, especially in the early stages of therapy. In this case, patients would report mostly difficulties in *getting* the object, or else a depression for having lost it (in which case, they would be expected to report an experience akin to a “loss of soul”). But in either case, what would be missing is a reflection on how much “self” had been placed *in the object*.

Although this solution may be regarded as particularly common during youth, it is worth reminding that it can be undertaken at any stage of life. Elsewhere, I have used the novel *Damage* (Hart, 1991) to illustrate the consequences that such an excess of “corruptibility” can have also for a middle-aged and married man (Polipo, 2020). Furthermore, what I call the concretistic-literal solution tends to be seen as the one preluding to the worst consequences. Sanford (1980), for instance, in writing about a patient who “chose an unconscious path” and proceeded “to live out her longings concretely,” comments that “this almost always results in a disaster or, at least, in some kind of mischief” (p. 26). However, I believe that this solution must be credited at least with one significant advantage: namely, that by pushing, as it were, the subject against the object, it gives at least the former the chance to realize the discrepancy between the actual person and his image of her, and thus—through the experience of disappointment—to begin that process of differentiation which may set him onto a conscious path.

## The Fearful-Avoidant Solution

This advantage is not present in the “fearful-avoidant” solution. This is the case in which the subject is still convinced that the numinous qualities belong to the object, but does not dare to enter a relation with it. This may be, in a first

scenario, out of *fear*, for, as noted, an anima figure is not only alluring, but also fear-inspiring (Jung, 1921, para. 808). In particular, what would be at stake here is not the common shyness that many can experience in the presence of their “crush”, but a real fear of the revolution that the anima represents: a “fear of the incalculable power of the unconscious” (1928a, para. 316). The subject may then continue to think the object precious, but he may renounce to approach it, perhaps contenting himself with contemplating her “from afar”. In another scenario, the subject may instead *avoid* the object not so much out of fear, but because the experience of loving in itself can be painful, frustrating and humiliating for one’s pride. In this case, a young man resorting to blocking his anima figure on social media, for example, may be seen as taking a similar solution as Odysseus’ companions who plugged their ears with wax.

This solution, too, is to be regarded as common in student years. But compared to the concretistic-literal one, where the subject exercised at least their vulnerability, this is the solution in which neither virtue is exercised. The consequences of this should not be underestimated. For if anima is indeed the “archetype of life”, then by blocking out the anima the young man risks blocking out *life itself*. In this sense, as Jung notes, “love reveals its highest mysteries and its wonders only to those who are capable of unqualified devotion and loyalty of feeling,” and keeping oneself at a safe distance has its price, for “to risk nothing ... is the most effective way of forestalling any real experience” (1922/1928, paras. 232–233). To use a metaphor, a projection can be compared to a letter addressed by the unconscious to consciousness. If one refuses to open it, one will forever ignore its content. What von Franz (1994) writes about dreams is also true of projections: they are like “letters which the Self writes to us” (p. 27). Will we answer our mail?

## The Rational-Depressive Solution

Moving onto the conscious path, the first possibility is the “rational-depressive” solution. This is the case in which the subject exercises his incorruptibility, but not his vulnerability. Similarly to the fearful-avoidant solution, the subject chooses not to answer his “mail”. But for a different reason: namely, a rationalistic argument whereby he concludes that, since a projection is at work, it is not worth it for him to enter that experience—for it would be already starting on shaky ground, it would lead to nothing anyway, or for similar reasons.

This solution is common among subjects who have already had experiences of projection and have come out of them embittered, wishing not to repeat the “mistakes of the past”. The subject would like to get rid of anima through rationalization. And such a “solution would be perfect if a man were really able to shake off the unconscious” (Jung, 1928a, para. 258). But what

happens more often is that the subject may “know”, but continues to love. We then witness, as Jung notes, “the characteristic phenomenon of a person trying to devalue the former object” as a way to “detach his libido from it” (1916/1948, para. 507), that is, devaluing his experience as *mere* projection, and adopting a “‘nothing but fantasy’ attitude” (1928, para. 319). This solution corresponds to what von Franz (1980) calls “apotropaic reflection”, whereby “the reality that had hitherto been believed is explained as nonexistent” (p. 39). In such cases, a therapist may guide the patient to acknowledge “the ‘symbolic value’ of the object” (Jung, 1916/1948, para. 507). This would imply “reconsidering this content that I have recognized as illusory and subjective as a reality in its own right. Psychic reality, yes, but no less real” (Ribola et al., 2013, p. 53, my translation). Von Franz (1980, p. 52) suggests that this may begin by asking oneself a simple question: *If my experience, taken literally, is not credible, then where did the projection come from? Where did the error I believed in come from?*

## The Transitional-Developmental Solution

The “transitional-developmental” solution is the case in which both vulnerability and incorruptibility are exercised and as such, from a Jungian perspective, may be regarded as the solution that is conducive to optimal psychic development. In this case, the subject is aware that a projection is at work, but does not shy away from it. Rather, he adopts a way of relating to the object that can be best described as a form of “play”. As Stein (2006) notes, there is a parallel between the Winnicottian “transitional space”, as the middle reign between physical and psychic reality characteristic of child’s play, and the space in which individuation can occur. In both cases, there is a developmental opportunity in adopting “a unique kind of psychological attitude ... that embraces the paradox” and “rests on the recognition of a specifically psychological world in which there is room to play and to carry out the operations of individuation” (p. 143).

Using Jung’s language (1921, para. 66), we may say that undertaking this solution means addressing the love problem neither “*in re*” (as in the concretistic-literal or fearful-avoidant solutions), nor “*in intellectu*” (as in the rational-depressive solution), but “*in anima*”, as an area of experience with a reality of its own. To traverse this area, relying on one’s “play instinct” (para. 196) is essential to hold the tension between opposites, treating the anima as neither a thing, nor a mere product of the mind. Maintaining this two-fold attitude can create the conditions for bringing the subject *through* the experience, to a place where love may not be a problem for him anymore. But this transformation is only possible if, led to it by necessity, the subject starts playing “with the object it loves” (para. 197). Of course, this is as easy to write on paper as it is hard to do in practice. Precisely because of our



tendency to release the tension of the opposites and “simplify” the love problem by living it out concretely, running from it, or explaining it away, as different ways to elude that difficult ethical task: “*serious play*” (para. 196, emphasis in original).

## Discussion

When Jung writes about his “technique for educating” the anima” (1928, para. 323) or “coming to terms” with it (para. 336), he means his technique of active imagination. As is known, this technique consists in a form of inner dialogue with the anima in imaginative work, where one should let the figure speak as an autonomous reality, and only later applying one’s criticism to analyze what she said. Active imagination, too, is a “game” (para. 201) that requires both vulnerability and incorruptibility to be played. However, while active imagination may be suited for cases in which a man needs to *objectify* the anima (for instance, to get to the bottom of an “irrational mood” by asking one’s soul direct questions; 1928, para. 321), in the case of anima projections the objectification is already present. I wish to clarify, then, that for the purposes of working through anima projections, the “game” that I see as defining the fourth solution is one that is played not only (nor primarily) with oneself, but with the actual *carrier* of one’s anima, i.e., with the woman in flesh and bones. I consider exercising one’s vulnerability and incorruptibility in relation to the recipient of the projection as important for two reasons.

The first is that it is not true that what a man projects onto a woman in anima projections pertains only to a symbolic, as opposed to literal, reality. For every projection is always “hung on a hook” that is “offered by the other person” (1928b, para. 99). The recipient of an anima projection often *actually* possesses characteristics making her a good “anima type” (1925, para. 339). And in this sense, engaging with her is in itself a way to give “the ‘other side’ the opportunity for perceptible psychic activity” (1928, para. 323). The second reason is that the influence of anima is something that “without a close and living relationship” with someone, one hardly ever catches a trace of (von Franz, 1980, p. 180). As Jung admits, only in the context of personal relationships can the anima be integrated, for only there do anima projections “become operative” (1951, para. 42). If individuation is a dialectical process that requires *concrete people* to contend with, as in the case of Shadow projections (Gordon-Montagnon, 2005), then also the “dialectics with the anima” (Jung, 1928, para. 201) will have to feed on concrete, meaningful personal relationships.

We have reason to think that Jung’s relationship with Sabina Spielrein, for instance, taught him a great deal about the anima problem (Carotenuto, 1980), no less than any “armchair” exercise. Similarly, if Dante

had been chasing Beatrice only in his visions, and not also *literally* looking for her with his heart in his throat, would he really have made himself vulnerable to her? And how much more difficult it is to exercise one's incorruptibility in the presence of a figure who is not projected against the black screen of our eyelids, but is staring straight into our pupils! On the other hand, remaining "incorruptible" in relation to the recipient of an anima projection does not mean being sexually abstinent or chaste. It simply means knowing that she is the mediatrix to a reality that escapes her, just as much as it escapes you. Similarly, making oneself "vulnerable" in relation to her does not mean *consuming* love. It simply means taking her seriously, letting her influence you, letting her change your life.

From the reference to Jung's idea of serious play, it should also be clear that by "playing" with the recipient of the projection, I do not mean using her *like* an object (as in "playing with her heart"), for that would not be serious behaviour at all. Having an ethical relationship to the carrier of one's anima *as a person* means, to use a Kantian language, treating her always also as an end in herself, and never only as a means to one's individuation. By "playing" I rather mean mentally occupying *a space of play* or "play area" (Winnicott, 1971, p. 13). When the child uses a banana as if it were a telephone, he is maintaining a special attitude towards the object that he is animating: the banana is not just a banana to him but is not literally a telephone either. If such an attitude can be transferred, by way of analogy, to the relation between persons, then the way through the anima problem seems to require the young man to occupy a similar space between reality and fantasy, in which psychic development can become possible. Ovid, too, begs Eros not to make *real war* against young men, but to "play" with them (ca. 2 AD/2001, p. 235).

## Conclusions

In this paper, I have considered the ethical problem raised by anima projections for young heterosexual men. Due to this narrow scope, the paper has a series of limitations that may be addressed by future research. In particular, I am aware that my analysis leaves out other important issues such as the ethical problem raised for the woman onto whom the anima is projected (Kast, 2006); the question of how to manage anima projections in the context of an ongoing relation later in life (e.g., marriage; Jung, 1925, para. 338); or the question of "conflicts of duties" (1951, para. 48) where a man, by orienting themselves towards the ethical ideal of vulnerability, may fail to fulfil a moral obligation (e.g. faithfulness to a current partner). Furthermore, I am aware that by focusing on anima projections by heterosexual young men, and particularly by a certain "thinking type", I have neglected related experiences, such as anima projections by homosexual men (Beebe, 2008), anima projections by

heterosexual men with a different typology and, most importantly, animus projections. I have done so, on the one hand, because of the limits imposed by my own typology and identity background, which give me more insight into some experiences than others. But on the other hand, it is also because I believe that the analysis of each of these experiences would require a phenomenology of its own. Indeed, I have started from the idea of anima projections as *a particular subjective experience* precisely because this experience comes with a phenomenology that has many features in common, but does not completely overlap, with that of, say, animus projections. Doing justice to the latter would require detailing some phenomenological differences which, in turn, would raise complications deserving an ad-hoc analysis. To use but one example that is relevant to student life, a difference is that animus projections are more likely to fall onto a teacher (as opposed to a classmate) than anima projections, especially if the teacher is an “animus figure” such as the philosophy professor nicknamed “The Dreamer” in D’Avenia’s novel (2010), i.e., a figure whom Jung would characterize as a representative of Logos. But what would be the implications of suggesting that a young woman should make herself “vulnerable” to an older man in a relationship characterized by power asymmetry? This cursory example should give an idea of the complexities that one runs into at all levels. Having said that, and notwithstanding the differences that have led me to limit my analysis to a narrow scope, I wish to make clear that I believe that the ethical structure that underlies the map I have proposed, with the two virtues and the four solutions they generate, may be found to hold true for a variety of relations based on projection, regardless of typology, age, sex, gender and sexual orientation. I leave it to future research to map these forms of relation better than I was able to do here.

## References

- Barreto, M. H. (2018). The ethical dimension of analytical psychology. *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 63(2), 241–254.
- Carotenuto, A. (1980). *Diario di una segreta simmetria: Sabina Spielrein tra Jung e Freud*. Astrolabio.
- Colacicchi, G. (2021). *Psychology as ethics: Reading Jung with Kant, Nietzsche and Aristotle*. Routledge.
- Dante, A. (1899). *The new life (La vita nuova)*. Ellis and Elvey. (Original work ca. 1265–1321).
- D’Avenia, A. (2010). *Bianca come il latte rossa come il sangue*. Mondadori.
- Gibson, C. A. (Ed.). (2008). *Libanius’s Progymnasmata: Model exercises in Greek prose composition and rhetoric*. Society of Biblical Literature.
- Gordon-Montagnon, R. (2005). “Do be my enemy for friendship’s sake” (Blake). *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 50(1), 27–34.
- Hart, J. (1991). *Damage*. Arrow Books.
- Hillman, J. (1985). *Anima: An anatomy of a personified notion*. Spring.
- Jung, C. G. (1916/1948). General aspects of dream psychology. CW 8.
- Jung, C. G. (1916/1957). The transcendent function. CW 8.

- Jung, C. G. (1921). Psychological types. CW 6.
- Jung, C. G. (1922/1928). The love problem of a student. CW 10.
- Jung, C. G. (1925). Marriage as a psychological relationship. CW 17.
- Jung, C. G. (1927). Mind and earth. CW 10.
- Jung, C. G. (1928a). The relation between the ego and the unconscious. CW 7.
- Jung, C. G. (1928b). On psychic energy. CW 8.
- Jung, C. G. (1951). Aion: Researches into the phenomenology of the self. CW 9 (Part 2).
- Jung, C. G. (1959). The archetypes and the collective unconscious. CW 9 (Part I).
- Kast, V. (2006). Anima/animus. In R. K. Papadopoulos (Ed.), *The handbook of Jungian psychology: Theory, practice and applications* (pp. 113–129). Routledge.
- Leopardi, G. (1917). A Silvia. In A. Donati (Ed.), *Canti*. Laterza. (Originally published 1831).
- Márquez, G. G. (1985). *El amor en los tiempos del cólera*. Oveja Negra.
- Neumann, E. (1949). Depth psychology and a new ethic. Hodder & Stoughton, 1969.
- Ovid. (2001). *Remedia amoris*. In A. S. Kline (Trans.), *The love poems*. Poetry in translation. (Originally published ca. 2 AD).
- Polipo, N. F. (2020). Vulnerability and incorruptibility. In E. Brodersen & P. Amezcaga (Eds.), *Jungian perspectives on indeterminate states: Betwixt and between borders* (pp. 240–260). Routledge.
- Polipo, N. F. (2021). The emerging field of Jungian ethics. *Jung Journal: Culture & Psyche*. 15(4), 96–101.
- Ribola et al. (Eds.) (2013). *Quattro saggi sulla proiezione*. Vivarium.
- Rossetti, D. G. (1899). Prefatory note. In *The new life (La vita nuova)* of Dante Alighieri. Ellis & Elvey.
- Sanford, J. A. (1980). *The invisible partners: How the male and female in each of us affects our relationships*. Paulist Press.
- Shakespeare, W. (2000). *Romeo and Juliet*. Oxford University Press. (Originally published 1597).
- Silver, D. (1991). Freud, Gisela, Silberstein, and the repudiation of femininity. *Psychoanalytic Inquiry*, 11(4), 441–456.
- Stein, M. (2006). *The principle of individuation: Toward the development of human consciousness*. Chiron.
- Tomasi di Lampedusa, G. (2002). *I Racconti*. Feltrinelli. (Original work published 1961).
- Vittorini, E. (1948). *Il garofano rosso*. Mondadori.
- von Franz, M.-L. (1980). *Projection and re-collection in Jungian psychology: Reflections of the soul*. Open Court.
- von Franz, M.-L. (1994). *The way of the dream: Conversations on Jungian dream interpretation*. Shambhala.
- Winnicott, D. W. (1971). Transitional objects and transitional phenomena. In *Playing and reality* (pp. 1–25). Tavistock.

---

TRANSLATIONS OF ABSTRACT

Dans sa forme typique, une “projection de l’âme” est une expérience psychique dans laquelle un homme hétérosexuel est pris dans une attirance intense, presque magique, pour une femme. Ce qui distingue les expériences numineuses de simples béguins, c’est un ensemble de caractéristiques phénoménologiques spécifiques. Les projections de

l'anima sont particulièrement fréquentes à la fin de l'adolescence et au début de l'âge adulte, où elles produisent un profond sentiment de désorientation. Il n'existe que peu de formation pour les jeunes hommes en ce qui concerne comment faire face à de telles expériences et comment utiliser de manière profitable l'opportunité de développement qui les sous-tend. Dans cet article, je considère les projections de l'anima comme étant un problème éthique et j'esquisse une "carte" psycho-éthique visant à aider les jeunes hommes désorientés - ou tout praticien dont la tâche est d'aider ces jeunes hommes - à relever ce défi sur le chemin de l'individuation. Cette carte envisage quatre solutions au problème de l'amour: la solution "concrète-littérale", celle de "l'évitement angoissé", la "dépressive-rationnelle" et la "transitionnelle-développementale". La carte indique que cette dernière solution est celle qui permet un développement psychique optimal. Bien que conçue pour les jeunes hommes, cette carte peut également être utilisée pour d'autres relations fondées sur la projection, quel que soit l'âge, le sexe, le genre ou l'orientation sexuelle.

*Mots clés:* Jung, projection, anima, éthique, amour, adolescence, étudiant

In ihrer typischen Form ist eine "Animaprojektion" eine psychische Erfahrung, bei der ein heterosexueller Mann von einer intensiven, fast magischen Anziehungskraft auf eine Frau erfaßt wird. Was diese numinosen Erfahrungen von einer gewöhnlichen "Schwärmerei" unterscheidet, ist ein Muster spezifischer phänomenologischer Merkmale. Animaprojektionen treten besonders häufig in der späten Adoleszenz und im frühen Erwachsenenalter auf, wo sie ein tiefes Gefühl der Orientierungslosigkeit hervorrufen können. Für junge Männer gibt es kaum Aufklärung darüber, wie sie mit diesen Erfahrungen umgehen und die ihnen zugrunde liegenden Entwicklungschancen verwirklichen können. In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich Animaprojektionen als ethisches Problem dar und entwerfe eine psychoethische "Landkarte", die für desorientierte junge Männer oder jeden Praktiker gedacht ist, der die Aufgabe haben könnte, ihnen bei der Bewältigung dieser Herausforderung auf dem Weg der Individualisierung zu helfen. Die Karte betrachtet vier Lösungen für das Liebesproblem: die "konkretistisch-wörtliche", die "ängstlich-vermeidende", die "rational-depressive" und die "übergangsweise-entwicklungsorientierte" Lösung und gibt an, daß letztere die Lösung bildet, die förderlich ist zur optimalen psychischen Entwicklung. Obwohl die Karte mit Schwerpunkt auf junge Männer entwickelt wurde, kann sie auch auf andere auf Projektion beruhende Beziehungen angewendet werden, unabhängig von Alter, Geschlecht oder sexueller Orientierung.

*Schlüsselwörter:* Jung, Projektion, Anima, Ethik, Liebe, Adoleszenz, Student

Nella sua forma tipica, una "proiezione dell'anima" è un'esperienza psichica in cui un uomo eterosessuale viene catturato da un'attrazione intensa, quasi magica, per una donna. Ciò che distingue queste esperienze da una comune "cotta" è un pattern di caratteristiche fenomenologiche specifiche. Le proiezioni dell'anima sono particolarmente comuni nella tarda adolescenza e nella prima età adulta, quando possono causare un profondo senso di disorientamento. C'è una scarsa educazione per

i giovani su come affrontare queste esperienze e come concretizzare le opportunità di sviluppo che ne sono alla base. In questo articolo, definisco le proiezioni dell'anima come un problema etico, e delinea una "mappa" psico-etica, destinata ad essere utilizzata da giovani uomini disorientati o da qualsiasi professionista che possa avere il compito di aiutarli ad affrontare questa sfida lungo il percorso di individuazione. La mappa considera quattro soluzioni al problema dell'amore: la soluzione "concretistica-letterale", la "timorosa-evitante", la "razionale-depressiva" e la "transizionale-evolutiva", e indica quest'ultima come quella favorevole allo sviluppo psichico ottimale. Sebbene sviluppata concentrandosi sui giovani uomini, la mappa può essere applicata ad altre relazioni basate sulla proiezione, indipendentemente dall'età, dal sesso o dall'orientamento sessuale.

*Parole chiave:* Jung, proiezione, anima, etica, amore, adolescenza, studente

---

Типичное проявление проекции анимы - это психическое переживание сильного, практически магического влечения гетеросексуального мужчины к женщине. Что отличает эти нуминозные переживания от обычной влюбленности, так это ряд особых феноменологических характеристик. Особенно часто анима проецируется в позднем подростковом и раннем взрослом возрасте, когда эти проекции могут вызывать глубокое чувство дезориентации. Молодых людей не учат тому, как справляться со своими переживаниями и использовать заложенный в них потенциал развития. В ранней статье я рассматриваю проекции анимы как этическую проблему и набрасываю психотическую "карту", которую могли бы использовать дезориентированные молодые люди или специалисты-практики, задачей которых является помочь им справиться с этой проблемой на пути индивидуации. Карта предусматривает четыре варианта решения любовной проблемы - "конкретно-буквальное", "испуганно-избегающее", "рационально-депрессивное" и "переходно-развивающее"- и выделяет последнее как способствующее оптимальному психическому развитию. Хотя карта разрабатывалась преимущественно для молодых мужчин, она может применяться как ориентир для основанных на проекции отношений и в других случаях вне зависимости от возраста, пола, гендерной принадлежности или сексуальной ориентации.

*Ключевые слова:* Юнг, проекция, анима, этика, любовь, подростковый возраст, студент

---

En su forma típica, una "proyección del ánima" es una experiencia psíquica en la que un hombre heterosexual se ve atrapado por una atracción intensa, casi mágica, hacia una mujer. Lo que diferencia a estas experiencias numinosas de un "flechazo" común es un patrón de características fenomenológicas específicas. Las proyecciones del ánima son especialmente frecuentes al final de la adolescencia y al principio de la edad adulta, cuando pueden causar una profunda sensación de desorientación. Existe poca educación para los hombres jóvenes sobre cómo tratar estas experiencias y dar lugar a la oportunidad de crecimiento y desarrollo que subyace a las mismas. En este artículo,

planteo las proyecciones del ánima como un problema ético y esbozo un "mapa" psico-ético destinado a ser utilizado por jóvenes desorientados o por cualquier profesional que tenga la tarea de ayudarles a navegar este desafío en el camino de la individuación. El mapa considera cuatro soluciones al problema del amor: la "concreta-literal", la "temerosa-evitativa", la "racional-depresiva" y la "transicional-del desarrollo", e indica esta última como la que conduce a un desarrollo psíquico óptimo. Aunque se ha elaborado centrándose en los hombres jóvenes, el mapa puede aplicarse a otras relaciones basadas en la proyección, independientemente de la edad, el sexo, el género o la orientación sexual.

*Palabras clave:* Jung, proyección, ánima, ética, amor, adolescencia, estudiante

---

一个学生的爱情问题——再探: 阿尼玛投射案例的心理伦理地图

在其典型形式中, "阿尼玛投射" 是一种心理体验, 在这种体验中, 一个异性恋男人被一个女人强烈的、几乎是魔法般的吸引力所吸引。把这一圣密性经历与普通的 "爱情" 经历区别的是一种具有特殊模式的现象学特征。阿尼玛投射在青春期晚期和成年早期尤为常见, 会给人带来深深的迷失感。很少有针对年轻男性的教育, 讲述如何处理这些经历, 以及如何实现这些经历所蕴含的发展机遇。在本文中, 我将 "阿尼玛投射" 视为一个伦理问题, 并勾勒出一张心理伦理 "地图", 供迷失方向的年轻男性或任何可能负责帮助他们在个体化道路上应对这一挑战的从业者使用。该地图考虑了解决爱情问题的四种方法: "具体的-直观的"、"恐惧-回避"、"理性-抑郁" 和 "过渡-发展" 的方法, 并指出后者有利于心理的最佳发展。虽然该地图是以年轻男性为重点开发的, 但它也适用于其他基于投射的关系, 不分年龄、性别或性取向。

关键词: 荣格, 投射, 阿尼玛, 伦理, 爱, 青春期, 学生

---