The Popular Basis of the State's Monopoly on Legitimate Violence: How American Voters Use Political Values to (De)Legitimate Gun Rights

Luis Antonio Vila-Henninger

Abstract

Stemming from Max Weber (1946 [1919]), many sociologists understand legitimate violence as monopolized by the state. The literature has established that for the state to maintain legitimacy it must either demonstrate sustained efficacy or have its legitimacy based on the values of its citizens (Lipset 1963). The statistics on gun control in the United States (Giffords Law Center 2020) and sociological literature (e.g. Hill et al. 2020a, 2020b) demonstrate the sustained inefficacies of gun rights. Thus, this article investigates the legitimacy of these rights in terms of voters' political values. I use a case set (Small 2009) of 120 voters interviewed in Arizona from 2013-2015. My analysis is an example of qualitative secondary analysis (Duchesne 2017; Belot and Van Ingelgom 2017; Davidson et al. 2019). My findings confirm and extend the literature on the bases of legitimate violence in the United States (e.g. Shapira and Simon 2018; Carlson 2019). Furthermore, my findings provide evidence of voter socialization into a political culture that combines public, declarative, and nondeclarative forms of culture (e.g. Lizardo 2017). These findings also bridge the sociological literature on values (Wuthnow 2008), political sociology (Lipset 1963), the sociology of culture (Miles 2015), and moral psychology (Haidt 2012).

Introduction

Based on the work of Max Weber (1946 [1919], 1978 [1922]), many sociologists, political scientists, and economists understand legitimate violence as monopolized by, and stemming from, the state. Thus, from this perspective, violence by non-state actors that is approved or delegated by the state is legitimate (Weber 1946 [1919], 1978 [1922])—for example "stand-your-ground" laws.

Important work has been done on the legitimacy of state violence (Elias 1978; Anderson 2000; Gong 2015; Elcioglu 2017; Rios et al. 2020), as well as how the violence of non-state actors is legitimated. In particular, scholars have investigated the social psychological processes (Shapira and Simon 2018; Gordon 2020) and identity work (Carlson 2015) through which non-state violence is legitimated—as well as how state actors legitimate violence by non-state actors (Carlson 2019, 2020a, 2020b).

The literature has established that for the state to maintain legitimacy it must either demonstrate sustained efficacy or have its legitimacy based on values that are widely shared by its citizens (Lipset 1959, 1963a). The statistics on gun control in the United States show the staggering cost—both economic as well as in terms of human life—of gun rights (Giffords Law Center 2020). Thus, given the major demonstrable inefficacies of gun rights, scholars need to understand the legitimacy of these rights in terms of values that are widely shared by Americans.

However, there is a gap in the literature concerning the values upon which the legitimacy of gun rights is based. For example, classic sociological literature on political legitimacy (Lipset 1959, 1963a, 1963b) in the United States has largely overlooked voter legitimation of gun rights and of violence by non-state actors. Furthermore, the qualitative literature on American politics in sociology and political science largely focuses on guns as an identity issue (Carlson 2015)—which echoes qualitative work in sociology and political science on American politics as an investigation of citizens' identity, deliberation, or attitudes (Lane 1962; Hochschild 1981;

Conover 1991; Chong 1993; Eliasoph 1998; Soss 2000; Perrin 2005; Prasad et al. 2009, 2016; Kidder and Martin 2012; Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2016; Kidder 2016; Pacewicz 2016; Skocpol and Williamson 2016; Stoker, Barr, and Hay 2016; Duina 2017; Williamson 2017; Schrock et al. 2018; Wuthnow 2018; Dignam et al. 2019; Silva 2019; Curtis 2020; Erichsen et al. 2020; Hull and Edgell 2020; Leeds 2020; Ulbig 2020). The aforementioned work makes important contributions to our understanding of politics in America from the perspective of citizens but has overlooked legitimacy and citizens' political legitimations (e.g. Vila-Henninger 2018, 2020a).

Therefore, in this article, I investigate the political values upon which voters' legitimations and delegitimations (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2020a) of gun rights in the United States are based. I will then analyze how the uses of these values intersect with frames used to legitimate the violence of non-state actors (Shapria and Simon 2018; Carlson 2019). I do so by applying Michael Burawoy's (1998, 2009; Sallaz 2009) "Extended Case Method" to semi-structured interviews (Vila-Henninger 2019b) to perform an analysis that is analogous to abduction (Timmermans and Tavory 2012; Tavory and Timmermans 2014; Carlson 2019). My approach then echoes that of Jennifer Carlson's (e.g. 2019) abductive analysis of the legitimation of gun rights.

For this analysis, I use a case set (Small 2009) of 120 voters interviewed in Arizona from 2013-2015. My analysis is a form of qualitative secondary analysis (Duchesne 2017; Belot and Van Ingelgom 2017; Hughes and Tarrant 2020). In particular, I apply the approach of "Big Qual" (Davdison et al. 2019) in which I searched for keywords in the corpus and then coded passages in which those keywords appeared. Accordingly, the keywords I used were "gun," "shooting," and "arms."

I proceed with this article in five steps. First, I outline the relevant literature and theory. Second, I discuss analytical strategy and methods. Third, I provide definitions of the codes I used in my analysis. Fourth is my qualitative analysis. Fifth, I discuss my findings.

Theory and Literature Review

Max Weber and Legitimate Violence

For Max Weber (1946 [1919], 1978 [1922]), the use of legitimate violence is a central characteristic of the state. Weber argued that without the monopolization of the legitimacy of violence by the state, society would descend into anarchy. The state then allows non-state actors to use violence legitimately, but the legitimacy of said violence is given—or taken away—by the state (Weber 1946 [1919]; Elias 1978; Anderson 2000; Gong 2015; Elcioglu 2017; Carlson 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Rios et al. 2020)—as we can see in "stand-your-ground" laws.

The role of citizens in determining the legitimacy of violence has received increasing attention. Scholars have investigated the social psychological processes (Shapira and Simon 2018; Gordon 2020) and identity work (Carlson 2015) through which non-state violence that is sanctioned by the state is legitimated. Conversely, Gordon (2020) provides compelling evidence of legitimation processes in which the legitimacy of the violence of non-state actors stems from citizens rather than the state. However, there is a gap in the literature concerning the role of voters—who are at the intersection of state and non-state legitimacy.

Gun Rights and Legitimacy

On the one hand, voters are private actors and thus can utilize state legitimated forms of violence for such actors—for example, via gun rights. On the other, state legitimacy is based on the political norms, beliefs, and values of voters (Lipset 1959, 1963a, 1963b; Beetham 1991; Beetham and Lord 1998; Van Ingelgom 2014; Vila-Henninger 2020a, 2020b). This perspective stems from the Weberian tradition that power is legitimate when it is accepted on normative

grounds (Weber 1978 [1922]; Lipset 1963a). The argument, then, is that the state's only hopes of retaining legitimacy are either through demonstrated sustained efficacy or by basing itself on values shared by its citizens (Lipset 1959, 1963a, 1963b, 1989).

Here we see the importance of the legitimacy literature for understanding the relationship between the legitimacy of state violence and the values of citizens. Far from demonstrating sustained efficacy, gun rights have led to an increasing amount of violence—including mass shootings in the United States—that has resulted in an astounding amount of human deaths (Giffords Law Center 2020). Gun rights also allow violence that results in a staggering cost to the US economy, as well as American taxpayers (Giffords Law Center 2020).

Furthermore, these rights have little to no established public health benefits (e.g. Dowd-Arrow et al. 2019; Hill et al. 2020a, 2020b). For example, Terrence Hill and colleagues found that while gun ownership is negatively associated with fears and phobias (Dowd-Arrow et al. 2019), gun ownership is unrelated to happiness (Hill et al. 2020a) or sleep health (Hill et al. 2020b).

The alternative, from the perspective of the legitimacy literature, is that the sustained legitimacy—and potential illegitimacy—of gun rights is rooted in values that are widely held by citizens (Lipset 1959, 1963a, 1963b, 1989; for an empirical analysis see Vila-Henninger 2020a). Thus, to understand the sustained legitimacy of gun rights despite key demonstrated sustained inefficacies, we need to understand the basis of this legitimacy in the values of voters.

Studying the legitimacy of gun rights in the United States in terms of the values of American voters helps to fill a gap in the qualitative literature on guns in the United States. This literature largely sees guns rights as an identity issue (Carlson 2015)—which echoes qualitative work in sociology and political science on American politics as an investigation of citizens' identity, deliberation, or attitudes (Lane 1962; Hochschild 1981; Conover 1991; Chong 1993; Eliasoph 1998; Soss 2000; Perrin 2005; Prasad et al. 2009, 2016; Kidder and Martin 2012; Cramer 2016; Fields 2016; Hochschild 2016; Kidder 2016; Pacewicz 2016; Skocpol and Williamson 2016; Stoker, Barr, and Hay 2016; Duina 2017; Williamson 2017; Schrock et al. 2018; Wuthnow 2018; Dignam et al. 2019; Silva 2019; Curtis 2020; Erichsen et al. 2020; Hull and Edgell 2020; Leeds 2020; Ulbig 2020). The aforementioned work, which builds on quantitative scholarship (e.g. Converse 1964; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017), has overlooked the role of legitimacy.

Values

Furthermore, proceeding with this analysis helps to address a key gap in the sociological literature on values. For example, in the sociology of culture, neither advocates (e.g. Miles 2015) nor critics (Martin and Lembo 2020) of the concept of "values" integrate accounts of values from political sociology (Lipset 1963a, 1963b, 1989). Traditionally, sociologists have analyzed values using a functionalist framework (Parsons and Shils 1951). However, others have applied the framework of Max Weber to analyze values as they developed historically. Seymour Lipset in particular developed an agenda for doing so (Lipset 1963a, 1963b, 1989)—which has developed into a fruitful empirical literature (Baer et al. 1990; Baxter-Moore et al. 2018; Besley and Persson 2019). Recent work, however, has turned to moral psychology to develop a framework for understanding values (Hitlin and Vaisey 2013; Longest, Hitlin, and Vaisey 2013; Vaisey and Miles 2014; Miles 2015; Miles and Vaisey 2015 Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2020b). This article seeks to build a bridge between both of these literatures.

To do so, I turn to prominent work in moral psychology on political values from Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). This work builds on decades of investigations of the psychological differences between liberal and conservative ideology in American politics (e.g. Singer 1981;

Deutsch 1990; Jost et al. 2009; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Waytz, Iyer, Young, Haidt, and Graham 2019).

MFT was developed by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues (Haidt 2001; Haidt et al. 2009; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt 2012, 2018; Waytz, Iyer, Young, Haidt, and Graham 2019). This perspective begins with Jonathan Haidt's (2001, 2012) dual-process model—in which moral judgment is driven by automatic moral intuitions and moral reasoning occurs post hoc to make automatic moral judgments socially acceptable. In the realm of political reasoning, the argument of MFT is that individuals are more responsive to discourse that resonates with their moral intuitions—which then results in actors' use of culturally-specific "moral matrices" regarding political ideology (Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009: 115; Haidt 2012, 2018: 114). Moral matrices provide a framework for understanding "grand narratives" (Smith 2003) regarding politics that can be found in each political ideology's collective discourse. Each collective ideological discourse is then rooted in a "most sacred value" (Haidt 2012, 2018: 296). Actors then use their political ideology's "most sacred value" to justify their political opinions and behaviors (e.g. Haidt 2012, 2018: 351, 364-5).

Each ideology's most sacred value is theorized to correspond with all of the moral intuitions that followers of the ideology tend to share. A most sacred value is then an ideological narrative's foundational goal or moral principle that followers of the ideology will not compromise under any circumstance (Tetlock et al. 2000: 853; Tetlock 2003; Graham and Haidt 2012, 2018: 14; Haidt 2012, 2018: 345, 364). For example, an actor's use of the conservative most sacred value indicates that American conservative political ideology resonates with the agent, who is thus equally sensitive to all six moral foundations of American conservative political ideology. Conversely, an actor's use of the liberal most sacred value demonstrates that American liberal political ideology resonates with the agent, who is thus is most sensitive to the two moral foundations—care and fairness—of American liberal political ideology (Graham et al. 2011; Haidt 2012).

My analysis focuses on two "most sacred values" (Haidt 2012, 2018; Graham and Haidt 2012, 2018; Vila-Henninger 2018, 2020a) in voter legitimations: the most sacred value for liberal American political ideology and the most sacred value for American conservative political ideology. On the one hand, American liberal political ideology's "most sacred value [is] care for victims of oppression" (Haidt, 2012: 345) and protecting "the rights of certain vulnerable groups" (Haidt, 2012: 212). On the other, American conservative political ideology's' "most sacred value" is preserving "the institutions and traditions that sustain a moral community" (Haidt, 2012: 357).

Subsequent work has established that American political conservatives are mainly concerned with protecting an in-group (Waytz, Iyer, Young, Haidt, and Graham 2019). In a broader sense, then, the core of American conservative political ideology is the protection of an in-group (Waytz, Iyer, Young, Haidt, and Graham 2019), so American political conservativism's most sacred value is to preserve institutions and traditions that protect a moral community or another in-group (Vila-Henninger 2020a). Moreover, regarding government regulation, the theory is that "liberals are most concerned about the rights of certain vulnerable groups…[while] conservatives, in contrast, hold a more traditional idea of liberty as the right to be left alone, as they often resent liberal programs that use government to infringe on their liberties in order to protect the groups that liberals care about most" (Haidt, 2012: 212).

It is important to note that a shortcoming of MFT is that it treats variation in actors' intuitions as stemming from genetic differences (e.g. Haidt 2012, 2018). Important empirical work has raised key doubts about this assumption (Hatemi et al. 2019).

Rather, my article follows Stephen Vaisey's (Vaisey 2009; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010) use of Jonathan Haidt's (2001) dual-process model to develop an account of moral intuitions as resulting from socialization. As such, I theorize that most sacred values and corresponding

intuitions are developed historically and learned by voters through social interaction (Vila-Henninger 2020b). Actors then use most sacred values often implicitly through topic-specific applications of a given value that are available in political discourses from elites (Vila-Henninger 2019b; 2020b).

Political Values and Gun Culture

If the (il)legitimacy of gun rights is based on the values of American citizens, then how might we expect most sacred values to manifest regarding gun rights in voters' legitimations? To answer this question, we must first turn to the literature on gun culture (for a review see Pierre 2019). For example, decades ago, scholars found little differences in the attitudes about gun control between Canadians and Americans (Mauser and Margolis 1992). However, there is recent evidence that uses Seymour Lipset's analytical framework (Lipset 1989) to show how American political values shape differences between American and Canadian attitudes about the role of government (Baxter-Moore et al. 2018).

In this vein, McLean (2018) confirms Lipset's (1989) analysis of how the differences in values between Canadians and Americans shapes variation in attitudes about guns between the two nations. In particular, McLean (2018) finds that much of this variation can be traced to American gun enthusiasts' attitudes about gun culture being rooted in American values of individual liberty and aversion to government.

Other research delves further into American gun culture. For example, Mencken and Froese (2019) find that white males in economic distress feel use guns as a way to feel empowered. This echoes Stroud (2012)—who finds gun ownership to be an expression of hegemonic masculinity.

Much of the research on gun culture stems back to the work of Kahn and Braman (2003), who argue that cultural worldviews motivate attitudes on gun regulation. In particular, they posit that egalitarian or solidarity worldviews lead to support for gun control, while hierarchical or individualistic worldviews lead to opposition to gun control. Building on this, Wozniak (2017) finds that cultural beliefs predict position on gun control but that the strongest predictors are political affiliation and political beliefs. Furthermore, Depetris-Chauvin (2015) reveals that fears of gun control predict increases in gun purchases, while Kalesan et al. (2016) find a strong association between gun culture and gun ownership.

Furthermore, research on Americans' attitudes regarding gun rights shows that partisan polarization of these attitudes is only beginning (Miller 2019). Rather, factors such as Christian nationalism and American sacralization of gun rights—across partisan affiliation—tend to be better predictors of attitudes about gun rights (Whitehead et al. 2018).

However, the media tends to portray these attitudes as polarized by partisan affiliation—with the argument being that there has been intense partisan polarization in attitudes about gun rights in the United States over the past 20 years (e.g. Blanton 2018; Cohn and Sanger-Katz 2019). Work on partisan fear-mongering in the Obama era concerning gun control supports these accounts and demonstrates a strong association between such rhetoric and gun purchases (Depetris-Chauvin 2015). Thus, the scientific literature and media accounts contradict, with scholarship suggesting that partisan polarization on gun issues is just beginning.

Data and Methods

Qualitative Methods

In order to analyze voters' use of most sacred values in their (de)legitimations of gun rights, I used semi-structured interview data. These data were collected as part of a larger project that selected cases based on respondent partisan affiliation and economic position by holding constant many other demographic characteristics. Given the theoretical concerns of the larger

project for which these data were collected, the project recruited Caucasian, non-Hispanic males of European descent from the second congressional district in Tucson who voted in 2008 and/or 2012.

These data consist of recorded semi-structured interviews with participants about voting for presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012, as well as four different Arizona state ballot measures. After each semi-structured interview, respondents completed a brief demographic questionnaire that, among other uses, allowed me to determine each respondent's economic position for this article. This project's research instruments consisted of questions that indirectly asked respondents why they voted the way they did. Such instruments allowed for the collection of data on voter legitimations. These research instruments followed the lead of well-established semi-structured interview techniques (e.g. Lamont 1992, 2000; Swidler 2001, Lamont and Swidler 2014). Furthermore, all respondents' names in this article are pseudonyms.

This project recruited respondents by using a variety of techniques—including door-to-door canvassing, referrals, and snowball sampling. For the larger project, there were 120 total respondents. The first 100 were volunteers and the last 20 were remunerated. The later 20 respondents were recruited using online ads for remunerated participation and confirmed that the project had reached saturation with volunteer respondents.

Consistent with literature in political sociology (Brooks and Brady 1999; Manza and Brooks 1999; Bartels 2006; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Gelman et al. 2008; Gelman, Kenworthy, and Su 2010; Vila-Henninger 2020a), I determined respondent's partisan affiliation according to the respondent's vote for president. Respondents for the original study were recruited on the basis of having voted for either the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate in 2008 and/or 2012. I labeled respondents as a "Democrat" if they voted for Barack Obama for president in 2008 and 2012. I labeled respondents as "Republican" if they voted for John McCain in 2008 and Mitt Romney in 2012. If the respondents deviated from either of these definitions, I noted how they deviated in my description of the respondent in this article.

Furthermore, I categorized respondents as "High-Income" if their household income at the time of the interview fell in the top tercile of the city of Tucson's household income distribution for the year in which they were interviewed. Conversely, I categorized respondents as "Low-Income" if their household income at the time of the interview fell in the bottom tercile of the city of Tucson's household income distribution for the year in which they were interviewed. For a summary of respondent characteristics, see Tables 1 and 2 (below).

Table 1. Total Sample of Usable Cases

	Republican	Democrat
Low Income	14	20
High Income	19	36

Table 2. Unusable Cases

	Number
Changed Party	8
Third-Party	5
Middle Income	13
Missing Data (Incomplete Audio or Interview)	5

For this article, I selected cases within the project's achieved case set (Small 2009) to perform a secondary analysis. I selected respondents to code by searching for the words "gun,"

"arms," and "shooting" in all of my interview transcriptions. This applies methods for secondary qualitative analysis from "Big Qual" (Davidson et al. 2019). As the analysis for this article was performed years after data collection (2013-2015) and done for a purpose other than what was specified by the original research question, I argue that this constitutes a form of secondary qualitative analysis (Duchesne 2017; Belot and Van Ingelgom 2017; Hughes and Tarrant 2020).

Respondents were not directly asked about guns or gun rights but were instead asked about how they voted for president in 2008 and 2012, as well as four different economic ballot measures that were on the ballot in Arizona in 2008, 2010, and 2012 regarding public education, medical marijuana, undocumented immigration, and housing. Thus, the topics of guns and gun rights arose naturally in the semi-structured interview and were not a part of any of the interview prompts.

Analytical Approach

I coded interview transcriptions using ATLAS.ti, a Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). I analyzed my qualitative data using a codebook that I developed over several rounds of data analysis, in which I continually refined my codes by using theory-based deductive coding, then used anomalous cases to generate abductive codes (Vila-Henninger 2019b).

In particular, I applied the principle of "Reconstruction" from Michael Burawoy's Extended Case Method (Burawoy 2009; see also Burawoy 1998; Sallaz 2009). Reconstruction argues that representation—as used by positivism—is not possible with semi-structured interview data. Therefore, instead of generalizing to a population, the researcher performs qualitative analysis to build theory.

The procedure begins with deductive coding by using a "core" theory or set of theories—which then provides a framework for identifying theoretical anomalies in the data. The researcher then uses these anomalous cases to build theory and generate abductive codes. This process, as I apply it, is analogous to abduction, with the exception that abduction begins with a variety of theories rather than a core theory or set of theories (Peirce 1974 [1934]; Timmermans and Tavory 2012: 171; Tavory and Timmermans 2014; Swedberg 2017; Carlson 2019; Karell and Freedman 2019). Abduction has been used fruitfully in qualitative sociology to study the legitimation of gun rights and violence by private actors (e.g. Carlson 2019). Thus, this article seeks to build on this qualitative abductive work.

To do so, I code "rationales" (Vila-Henninger 2019b). This approach is advantageous for studying legitimations because it matches issue-specific legitimations with the broader justifying principles or ideas to which the legitimation appeals. A "rationale" is "any application of a broader principle in a way that justifies the respondents' stance on an issue or topic in terms that are relevant to said issue or topic" (Vila-Henninger 2019b: 33). Thus, I investigate legitimations that are specific to gun rights as instances of either the liberal or conservative most sacred value.

It is important to note here that the goal of my analysis is to build theory. As such, it is not generalizable to any population. This makes rationales the immediate outcome of interest and the broader political legitimacy of gun rights in America the ultimate outcome of interest.

Coding

My codes for political ideology are of rationales of the most sacred value for American liberal and conservative political ideology—respectively (Tetlock et al. 2000; Tetlock 2003; Haidt 2012, 2018; Graham and Haidt 2012, 2018; Vila-Henninger 2018, 2020a). I thus created codes for rationales that were instances of either the conservative most sacred value or the liberal most sacred value.

Recall that the liberal most sacred value is to protect the oppressed or vulnerable and the conservative most sacred value is to protect a moral community or in-group and the traditions and institutions that benefit that in-group. Based on the qualitative literature on legitimations in America of gun rights, I expected Democrats to use one liberal rationale and Republicans to used one or more of seven conservative rationales.

Liberal Most Sacred Value Coding

The intersection of most sacred values and the gun control literature brings us to the article of Kahn and Braman (2003), who argue that those with solidaristic worldviews support gun control. We can see this as intersecting with the liberal most sacred value of caring for the vulnerable or oppressed. Given the staggering amount of school shootings in the United States and the relationship of these shootings to public opinion (Wozniak 2017), I expect Democrats to express solidarity by wanting to limit gun rights to protect children from school shootings. I coded for this deductive *Prevent School Shooting* rationale when voters delegitimated gun rights to "prevent" or "stop" "school shootings." Here, respondents needed to mention protecting "children" or "kids."

Conservative Most Sacred Value Codes

The first rationale is a "frame" (Carlson 2019) or "schema" (Shapira and Simon 2018) that stresses a dichotomy: good guys with guns versus bad guys who perpetrate violence. In this frame, the "good guy" has to use violence for public safety. Conversely, the "bad guy" is seen as evil and a threat to law-abiding citizens—thus justifying lethal gun violence by the "good guy." This is called "Gun Militarism" (Carlson 2019) and by utilizing this "good guy" versus "bad guy" dichotomy, this frame actually employs a euphemized racial frame in which stereotypes of "good guys" are associated with Caucasians and stereotypes of the "bad guy" evoke criminality by minorities (Bobo and Charles 2009; Forman 2017). In my respondents' legitimations, I label this the *Racialized Moral Dichotomy* rationale. This is an example of the conservative most sacred value because it portrays the "good guy" as a moral citizen who uses gun violence to protect other law-abiding citizens from an immoral "bad guy." Here, respondents must have used words such as "good guy" or "good citizen" in contrast to a "bad guy" or "criminal"—or must have illustrated this dichotomy with an example in which citizens following the law are threatened by physical violence from some minority group.

A similar but distinct abductive code emerged that I titled *Racialized Gun Control.* In this frame, respondents drew upon the dichotomy established by "Gun Militarism"—but to delegitimate gun rights. The logic is that gun rights are illegitimate because they provide gun access to criminals. I coded for this rationale when respondents delegitimated gun rights by discussing how the current system "provided" or "gave" "bad guys," "criminals," "gangs," or "drug lords" access to guns—which they then used for lethal gun violence. An example would be a respondent saying that "drug lords" "come here and buy [guns] because they can't get them in Mexico." This example is racialized because it uses the coded language of "bad guys" to describe violence by Latinos—and Mexicans in particular. This is an example of the conservative most sacred value because it frames "criminals" as using violence to harm moral law-abiding citizens. I did not code for this rationale when respondents described criminals as using guns to kill each other.

Another rationale I expected to see was the "Gun Populism" frame from Carlson's (2019) work. In this frame, citizens are portrayed as an in-group—in contrast to the state or politicians, who are portrayed as out of touch. This then justified citizens using legal gun violence to buttress police force. This rationale, *Gun Populism*, synthesizes three different "Gun Populism" frames from Carlson's (2019) research. The key here is that citizens are characterized as justified in using gun violence either to "help the police" or "protect the public." I also coded

for this when respondents justified gun rights by portraying attempts to curtail said rights as "misguided" attempts by politicians. This is an example of the conservative most sacred value because it portrays gun violence as moral—thus making gun rights a key tradition that needs to be upheld in order to support a moral community.

Following quantitative research (Whitehead et al. 2018), I coded for *Gun Rights as Sacred* when respondents legitimated their gun rights as "sacred." Here, respondents must have described access to guns in terms of "rights," and then described these rights as "sacred" or "God-given." This is an instance of the conservative most sacred value because if provided by God, gun rights are then a sacred tradition needed to sustain a moral community. This reaffirms qualitative work on guns as a "right" (McLean 2018).

McLean's (2018) mix-methods investigation into the values used by American citizens reveals two more deductive rationales. First, I coded for *Liberty* when respondents discussed their access to guns in terms of their "liberty." In the eyes of conservatives, "liberty" from government regulation is a central tradition for maintaining a moral community (Haidt 2012, 2018). I did not apply this code when respondents discussed "bad guys" or "criminals" killing each other because of their access to guns and thus dismissed this violence as a "natural consequence" of "liberty" without appealing to a vulnerable group or moral community.

Also drawing upon McLean (2018), I coded for *Tyranny* when respondents described gun rights in terms of "protecting against" or "checking" the potential abuses of a "tyrannical" or "overreaching government." The key feature here is that guns were described as a "check" on potential "government overreach." This is an example of the conservative most sacred value because gun rights are portrayed as a tradition that helps to protect moral citizens against the potential abuses of an out-group: the government.

Subsequent abductive codes emerged for the conservative most sacred value. First is a code called *Distrust of Government Gun Control.* This rationale replicates findings from Vila-Henninger (2020a) on the use of the conservative most sacred value to delegitimate government action by portraying the government as unable to "refrain" itself or as "incrementally" taking away rights and "overreaching" in its attempts to "control citizens." In Vila-Henninger's (2020a) findings, a proposed sales tax rate increase was delegitimated on the grounds that the government did not have the necessary self-control to refrain from continually raising the tax rate. Here, a similar rationale emerged as respondents discussed the government as not being able to "control itself" or "refrain" from eliminating gun rights. In this rationale, the government and/or politicians were portrayed as immoral due to their lack of self-control—wanting more and more power over citizens while giving them fewer and fewer rights. In this rationale, then, American citizens constituted a moral in-group while the government and politicians were portrayed as an immoral out-group.

Furthermore, the abductive code of *Gun Control Protects Family* emerged as a conservative most sacred value rationale that stressed preserving the traditions that protect an in-group. I coded for this when respondents discussed wanting to increase gun control as a way to protect the respondent's "family." Here, respondents must have discussed "gun control" and delegitimated guns as a "danger" or a "threat" to the respondent's family. In this context, then, respondents were worried about protecting an in-group—their family—and wanted to do so by appealing to the tradition of gun control.

Finally, an abductive code emerged that I call *Republicans as Mentally Deficient.* I coded for this when respondents described the gun fanaticism of Conservatives or Republicans as a way to delegitimate gun rights. Here, respondents must have used words such as "crazy," "insane," "gun nuts," and/or "stupid" to define Republican or Conservative gun owners. I also applied this code when respondents described gun ownership as associated with an unstable mental state—such as hoarding guns and keeping a "loaded weapon." This is an example of the

conservative most sacred value because it stresses protecting an in-group—those without guns—from the dangerous out-group of Conservative or Republican gun owners.

See Table 3 (below) for a summary of rationales and Table 4 (below) for a summary of rationales according to income-level and partisanship intersections.

Table 3. Codes for Conservative and Liberal Most Sacred Value Rationales

Rationale Code	Most Sacred Value	Deductive vs Abductive	Present vs Absent	Legitimate vs. Delegitimate Gun Rights	Used by Republican(s), Democrat(s), Both, or Neither
Prevent School Shooting	Liberal	Deductive	Absent	Delegitimate	Neither
Gun Rights as Sacred	Conservative	Deductive	Absent	Legitimate	Neither
Tyranny	Conservative	Deductive	Absent	Legitimate	Neither
Gun Populism	Conservative	Deductive	Absent	Legitimate	Neither
Racialized Moral Dichotomy	Conservative	Deductive	Present	Legitimate	Republican
Liberty	Conservative	Deductive	Present	Legitimate	Republican
Distrust of Government Gun Control	Conservative	Abductive	Present	Legitimate	Republican
Republicans as Mentally Deficient	Conservative	Abductive	Present	Delegitimate	Democrat
Gun Control Protects Family	Conservative	Abductive	Present	Delegitimate	Democrat
Racialized Gun Control	Conservative	Abductive	Present	Delegitimate	Democrat

Table 4. Rationales by Income Level and Partisanship Intersection

Income Level and Partisanship Intersection	Number of Respondents	Rationales (Code and N)
High-Income Republicans	2	*Distrust of Government Gun Control (2)*
Low-Income Republicans	6	*Liberty (2), Distrust of Government Gun Control (3), Racialized Moral Dichotomy (1)*
High-Income Democrats	2	*Republicans as Mentally Deficient (1), Gun Control Protects Family (1)*
Low-Income Democrats	2	*Republicans as Mentally Deficient (1), Racialized Gun Control (1)*

Analysis

In what follows, I discuss the three types of rationale use that emerged: 1) Liberal Most Sacred Value, 2) Republicans Using the Conservative Most Sacred Value to Legitimate Gun

Rights, and 3) Democrats Using the Conservative Most Sacred Value to Delegitimate Gun Rights.

1. *Liberal Most Sacred Value*

Surprisingly, I found no evidence that a liberal most sacred value was used among my respondents to legitimate or delegitimate gun rights. All other studies that have employed the most sacred values framework in sociology to analyze American voters' legitimations (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2020a) have found consistent evidence of respondents' use of the liberal most sacred value to legitimate political positions that are traditionally associated with the Democratic party. This suggests that the gun debate in America could potentially be drawing very little on the liberal most sacred value—which would make this issue different from most other issues in American politics.

2. *Republicans Using the Conservative Most Sacred Value to Legitimate Gun Rights*

In this section, I discuss the different uses of the conservative most sacred value to legitimate gun rights by Republican respondents. We begin with Colin, a low-income Republican, who confirmed McLean's (2018) mix-methods investigation by providing evidence of the *Liberty* rationale. Colin argued that "[t]he constitution...the president of the United States, that's his number one job. I mean, to defend that to the max…let's say the second amendment. The right to bear arms. We have a right to bear arms, that's it…the only people that use guns to kill other people are criminals... I'm one of those guys that...if you don't like this country, get out."

This is a clear use of not only the concept of "Liberty," but as Vila-Henninger (2020a) demonstrated, the conservative application of liberty. Liberty is the most sacred value for libertarians, while for conservatives it is a moral tradition that protects an in-group or moral community (also see Iyer et al. 2012; Haidt 2012, 2018). Thus, here we see the classic trope of defending gun rights as stemming from the constitution and the "right to bear arms." However, the issue is more complex than merely having rights. The importance of the Second Amendment, for Colin, stemmed from the importance of the constitution as establishing traditions and institutions that protect and promote an in-group—Americans.

Here, position on gun rights was portrayed as the ultimate criterion for determining whether someone is an American: "if you don't like this country, get out." Thus, anyone who was critical of the United States and of gun rights was not American according to the respondent. In this light, we can see gun rights as part of a set of traditions and institutions that define what it means to be American and set the ultimate boundaries for inclusion in American society. This explains the use of this rationale by another respondent to delegitimate former President Obama and also coincides with the spike in gun sales during the Obama administration (Depetris-Chauvin 2015).

The *Distrust of Government Gun Control* rationale was used by five respondents—two high-income Republicans and three low-income Republicans. All of these respondents voted for McCain in 2008. Four out of these five respondents voted for Romney in 2012, while the fifth respondent voted for a third party in 2012.

The following passage is from an interview with Sherwin—a high-income Republican respondent:

Interviewer: Okay, so what are some of the specific things that Obama did to make the country so much more unstable?

Sherwin: Well, it's incremental, but it's big steps, and the biggest one right now is the healthcare end. So, okay, so now what they want is single-payer. I mean, this is just… this whole thing is just to funnel us all into single-

payer. So, now they're going to say ((Changes tone of voice)) "Well, we own the healthcare system. Well, you can't eat fatty foods. Well, you can't smoke. Well, you have to exercise, or we're going to tax you because it's a tax, not a fine. Well, we got too many doctors over in this city. If you get your doctorate and you're a medical doctor, you're going to have to move out to Missouri. You can't practice here. We got too many doctors here." It's social engineering, rather than letting things flow and take care of themselves, that's the biggest one, and I think it's incremental and I see it happening and everybody ((changes tone of voice)) "Nah it won't happen." I've seen so many things happen where incrementally that's what they do. They want to restrict guns. Well, you know, I just think that's the 2nd Amendment. If you don't like guns then change the amendment.… I mean, we can go on and on about the stuff that's been going on. And, I know every administration does their stuff, but I think [Obama is] a little over the top and gets away with it.

Confirming Vila-Henninger's (2020a) findings, we see that gun control is discussed alongside taxes as an instance of the government's lack of self-control. In this example, the respondent described the government as unable to control its lust for power and asserted that gun control is part of a gradual process in which the government takes away rights from citizens to gain more power. Sherwin described this process as "incremental." The respondent then identified the Second Amendment as part of the constitution and argued that if former President Obama—who was president at the time of the interview—wanted to enact gun control he needed to "change the amendment." However, for Sherwin, former President Obama could not control himself and was "a little over the top and gets away with it." This was then part of what the respondent portrayed as a power grab that was a piece of a broader agenda of "social engineering."

Here, we see that the respondent characterized the government, and former President Obama in particular, as untrustworthy. Instead of seeking to change gun rights through legal avenues and "chang[ing] the amendment," Sherwin asserted that former President Obama wanted to trick citizens through a series of "incremental" restrictions to rights. For the respondent, this was part of a larger strategy to grab power: "it's incremental, but it's big steps."

This delegitimation is powerful because it speaks to the heart of the conservative most sacred value. If the core moral principle for conservatives is to protect the institutions and traditions that sustain a moral community and protect an in-group, then this rationale delegitimates the government—and those who run the government—as a threat to the moral community who try to take away the traditions and institutions that sustain this community. Furthermore, because a key element of the conservative most sacred value is the protection of a moral community, this rationale fundamentally delegitimated former President Obama for conservatives by portraying him as immoral in his supposed lack of self-control and alleged lust for power. Thus, in this rationale, former President Obama was not only unfit to oversee a moral community, but through his supposed power grab sought to eliminate the traditions and institutions that maintained American society.

As opposed to the *Tyranny* rationale, in the *Distrust of Government Gun Control* rationale, gun rights were not in place to protect against the potential overreach of the government. Similarly, as opposed to the *Gun Rights as Sacred* or *Liberty* rationales, the issue was bigger than gun rights per se. Instead, for the *Distrust of Government Gun Control* rationale, the government itself was untrustworthy due to its alleged immoral character. Thus, citizens' rights, rather than government regulation, were the foundation of a moral community.

For the *Distrust of Government Gun Control* rationale, the government was spiraling out of control in a power-hungry drive for dominance over citizens. Therefore, the government was unable to morally regulate guns because it was not moral itself and thus was unable to demonstrate the self-control needed to govern. This is similar to the *Racialized Moral Dichotomy* rationale's use of a moral dichotomy—however in the *Distrust of Government Gun Control* rationale, the government—rather than minorities—is demonized as "the bad guy."

Furthermore, while the *Distrust of Government Gun Control* is similar to the *Gun Populism* rationale, the *Distrust of Government Gun Control* rationale stresses the lack of self-

control of the government as a way to morally delegitimate the government's ability to regulate guns. This is an instance of the conservative most sacred value because it conceptualizes citizens and citizens' rights as the foundation of a moral community—and juxtaposes these rights with the allegedly power-mad government that is unable to refrain from abusing its powers. This confirms findings that showed a spike in gun purchases following fear-mongering about former President Obama supposedly eliminating gun rights (Depetris-Chauvin 2015).

Evidence of the *Racialized Moral Dichotomy* confirms and builds theory by Shapira and Simon (2018) and by Carlson (2019). Most notably, this rationale demonstrates a frame that Carlson (2019) provided evidence of in police chiefs' legitimations of citizens' violence. This frame legitimates violence by citizens by using a racialized dichotomy (Bobo and Charles 2009; Forman 2017) between "good guys" and "bad guys." The portrayals of "good guys" then draw upon positive stereotypes of Caucasians, while the characterization of "bad guys" draws upon negative stereotypes of minorities. Ronald, a low-income Republican, made the racial element of this dichotomy explicit in his description of whom in society he thought would benefit from McCain being elected in 2008:

> The border patrol definitely would have…The ranchers along the border would have gotten the support they needed. They're still coming across the border trashing people's lands. I've seen the pictures, okay? They killed a couple down on the border, somewhere down there, and the house up the street they didn't. The woman fought back. One of the women fought back. There are stories like that. A couple that just moved down here, a father, his kids, stuff like that, his eight-year-old can fire a pistol. He never leaves the house without [his gun] because there are people coming across the property at all hours of the day and night. And he's told his kid: "If anybody comes near you and tell them stop, if they take another step, shoot them." That's the life on the border right now.

Here we see Ronald make explicit what Carlson (2019) finds implicitly in the legitimations of police chiefs. Ronald identified undocumented immigrants as an allegedly dangerous group that, in his portrayal, presented a threat to the physical safety of the law-abiding citizens who lived on the border. This racial element of the "bad guy" frame was made explicit when Ronald identified undocumented immigrants coming from Mexico as justifying lethal gun violence by citizens. The "good guy" portrayal still implicitly referred to Caucasians, but the respondent explicitly demonized undocumented immigrants by asserting that they flaunted the law and terrorized innocent citizens. Undocumented immigrants then, in this portrayal, merited lethal force against them by law-abiding, presumably Caucasian, citizens. This passage established a clear racialized moral dichotomy in which a moral community—law-abiding Caucasian citizens—needed traditions—such as gun rights—to protect themselves from an immoral Hispanic out-group that presented what was portrayed to be an extreme threat to the safety of the moral Caucasian community.

3. Democrats Using the Conservative Most Sacred Value to Delegitimate Gun Rights

Three abductive conservative most sacred value rationale emerged among my respondents. These three were exclusively used by Democratic voters. First, the *Gun Control Protects Family* rationale was used by only one respondent, Duane, who was high-income and voted for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. The respondent mentioned gun control seven different times throughout his interview. In particular, the participant began by legitimating his vote for Obama in 2008. He explained that if McCain would have won that it would have led to "things like increased military spending, which would just kind be a general militarization of American society. It would be the end of gun control, which is a danger to my family."

Here, we see the respondent use the *Gun Control Protects Family* rationale by describing the "end of gun control" as being a "danger to my family." Later the respondent discussed the issue in terms of personal safety. While this rationale was only used by a

Democrat in my data, it draws upon the conservative most sacred value in that it advocated conserving traditions—in this case, gun control—to protect an in-group. Here, the in-group for the respondent was his family. The participant was not worried about children, or families in general, but instead had the parochial concern for his family—making this distinctly an example of the conservative most sacred value (Haidt 2012, 2018; Waytz, Iyer, Young, Haidt, and Graham 2019).

Next, we see two Democratic respondents—one high-income and one low-income—use the abductive rationale *Republicans as Mentally Deficient*. Marlon, a low-income Democrat, described his uncle's conservative turn as he aged: "So he was pretty anti-Bush then, but he didn't vote for Obama because Obama was black. Now I've noticed that he's more conservative now. He collects guns now, he has a loaded gun in his house, he never used to do that shit. He's retired, he's getting older but I never heard him say something and I told him what are you being a Republican now?" Later, Marlon shifted his focus to FOX News:

[E]veryone listens to FOX news. It's this an all-American network and a fucking British guy owns it. You know, and they don't understand globalism, globalization, they don't understand big money. Have no conception of those things. All they see is guns in America and we need to get back to the '50s or something, like there's fucking stupid ass people on it, but those are the ones who vote so that's what, you know…I don't know. If you are going to vote Republican, you might as well not vote you know that's the way I look at it.

Marlon provided two clear examples of the *Republicans as Deficient* rationale. In both instances, affinity towards guns was symbolic of being Republican in a way that portrayed Republicans in a very negative light. First, the respondent described what was portrayed as his uncle's mental decline into not only racism but also into gun fanaticism. Marlon depicted his uncle as "collect[ing] guns" and having "a loaded gun in his house." The respondent associated this behavior with his uncle's racism, as well as delegitimated it by saying "he never used to do that shit." Here, we see Marlon portray his uncle as a sort of Kurtz who had descended into madness. His uncle's hoarding of gun and behavior of keeping a "loaded gun" were then signs of this mental decline.

However, this decline was also associated with being "conservative" more generally. We see the same themes in Marlon's description of FOX News and its appeal to "fucking stupid ass people" who voted Republican by promoting "guns in American" and a return to "the '50s or something." While this interview was conducted in 2014, the description of FOX News as appealing to Republicans by promoting a return to the 1950s is a clear harbinger of Donald Trump's "Make American Great Again" slogan. For the respondent, then, gun advocacy was a clear symbol of Conservativism and appealed to Republicans. These Republicans were then depicted as being mentally unstable and engaging in dangerous behavior—such as hoarding guns and keeping a loaded weapon—or as being "fucking stupid ass people" who "might as well not vote."

Finally, one respondent—a low-income Democrat with the pseudonym of "Isaac"—used the *Racialized Gun Control* rationale. Recall that this rationale is similar to "Gun Militarism" (Carlson 2019) and thus the *Racialized Moral Dichotomy* rationale, but showed the inverse case. In this rationale, the respondent delegitimated gun rights by describing how they provided a racialized "bad guy" access to arms—and thus enabled this "bad guy" to engage in illegitimate violence. This is an instance of the conservative most sacred value because it seeks to protect a moral community of law-abiding citizens from dangerous outsiders. Isaac used this delimitation to justify his vote to legalize medical marijuana. He explained that

[There are m]urders all through Mexico going on right now are all based on this stuff [i.e. drugs]. …People are getting blown away by our guns that people come here and buy because they can't get them in Mexico. And of course, the FOX news people say, "Show me a country that prohibits arms and I'll show you a murderous country."

Well, they're murdering because the product, the consumer of the product is here. In other words, this proposition is a step toward legalizing all of it, which would put the drug lords out of business eventually.

Thus, we see the explicit racialization of a "bad guy"—which is analogous to "Gun Militarism" (Carlson 2019)—but this racialization was used to delegitimate gun rights. Furthermore, for this rationale, there was no clear moralized "good guy" who could legitimately use violence. Instead, the respondent invoked the lethal illegitimate violence of drug cartels in "Mexico" as a way to delegitimate gun rights.

This was an example of the conservative rationale because it was an attempt to protect a moral community in a broad sense—meaning law-abiding citizens "all through Mexico"—who are not involved in the drug trade. The respondent then demonized an explicitly racialized bad guy— "drug lords" in "Mexico." It was then the illegitimate violence that the "drug lords" were perpetrating with "our guns"—i.e. guns made available to them in the United States—that delegitimated gun rights. This is an interesting rationale because it demonstrates how a racialized "bad guy" can be used to delegitimate gun rights—thus extending Carlson's (2019) work.

Discussion and Conclusion

Discussion

This article does not argue that gun rights are an "unresolved issue." Rather, the contribution here is to help us understand the (il)legitimacy of gun rights and the roots of this (il)legitimacy in the legitimations of citizens. More broadly, then, understanding rationales used by citizens in their (de)legitimations helps us to see the normative bases of the (il)legitimacy of gun rights in America.

In these findings we see a clear picture emerge in which the liberal most sacred value was not used by voters to either legitimate or delegitimate gun rights. Instead, Democrats used the conservative most sacred value to delegitimate gun rights while Republicans used the conservative most sacred value to legitimate gun rights. These findings, which are based on data from 2013-2015, help to build theories of the polarization of the legitimation of gun rights for American voters while also providing evidence of common ground between Republicans and Democrats concerning gun rights.

The absence of the liberal most sacred value and prevalence of the conservative most sacred value also suggest the power of conservative ideological socialization concerning gun rights in America. The use of these broader discourses to legitimate policy positions provides evidence of issue-specific political socialization (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2020a). The prevalence of the conservative most sacred value then suggests that discourse and political socialization in America regarding gun rights is dominated by conservative rhetoric and values.

The *Republicans as Mentally Deficient, Gun Control Protects Family,* and *Racialized Gun Control* rationales expand the literature by demonstrating that Democratic voters use the conservative most sacred value to delegitimate gun rights. These findings present an interesting problem for Moral Foundations Theory, which argues that individuals adopt a sole most sacred value and that their moral intuitions are genetic (Haidt 2012). Conversely, my findings combined with Vila-Henninger's previous work on most sacred values in voters' legitimations (Vila-Henninger 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2020a) demonstrate that respondents vary in their use of most sacred values according to the policy context—thus building the case that moral intuitions are, at least in part, the product of socialization. The resulting interpretation would be that while liberal respondents are sensitive to care and fairness in certain policy contexts, they are sensitive to all of the moral foundations in the context of gun rights.

These findings on the use of the conservative most sacred value by Democratic voters help to confirm Stephen Vaisey's (Vaisey 2009; Vaisey and Lizardo 2010) theory in which

moral intuitions are learned through socialization. These results also confirm critiques in political science of Moral Foundations Theory's claims about the genetic roots of moral intuitions (Hatemi et al. 2019). Recent work (Vila-Henninger 2020b) has developed Vaisey's and Hatemi's arguments extensively and applied them to understanding political socialization and political legitimation. The empirical findings in this article then help to reinforce Vila-Henninger's (2020b) theory of political socialization and political legitimation.

A key result in this article was the emergence of a rationale that was similar to findings of Republican voters' delegitimation of taxes (Vila-Henninger 2020a)—the *Distrust of Government Gun Control* rationale. In this rationale, respondents delegitimated government attempts at gun control as an example of the federal government's lack of self-control—thus painting the government as immoral. This then suggests that a pillar of the gun control debate for Republican voters is the government lacks self-control and seeks to eliminate rights. This corresponds with theories of American conservative values from moral psychology (Haidt 2012, 2018; Waytz, Iyer, Young, Haidt, and Graham 2019). This also helps to build theories of the intersection of morality and gun rights in America (Whitehead et al. 2018) beyond Christian nationalism.

We can also learn much from discussing the deductive codes that I did not observe in voters' legitimations. The sole deductive liberal most sacred value deductive code of *Prevent School Shooting* was absent—which then fails to confirm the theoretical account of Kahn and Braman (2003) and Wozniak (2017). Furthermore, the *Gun Rights as Sacred* rationale did not appear—which then does not allow us to confirm Whitehead et al.'s (2018) theorization of gun rights in American culture as sacred. I also did not observe the *Tyranny* rationale—which suggests that respondents may discuss guns and gun rights differently online (McLean 2018) than in-person. Finally, I did not observe any instances of the *Gun Populism* rationale. This means that my findings do not provide evidence that this frame of legitimacy for the violence of non-state actors that is sanctioned by the state (Carlson 2019) is also present in the legitimations of voters.

My findings reaffirm and extend the work of Shapira and Simon (2018) and Carlson (2019, 2020a, 2020b) on the legitimation of citizens' violence by clearly showing that the racialized dichotomy that these scholars provided evidence of was also present in voters' legitimations of gun rights in the early to mid-2010s. Furthermore, the presence of the *Racialized Gun Control* rationale demonstrates that a rationale similar to "Gun Militarism" (Carlson 2019) can be used to delegitimate gun rights.

Finally, the presence of the *Liberty* rationale confirms McLean's (2018) findings and demonstrates the importance of most sacred values for understanding political legitimacy for voters in America. In this vein, my findings extend the work of McLean (2018)—who uses Seymour Lipset's framework to understand the values that Americans employ to legitimate gun rights as historically-based. My results suggest that in addition to the historically-based values identified by Lipset and McLean, most sacred values are also of central importance for understanding citizens' (de)legitimations of gun rights.

Conclusion

The presence of the conservative most sacred value demonstrates voter socialization in a way that provides evidence of a political culture that combines public, declarative, and nondeclarative culture (Swidler 1986, 2001; Díez Medrano 2003; Vaisey 2009; Patterson 2014; Vila-Henninger 2015; Lizardo 2017). This then helps us to build theories of how all three types of culture are combined.

These findings also contribute to work that uses the sociology of culture to understand gun culture (Carlson 2015; Mencken and Froese 2019) and build on the reemergent values literature in sociology (Wuthnow 2008; Prasad et al. 2009; Hitlin and Vaisey 2013; Longest,

Hitlin, and Vaisey 2013; Vaisey and Miles 2014; Miles 2015; Baker and Barg 2019; Silver and Silver 2019) by bridging political sociology (Lipset 1963a, 1963b, 1989), the sociology of culture (Vaisey and Miles 2014; Miles 2015), and moral psychology (Haidt 2012, 2018). This article then constitutes a link between qualitative and cognitive approaches to values (Wuthnow 2008). Furthermore, my findings reaffirm quantitative work that demonstrates how collective moral frameworks are used by political parties to mobilize voters (Jung 2019).

A potential limitation of this article is that I did not code entire interviews for rationales, but instead looked for keywords and coded passages in which keywords appeared. However, my aim here was to use this limitation as a strength by building upon the work of Davidson et al. (2019)—who provide a useful technique for conducting secondary qualitative analysis.

A key drawback of these findings is that they are based on data that were collected from 2013-15. Thus, they are not as up-to-date as some might hope. However, it is crucial to note that my analysis is only meant to build theory and thus should be seen as such—rather than as an attempt to generalize to a population, for example. Future work can extend this article by using data from voters collected during the Trump administration. This would then present the opportunity for longitudinal secondary analysis (Belot and Van Ingelgom 2017).

An additional potential limitation of this article is that it used data that were gathered for a different project and thus were collected using specific theoretical sampling guidelines. However, this is part of qualitative secondary analysis and many argue convincingly that showing evidence of phenomena in data collected to address a different research question is a strength rather than a limitation (Duchesne 2017; Belot and Van Ingelgom 2017; Hughes and Tarrant 2020).

Works Cited

Anderson, Elijah., and W.W. Norton & Company. 2000. *Code of the Street : Decency, Violence and the Moral Life of the Inner City*. New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company.

Andrew Miles. 2015. "The (Re)genesis of Values : Examining the Importance of Values for Action." *American Sociological Review* 80 (4): 680–704.

Baer, Douglas, Edward Grabb, and William Johnston. 1990. "The Values of Canadians and Americans: A Rejoinder." *Social Forces* 69 (1): 273–77.

Baker, William, and Katherin Barg. 2019. "Parental Values in the UK." *The British Journal of Sociology* 70 (5): 2092–2115.

Baldassarri, Delia, Gelman, Andrew. 2008. "Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion.(Report)." *The American Journal of Sociology* 114 (2).

Bartels, Larry M. 2006. "What's the Matter with What's the Matter with Kansas?" *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 1 (2): 201–26.

Baxter-Moore, Nick, Donald Munroe Eagles, Ibrahim Berrada, Oleksandr Chernomorchenko, Paul D. Coleman, Kelly Gaskin, Karey Hatch, Craig Hilimoniuk, and Patrick Morris. 2018. "Explaining Canada–US Differences in Attitudes toward the Role of Government: A Test of S.M. Lipset's 'Continental Divide.'" *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 56 (4): 472–92.

Beetham, David. 1991. *The Legitimation of Power*. Basingstoke [UK]: The Macmillan Press.

Beetham, David., and Christopher. Lord. 1998. *Legitimacy and the EU*. London; New York, N.Y.: Longman.

Belot, Céline, and Virginie Van Ingelgom. 2017. "La Réanalyse à l'épreuve d'une Comparaison Qualitative Diachronique : Stabilités et Évolutions Dans Les Perceptions Citoyennes de l'Europe En 1995-96 et 2005-06." *Recherches Qualitatives* 21.

Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2019. "Democratic Values and Institutions." *American Economic Review: Insights American Economic Review: Insights* 1 (1): 59–76.

Blanton, Dana. 2018. “Fox News Poll: Voters Favor Gun Measures, Doubt Congress Will Act.” Text.Article. Fox News. Fox News. March 24, 2018. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/fox-news-poll-voters-favor-gun-measures-doubt-congress-will-act.

Bobo L.D., and Charles C.Z. 2009. “Race in the American Mind: From the Moynihan Report to the Obama Candidacy.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 621 (1): 243–59.

Brooks C, and Manza J. 2013. “A Broken Public? Americans’ Responses to the Great Recession.” *American Sociological Review* 78 (5): 727–48.

Brooks, Clem, Brady, David. 1999. "Income, Economic Voting, and Long-Term Political Change in the U.S., 1952-1996." *Social Forces (University of North Carolina Press)* 77 (4).

Burawoy, Michael. 1998. "The Extended Case Method." *Sociological Theory* 16 (1): 4–33.

———. 2009. *The Extended Case Method : Four Countries, Four Decades, Four Great Transformations, and One Theoretical Tradition*. Berkeley: California University Press.

Carlson, Jennifer. 2015. *Citizen-Protectors : The Everyday Politics of Guns in an Age of Decline*.

———. 2019. “Revisiting the Weberian Presumption: Gun Militarism, Gun Populism, and the Racial Politics of Legitimate Violence in Policing.” *American Journal of Sociology* 125 (3): 633–82.

———. 2020a. “Police Warriors and Police Guardians: Race, Masculinity, and the Construction of Gun Violence.” *Social Problems*.

———. 2020b. *Policing the Second Amendment : Guns, Law Enforcement, and the Politics of Race*.

Chong, Dennis. 1993. *How People Think, Reason and Feel about Rights and Liberties*. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Cohn, Nate, and Margot Sanger-Katz. 2019. “On Guns, Public Opinion and Public Policy Often Diverge.” *The New York Times*, August 10, 2019, sec. The Upshot. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/10/upshot/gun-control-polling-policies.html.

Conover, Pamela Johnston, Ivor M. Crewe, and Donald D. Searing. 1991. “The Nature of Citizenship in the United States and Great Britain: Empirical Comments on Theoretical Themes.” *The Journal of Politics* 53 (3): 800–832.

Cramer, Katherine J. 2016. *The Politics of Resentment : Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*.

Curtis, Jennifer. 2020. “Failures of the Sociological Imagination: Trump, Brexit, and the Politics of Unfinished Conflict.” *The Sociological Quarterly* 61 (2): 187–205.

Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio. 2015. “Fear of Obama: An Empirical Study of the Demand for Guns and the U.S. 2008 Presidential Election.” *Journal of Public Economics* 130 (October): 66–79.

Deutsch, Morton. 1990. “Psychological Roots of Moral Exclusion.” *Journal of Social Issues* 46 (1): 21–25.

Dignam, Pierce, Douglas Schrock, Kristen Erichsen, and Benjamin Dowd-Arrow. 2019. “Valorizing Trumps Masculine Self: Constructing Political Allegiance during the 2016 Presidential Election.” *Men and Masculinities Men and Masculinities*, 1097184X1987369.

Dornbusch, Sanford M., and W. Richard Scott. 1975. *Evaluation and the Exercise of Authority*. San Francisco, Calif.

Dowd-Arrow, Benjamin, Terrence D. Hill, and Amy M. Burdette. 2019. “Gun Ownership and Fear.” *SSM - Population Health* 8 (August): 100463.

Duchesne, Sophie. 2017. “De l’analyse secondaire à la réanalyse. Une innovation méthodologique en débats.” *Recherches qualitatives. Hors-série*, no. 21, "La réanalyse des enquêtes qualitatives à l'épreuve de l'expérimentation": 7–28.

Duina, Francesco G. 2018. *Broke and Patriotic: Why Poor Americans Love Their Country*.

Elcioglu, Emine Fidan. 2017. “The State Effect: Theorizing Immigration Politics in Arizona.” *Social Problems* 64 (2): 239–55.

Elias, Norbert. 1978. *The Civilizing Process*. New York: Urizen Books.
Eliasoph, Nina. 1998. *Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life*. X-330 p.; 24 cm vols. Cambridge Cultural Social Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Erichsen, Kristen, Douglas Schrock, Benjamin Dowd-Arrow, and Pierce Dignam. 2020. "Bitchifying Hillary: Trump Supporters Vilification of Clinton during the 2016 Presidential Election." *Social Currents*, 232949652094102.
Fields, Corey. 2016. *Black Elephants in the Room: The Unexpected Politics of African American Republicans*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press
Forman, James. 2018. *Locking up Our Own : Crime and Punishment in Black America*.
Frye, Margaret. 2017. "Cultural Meanings and the Aggregation of Actions: The Case of Sex and Schooling in Malawi." *American Sociological Review* 82 (5).
Gelman, Andrew. 2008. *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do*. . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gelman, Andrew, Lane Kenworthy, and Yu-Sung Su. 2010. "Income Inequality and Partisan Voting in the United States." *Social Science Quarterly* 91 (5): 1203–19.
Goldberg, Amir, and Sarah K. Stein. 2018. "Beyond Social Contagion: Associative Diffusion and the Emergence of Cultural Variation." *American Sociological Review* 83 (5): 897–932.
Gong, Neil. 2015. "How to Fight Without Rules: On Civilized Violence in 'De-Civilized' Spaces." *Social Problems* 62 (4): 605–22.
Gordon, Jon. 2020. "The Legitimation of Extrajudicial Violence in an Urban Community." *Social Forces* 98 (3): 1174–95.
Graham, Jesse, and Jonathan Haidt. 2012. "Sacred Values and Evil Adversaries: A Moral Foundations Approach." In *The Social Psychology of Morality: Exploring the Causes of Good and Evil*, 11–31. Herzliya Series on Personality and Social Psychology. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.
Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek. 2009. "Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96 (5): 1029–46.
Hahl O., Kim M., and Zuckerman Sivan E.W. 2018. "The Authentic Appeal of the Lying Demagogue: Proclaiming the Deeper Truth about Political Illegitimacy." *American Sociological Review* 83 (1): 1–33.
Haidt J. 2001. "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment." *Psychological Review* 108 (4): 814–34.
Haidt, Jonathan. 2012. *The Righteous Mind : Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion*. New York: Pantheon Books.
Haidt, Jonathan, Jesse Graham, and Craig Joseph. 2009. "Above and Below Left-Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations." *Psychological Inquiry* 20 (2–3): 2–3.
Hatemi, Peter K., Charles Crabtree, and Kevin B. Smith. 2019. "Ideology Justifies Morality: Political Beliefs Predict Moral Foundations." *American Journal of Political Science* 63 (4): 788–806.
Hill, Terrence D., Benjamin Dowd-Arrow, Amy M. Burdette, and Lauren Hale. 2020. "Gun Ownership and Sleep Disturbance." *Preventive Medicine* 132 (March): 105996.
Hill, Terrence D., Benjamin Dowd-Arrow, Andrew P. Davis, and Amy M. Burdette. 2020. "Happiness Is a Warm Gun? Gun Ownership and Happiness in the United States (1973–2018)." *Population Health* 10 (April): 100536.
Hitlin, Steven, and Stephen Vaisey. 2013. "The New Sociology of Morality." Annual Review of Sociology 39: 51–68.
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2016. *Strangers in Their Own Land : Anger and Mourning on the American Right*.

Hochschild, Jennifer L. 1981. *What's Fair? : American Beliefs about Distributive Justice : American Beliefs about Distributive Justice / Jennifer L. Hochschild*. 345 p. vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Homans, George C. 1974. *Social Behavior : Its Elementary Forms*. New York.
Hughes, Kahryn, and Anna Tarrant. 2020. *Qualitative Secondary Analysis*.
Hull, Kathleen E., and Penny Edgell. 2020. "How Americans Talk about Separation of Church and State: Moral Frameworks of Justice and Care." *The Sociological Quarterly*, 1–24.
Ingelgom, Virginie Van. 2014. *Integrating Indifference : a Comparative, Qualitative and Quantitative Approach to the Legitimacy of European Integration*. Colchester: ECPR Press.
Iyer, Ravi, Spassena Koleva, Jesse Graham, Peter Ditto, Jonathan Haidt, and Liane Young. 2012. "Understanding Libertarian Morality: The Psychological Dispositions of Self-Identified Libertarians." *PLoS ONE* 7 (8): e42366.
Johnson, Cathryn, Timothy J. Dowd, and Cecilia L. Ridgeway. 2006. "Legitimacy as a Social Process." *Annual Review of Sociology* 32 (1): 53–78.
Joseph, Craig M., Jesse Graham, and Jonathan Haidt. 2009. "The End of Equipotentiality: A Moral Foundations Approach to Ideology-Attitude Links and Cognitive Complexity." *Psychological Inquiry* 20 (2–3): 172–76.
Joslyn, Mark R., and Donald P. Haider-Markel. 2017. "Gun Ownership and Self-Serving Attributions for Mass Shooting Tragedies* Attributions for Mass Shootings and Gun Ownership." *Social Science Quarterly* 98 (2): 429–42.
Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier. 2009. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities." *Annual Review of Psychology* 60 (1): 307–37.
Jung J.-H. 2020. "The Mobilizing Effect of Parties' Moral Rhetoric." *American Journal of Political Science* 64 (2): 341–55.
Kahan, Dan M., and Donald Braman. 2003. "More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions." *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 151 (4): 1291–1327.
Kalesan, Bindu, Marcos D. Villarreal, Katherine M. Keyes, and Sandro Galea. 2016. "Gun Ownership and Social Gun Culture." *Injury Prevention* 22 (3): 216–20.
Karell, Daniel, and Michael Freedman. 2019. "Rhetorics of Radicalism." *American Sociological Review* 84 (4): 726–53.
Kidder, Jeffrey L. 2016. "College Republicans and Conservative Social Identity." *Sociological Perspectives* 59 (1): 177–200.
Kidder, Jeffrey L., and Isaac William Martin. 2012. "What We Talk About When We Talk About Taxes." *Symbolic Interaction* 35 (2): 123–45.
Kleck, Gary, Marc Gertz, and Jason Bratton. 2009. "Why Do People Support Gun Control?: Alternative Explanations of Support for Handgun Bans." *Journal of Criminal Justice* 37 (5): 496–504.
Lamont, Michèle. 1992. *Money, Morals, and Manners: The Culture of the French and American Upper-Middle Class*. . Chicago: Univ of Chicago Press Chicago.
———. 2000. *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration*. New York, N.Y: Russell Sage Foundation.
Lamont, Michèle, and Ann Swidler. 2014. "Methodological Pluralism and the Possibilities and Limits of Interviewing." *Qualitative Sociology* 37 (2): 153–71.
Lane, Robert E. 1962. *Political Ideology : Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does*. New York; London: Free Press of Glencoe ; Macmillan.
Leeds, Tyler. 2020. "The State Schema: Seeing Politics through Morality and Capacity." *Qualitative Sociology*.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. *Some Social Requisites of Democracy : Economic Development and Political Legitimacy*. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Co.

———. 1963a. *The First New Nation : The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*. London: Heinemann.
———. 1963b. "The Value Patterns of Democracy: A Case Study in Comparative Analysis." *American Sociological Review* 28 (4): 515–31.
———. 1989. *Continental Divide : The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada*. Washington, D.C.: Canadian-American Committee.
Lizardo O., and Larson J. 2019. "Institutional Movement Logics and the Changing Shape of the US Social Movement Field, 1960-1995." *Social Forces* 97 (4): 1960–95.
Locke, John, and Thomas P. Peardon. 1954. *The Second Treatise of Government (an Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government)*. New York: Liberal Arts Press.
Longest, K. C., S. Hitlin, and S. Vaisey. 2013. "Position and Disposition: The Contextual Development of Human Values." *Social Forces* 91 (4): 1499–1528.
Manza, Jeff, and Clem Brooks. 1999. *Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions*. . Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Martin, John Levi, and Alessandra Lembo. 2020. "On the Other Side of Values." *American Journal of Sociology* 126 (1): 52–98.
Mauser, G A, and M Margolis. 1992. "The Politics of Gun Control: Comparing Canadian and American Patterns." *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 10 (2): 189–209.
McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
McLean, Dylan S. 2018. "Gun Talk Online: Canadian Tools, American Values*." *Social Science Quarterly* 99 (3): 977–92.
Mencken, F. Carson, and Paul Froese. 2019. "Gun Culture in Action." *Social Problems* 66 (1): 3–27.
Miles, Andrew, Raphaël Charron-Chénier, and Cyrus Schleifer. 2019. "Measuring Automatic Cognition: Advancing Dual-Process Research in Sociology." *American Sociological Review* 84 (2): 308–33.
Miles, Andrew, and Stephen Vaisey. 2015. "Morality and Politics: Comparing Alternate Theories." *Social Science Research* 53: 252–69.
Miller, Steven V. 2019. "What Americans Think About Gun Control: Evidence from the General Social Survey, 1972–2016." *Social Science Quarterly* 100 (1): 272–88.
Omar Lizardo. 2017. "Improving Cultural Analysis : Considering Personal Culture in its Declarative and Nondeclarative Modes." *American Sociological Review* 82 (1): 88–115.
Pacewicz, Josh. 2016. *Partisans and Partners the Politics of the Post-Keynesian Society*. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.
Parsons, Talcott, and Edward Shils. 1951. *Toward a General Theory of Action*. New York: Harper Torchbooks.
Patterson, Orlando. 2014. "Making Sense of Culture." *Annual Review of Sociology* 40: 1–30.
Peirce, Charles S. 1974. *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce : Vol. 5: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism and Vol. 6: Scientific Metaphysics*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard U.P.
Perrin, Andrew J. 2005. "Political Microcultures: Linking Civic Life and Democratic Discourse." *Social Forces* 84 (2): 1049–82.
Pierre, Joseph M. 2019. "The Psychology of Guns: Risk, Fear, and Motivated Reasoning." *Palgrave Communications* 5 (1): 1–7.
Prasad M., Hoffman S.G., and Bezila K. 2016. "Walking the Line: The White Working Class and the Economic Consequences of Morality." *Politics and Society* 44 (2): 281–304.

Prasad, Monica, Perrin, Andrew J., Bezila, Kieran, Hoffman, Steve G., Kindleberger, Kate, Manturuk, Kim, Powers, Ashleigh Smith, Payton, Andrew R.. 2009. "The Undeserving Rich: 'Moral Values' and the White Working Class." *Sociological Forum* 24 (2): 225–53.
Rios, Victor M., Greg Prieto, and Jonathan M. Ibarra. 2020. “Mano SuaveMano Dura : Legitimacy Policing and Latino Stop-and-Frisk.” *American Sociological Review* 85 (1): 58–75.
Sallaz, Jeffrey J. 2009. *The Labor of Luck: Casino Capitalism in the United States and South Africa*. . Berkeley: University of California Press.
Schrock, Douglas, Alexander Adams, Ryan Bausback, Pierce Dignam, Benjamin Dowd-Arrow, Kristen Erichsen, and Haley Gentile. 2018. “Trumping the Establishment: Anti-Establishment Theatrics and Resonance in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election.” *Race, Gender & Class* 25 (3/4): 7–26.
Shapira, H., and S. J. Simon. 2018. “Learning to Need a Gun.” *Qualitative Sociology* 41 (1): 1–20.
Silva, Jennifer M. 2019. *We’re Still Here : Pain and Politics in the Heart of America*.
Silver, Eric, and Jasmine R. Silver. 2019. “Morality and Self-Control: The Role of Binding and Individualizing Moral Motives.” *Deviant Behavior* 0 (0): 1–20.
Singer, Peter. 1981. *The Expanding Circle : Ethics and Sociobiology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Skocpol, Theda., and Vanessa. Williamson. 2016. “The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism.” New York: Oxford University Press.
Small, Mario. 2009. “`How Many Cases Do I Need?’.” *Ethnography* 10 (1): 5–38.
Soss, Joe. 2000. *Unwanted Claims : The Politics of Participation in the US Welfare System : The Politics of Participation in the US Welfare System*. viii, 247 p. vols. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Steensland, Brian. 2006. “Cultural Categories and the American Welfare State: The Case of Guaranteed Income Policy.” *The American Journal of Sociology* 111 (5).
STOKER, GERRY, COLIN HAY, and MATTHEW BARR. 2016. “Fast Thinking: Implications for Democratic Politics FAST THINKING: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC POLITICS.” *European Journal of Political Research European Journal of Political Research* 55 (1): 3–21.
Stryker, Robin. 1994. “Rules, Resources, and Legitimacy Processes: Some Implications for Social Conflict, Order, and Change.” *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (4): 847–910.
Swedberg, Richard. 2017. “Theorizing in Sociological Research: A New Perspective, a New Departure?” *Annual Review of Sociology* 43: 189–206.
Swidler, Ann. 1986. “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.” *American Sociological Review* 51 (2): 273–86.
———. 2001. *Talk of Love: How Culture Matters*. . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Tavory, Iddo, and Ann Swidler. 2009. “Condom Semiotics: Meaning and Condom Use in Rural Malawi.” *American Sociological Review* 74 (2): 171.
Timmermans, Stefan and Tavory, Iddo. 2012. “Theory Construction in Qualitative Research : From Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis.” *Sociological Theory* 30 (3): 167–86.
Tavory, Iddo, and Stefan Timmermans. 2014. *Abductive Analysis : Theorizing Qualitative Research*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Tetlock, Philip E. 2003. “Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions.” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 7 (7): 320–24.
Tetlock, Philip E., Orie V. Kristel, S. Beth Elson, Melanie C. Green, and Jennifer S. Lerner. 2000. “The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 78 (5): 853–70.
Ulbig, Stacy G. 2020. *Angry Politics : Partisan Hatred and Political Polarization among College Students*.
Vaisey, Stephen. 2009. “Motivation and Justification: A Dual-Process Model of Culture in Action.” *American Journal of Sociology* 114(6):1675–1715.

Vaisey, Stephen, and Andrew Miles. 2014. “Tools from Moral Psychology for Measuring Personal Moral Culture.” *Theory and Society* 43 (3): 311–32.
Vila-Henninger, Luis Antonio. 2015. “Toward Defining the Causal Role of Consciousness: Using Models of Memory and Moral Judgment from Cognitive Neuroscience to Expand the Sociological Dual-Process Model.” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, no. 2: n/a.
———. 2018. “The Medicinal Cannabis Question: How Actors Legitimate Vote Choice on Medical Marijuana Policy.” *The Sociological Quarterly*, no. 4: 1–24.
———. 2019a. “The Moral Economy of Neoliberalism: How Voters Use Neoliberal Ideology to (De)Legitimate Undocumented Worker Access to Labor Markets.” *Sociological Inquiry* 89 (2): 239–62.
———. 2019b. “Turning Talk into ‘Rationales’: Using the Extended Case Method for the Coding and Analysis of Semi-Structured Interview Data in ATLAS.Ti.” *Bulletin of Sociological Methodology* 143 (1): 28–52.
———. 2020. *Social Justification and Political Legitimacy: How Voters Rationalize Direct Democratic Economic Policy in America.* Palgrave Macmillan: New York
Waytz, Adam, Ravi Iyer, Liane Young, Jonathan Haidt, and Jesse Graham. 2019. “Ideological Differences in the Expanse of the Moral Circle.” *Nature Communications* 10 (1): 4389.
Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society. an Outline of Interpretive Sociology* Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weber, Max, Hans Gerth, and C. Wright Mills. 1946. *From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Whitehead, Andrew L., Landon Schnabel, and Samuel L. Perry. 2018a. “Gun Control in the Crosshairs: Christian Nationalism and Opposition to Stricter Gun Laws.” *Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World* 4: 237802311879018.
Williamson, Vanessa. 2017. *Read My Lips : Why Americans Are Proud to Pay Taxes*.
Wozniak K.H. 2017. “Public Opinion About Gun Control Post-Sandy Hook.” *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 28 (3): 255–78.
Wuthnow, Robert. 2018. *The Left behind : Decline and Rage in Rural America*.