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Do social enterprises attract workers who are more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in for-profit organizations to perform low-skilled jobs?

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ABSTRACT

The literature highlights that social enterprises (SEs) attract workers who are motivated to help others and to meet the social aims in which they believe. However, this assumption is challenged in the case of low-skilled jobs. Therefore, we have performed an empirical study in the quasi-market of service vouchers in Belgium to know if SEs attract workers who have a different motivational profile than their counterparts in for-profit organizations (FPOs) to perform low skilled jobs ($N = 217$). No significant differences were found. Next, we have compared FPOs with two types of social enterprises, Home Care Services Organizations (HCSOs) and Work Integration Social enterprises (WISEs), and again no significant differences were found for the whole sample. However, it seems that a selection effect exists in WISEs when the sample is reduced to people who were not previously unemployed. In others words, when WISEs deviate from their initial mission of 'hiring the most vulnerable people on the labor market', it is only to hire workers whose are highly motivated to achieve the organization's mission and who fit with the values defended by the organization.

1. Introduction

This article examines the specificities of the motivation of the workforce attracted by socially oriented organizations compared with for-profit organizations, with a particular focus on low-skilled jobs. According to the literature, one important characteristic of social enterprises (SEs)[1] is their capacity to attract workers who are not only motivated by monetary remuneration and are ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages to work for a social mission in which they believe (e.g. Preston, 1989; Valentinov, 2007). These SE workers have been initially identified as more intrinsically motivated than their counterparts in for-profit organizations

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(FPOs), where intrinsic motivation refers to activities performed for their own sake, because they are inherently interesting. However, most authors agree that the specificity of the SE workers is not to be motivated by an interesting task but to care about the social impact of their job. In others words, they are conscious of and motivated by the social mission of their enterprise. Recently, research developed at the crossroads of psychology and economics has pointed out that the content of the motivation to work in SE is not intrinsic but pro-social (e.g. De Cooman, De Gieter, Pepermans, & Jegers, 2011; Francois, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008). The motivation to make a pro-social difference is defined as the desire to make a positive difference in other people's lives and to make the world a better place (e.g. Grant, 2007). SE workers are, then, pro-socially motivated to help others by making 'a difference' (e.g. Francois, 2007; Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008; Lyons, Duxbury, & Higgins, 2006) and assign positive utility to contributing to society (e.g. Etienne & Narcy, 2010; Lewis & Ng, 2013).

The presence of such workers in SEs can be explained by an attraction-selection phenomenon. In other words, social enterprises attract and select pro-socially motivated workers. From a theoretical point of view, Besley and Ghatak (2005) analyze the reasons explaining the specific matching of social mission-oriented employees with social mission-oriented employers. However, in the case of low-skilled jobs, the hypothesis that SEs attract workers who are motivated to help others and to meet some social aims in which they believe is challenged. Therefore, the aim of this research is to know if SEs attract low-skilled workers with more pro-social motivation and higher value congruence with their new organization than their counterparts in for-profit organizations.

Empirically, this article focuses on the quasi-market of service vouchers in Belgium. This quasi-market is designed to foster the creation of regular salaried jobs for low-skilled persons. The services provided are related to housekeeping, strictly speaking (i.e. not care), at home or outside the home (ironing, household shopping, etc.). Even if the State contributes towards the cost, the provision of those services is open to all kinds of organizations: a variety of for-profit and not-for-profit providers (public and SEs) compete on the market. The scheme works as follows: Any person wishing to obtain housework services can buy vouchers and choose an accredited provider, which then sends a worker to the client's house. Workers are, therefore, hired by the providers and not directly by the households, which are clients of the providers (Defourny, Henry, Nassaut, & Nyssens, 2010). This field allows us to compare FPOs with two types of SEs: work integration social enterprises (WISEs) and home care services organizations (HCSOs). In this study, in order to distinguish between for-profit providers and SEs, we rely on their legal status. Providers with a legal status that allows unconstrained profit distribution pursue a mission of profit maximization while others are expected to pursue a social mission. To specify the type of social mission, we take into account the accreditation conferred by the public authorities. Accredited WISEs are social cooperatives that aim to create long-term jobs for the most disadvantaged workers.

Accredited HCSOs are non-profit organizations that focus on the delivering of comprehensive home care services to vulnerable families and elderly people. Distinguishing between these two types of SEs, rather than considering them as equivalent, makes it possible to observe the 'mission effect', and not only the 'sector effect' (for-profit or not-for-profit). In order to compare workers' motivations between FPOs, HCSOs and WISEs, we collected data via a questionnaire submitted to the workers before they started working for their new organization.

The paper is structured as follows: the second section is devoted to the literature review and the development of the hypotheses. The methodological aspects are described in the third section, while the fourth section presents and analyzes the results. Finally, the fifth section provides concluding remarks.

2. Literature review

The presence of more pro-socially motivated workers in SEs than in FPOs can be explained by an attraction-selection phenomenon (e.g. Besley & Ghatak, 2005). On the one hand, SEs attract pro-socially motivated workers because they have a mission oriented toward public interest and solidarity (e.g. Lanfranchi & Narcy, 2008) and are mainly active in socially oriented industries (e.g. health or education). In other words, if a pro-socially motivated person chooses to work for an SE rather than for a FPO, it is most probably because his/her altruistic values[2] match the organization's values and goals (e.g. Ben-Ner, Ren, & Paulson, 2011; Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Handy & Katz, 1998). On the other hand, SEs want to select workers who have values and motivations that fit with their social mission in order to ensure that they will adopt the expected work behavior. For instance, it is likely that HCSOs want to attract workers who are highly motivated to give quality help to elderly and vulnerable people. Consequently, value congruence[3] between workers and the organization would be especially high in SEs since they attract and select workers who are sympathetic to and motivated by the organization's social mission (e.g. De Cooman et al., 2011; Devaro & Brookshire, 2007). However, some nuances have to be applied to the case of WISEs because they have a mission centered on the integration of vulnerable workers on the labor market. While they do indeed want to attract pro-socially motivated people for the team that will supervise the low-skilled workers, their aim is not to hire only pro-socially motivated workers but also people who are not able to find a job because of their vulnerable profile.

A complementary explanation of the presence of more pro-socially motivated workers in SEs than in FPOs comes from the limitation of profit distribution in SEs (Hansmann, 1980; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999; Rose-Ackerman, 1996). Indeed, this limitation implies that SE employers have fewer incentives than their counterparts in FPOs to take financial advantage of their workers' motivations (Speckbacher, 2013). This works as a sign of trust and ensures that the workers' efforts will increase the quality and/or the quantity of the services and not be

turned into the owner's profit (e.g. Francois, 2007; Leete, 2006). These SE features also explain the massive presence of volunteers in the third sector (Degli Antoni, 2009).

Benefiting from a pro-socially motivated workforce that perceives a high fit with the organization's mission is a central issue for SEs since it is one of their main competitive strengths on a market (e.g. Steinberg, 2006; Valentinov, 2007). The labor donation theory highlights that SEs workers are ready to work for lower wages than their counterparts in FPOs (e.g. Benz, 2005; Preston, 1989; Rose-Ackerman, 1996) because they find that working for a social mission in SEs is more meaningful and personally rewarding than working in FPOs (Lewis, 2010; Mirvis & Hackett, 1983). SEs would, therefore, be able to offer lower wages to their workers than FPOs, all others things being equal. The use of lower wages by SEs may also be justified by the adverse selection issue: how can SE employers distinguish the most pro-socially motivated workers from the others? Handy and Katz (1998) suggest that one solution for SEs to select workers who best match the organization's mission is to offer lower wages because only that kind of workers would be ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages to satisfy their pro-social motivation while other people will seek employment in other sectors (Lewis & Frank, 2002). Therefore, paying lower wages increases SEs output by generating a negative adverse selection mechanism (Handy & Katz, 1998; Hansmann, 1980) and ensuring a higher probability of selecting workers who will put in efforts through their values and duty fulfillment (e.g. Akerlof & Yellen, 1990).

Nevertheless, the mechanisms allowing SEs to attract and select the most pro-socially motivated workers do not seem to work properly in the low-skilled job context. First, given their usually low pay (often close to the minimum allowed), people in low-skilled jobs do not have the necessary margins to give up a significant part of their wages to meet their pro-social motivation. This would be even truer in WISEs since most of their low-skilled workers are supposed to be in financial difficulty and to have had difficulties in finding a job. Empirical studies confirm that lower wages in SEs than in FPOs concern mainly skilled positions (e.g. Leete, 2006; Roomkin & Weisbrod, 1999), even in the context of the Belgian quasi-market in service vouchers (Brolis & Nyssens, 2015). If the labor donation theory does not work for low-skilled jobs, this means that the negative adverse selection mechanism highlighted by Handy and Katz (1998) is not applicable. Hence, SEs should have to use unreliable, long and costly selection processes to distinguish the most pro-socially motivated workers from the others. Second, Henry, Nassaut, Defourny, and Nyssens (2009) highlight that low-skilled workers are often not able to clearly identify the mission of their organization due to asymmetry of information. This implies that low-skilled workers with high pro-social aspirations do not perceive a particular fit with the SEs' social mission because they do not distinguish it from the mission of FPOs and are then not more attracted by SEs than by FPOs. Combining the selection and attraction issues in

the low-skilled job context suggests that is likely that SEs and FPOs hire workers with the same motivational profile.

Beyond this attraction-selection issue, we have also to take into account that workers in low-skilled jobs are not usually able to perceive the social impact of their work (it is easier to perceive the social impact of a surgeon job than a home-cleaning job, for example), which is essential to being pro-socially motivated by a task, as demonstrated by Grant (2007). In others words, while low-skilled people might have as many altruistic values and as much pro-social motivation as skilled people, low-skilled tasks are usually not sufficiently linked to the organization's social mission and have too weak social significance to be a real source of pro-social motivation (Devaro & Brookshire, 2007). For instance, housekeepers in HCSOs have difficulty in perceiving their social impact because they are not allowed to offer care or health services (the main mission of HCSOs), they have to deal with any type of clients (not only elderly and vulnerable people), and their clients tend to be away from home when they are working. It is even more complicated for low-skilled workers in WISEs to perceive their social impact since their organization's social mission is not centered on the users but on themselves. As a consequence, supposing that SEs attract and select the most pro-socially motivated workers available to fulfill low-skilled jobs, their pro-social motivation to perform this job would still not be very high.

For all these reasons, we hypothesize that SEs hire workers to fulfill low-skilled jobs with no more pro-social motivation nor higher value congruence with their new organization than their counterparts in FPOs. We set up the following two null hypotheses regarding newly hired people in order to perform low-skilled work:

$H1_0$: Workers' value congruence in SEs = Workers' value congruence in FPOs;

($H1_1$: Workers' value congruence in SEs > Workers' value congruence in FPOs).

$H2_0$: Workers' pro-social motivation in SEs = Workers' pro-social motivation in FPOs;

($H2_1$: Workers' pro-social motivation in SE > Workers' pro-social motivation in FPOs).

3. Methodology and data

3.1. Data collection

Empirically, this project focuses on the quasi-market of service vouchers in the French-speaking part of Belgium. Data were collected in three types of organizations: WISEs, HCSOs, and FPOs. WISEs and FPOs were randomly selected from the entire population of interest. Since the number of HCSOs on the service voucher quasi-market is much lower, we invited their entire population to take part in this study. In total, 65 organizations agreed to participate but only 53 of them hired at least one worker during the time period of the study (19 WISEs, 9 HCSOs and 25 FPOs). Once organizations had been selected, we collected data

by submitting a questionnaire to all housekeepers and ironers (workers with more qualified jobs were not considered) hired over the period from April 2012 to October 2013. This questionnaire was submitted before the workers' first day of work to ensure that their motivations had not already been affected by their new work environment. The confidentiality of their answers and their anonymity was, of course, guaranteed. The questionnaire included questions about work motivations, perception of value congruence with the organization, socio-demographic characteristics, previous working experiment and status on the labor market, and the ability to identify the mission of their new organization. The final sample included 217 workers distributed into FPOs (77), WISEs (86) and HCSOs (54).

3.2. Measures

3.2.1. Pro-social motivation

We use the 3-item scale of Grant (2008) to measure pro-social motivation (see Appendix 1). An example of an item is 'I am motivated to do my work because I want to have positive impact on others'. Workers had to indicate their agreement (or disagreement) based on a seven-level Likert scale from 'do not agree at all' to 'totally agree'. The value used to measure pro-social motivation is the average score obtained on these three items. Cronbach's alpha of the three-item scale is .86.

3.2.2. Person-organization fit

We measured value congruence between worker and organization with a single item developed by Cable and Judge (1996): 'I feel that my values match those of my organization'. Again, participants had the opportunity to indicate their agreement with this statement on a seven-level Likert scale.

3.3. Sample composition

First, we have to check whether SEs attract the same type of workers in terms of individual characteristics as FPOs (see Table 1). This was not the first experience as a worker in the quasi-market of service vouchers for some of them (37%), but none of the workers had previously worked in an SE. The sample is predominantly female (98%) and the majority of workers may be considered as unqualified (55% have no diploma) or low qualified (36% have a higher secondary education diploma). However, 8% of the workers have a higher level of education, which is surprising given that the position does not require any formal qualification. There are some differences in the new workers' profiles between the different types of organizations. Compared with FPOs, SEs hire more workers who were previously unemployed, supported in their efforts to find a job by a public work integration body, and with no previous experience on the quasi-market of service vouchers. The workers hired by FPOs also have fewer children and are more often of foreign origin than in SEs. WISEs hire more unskilled workers (which is consistent with

Table 1. Workers' characteristics at the first step.

	Total	FPO	SE	WISE	HCSO
N	217	77	140	86	54
Gender (% of men)	.03 (.19)	.04 (.20)	.01 (.12)	.02 (.15)	–
Age	33.58 (9.55)	33.60 (9.90)	33.57 (9.39)	34.74 (9.38)	31.72 (9.19)
Education level[a]	2.41 (.85)	2.59 (.96)	2.32** (.77)	2.20** (.78)	2.50 (.72)
<High School	.55 (.50)	.51 (.50)	.58 (.50)	.64 (.48)	.48 (.50)
=High School	.36 (.48)	.35 (.48)	.37 (.49)	.32 (.47)	.46 (.50)
>High School	.08 (.26)	.14 (.34)	.05** (.22)	.04* (.19)	.06 (.23)
Foreign origin[b] (%)	.15 (.36)	.25 (.44)	.09*** (.29)	.10** (.31)	.07** (.26)
Main task at work (%)					
Housekeepers	.97 (.18)	.96 (.19)	.97 (.17)	.95 (.91)	1.00 (.00)
Unemployed[c] (%)	.69 (.46)	.59 (.49)	.74** (.44)	.74 (.44)	.74 (.44)
Public Help[d]	.24 (.43)	.17 (.38)	.28* (.45)	.28 (.45)	.28 (.45)
Previous experience in the market	.37 (.48)	.45 (.50)	.33* (.47)	.36 (.48)	.28 (.45)
Family situation					
In couple (%)	.51 (.50)	.42 (.50)	.54* (.50)	.48 (.50)	.65** (.48)
Number of kids	1.32 (1.23)	.94 (1.04)	1.49*** (1.29)	1.43** (1.19)	1.59*** (1.43)

Notes: Standard deviations are given in brackets. Anova test (F-test) is performed to compare workers' characteristics between control group (FPO) and the treatment groups (SE-WISE-HCSO).
P-value:*$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$. [BF]In case of variances homogeneity hypothesis rejection, Brown–Forsythe statistic was considered.
[a]Scale from 1 'primary school' to 5 'University or others higher education of the long type'.
[b]People who comes from a country located outside from the EU-15.
[c]This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the worker was unemployed before to take this job as housekeeper and 0 otherwise.
[d]This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the worker has found his new job through the help of a public organization and 0 otherwise.

their mission) while HCSOs more often hire workers who live with a partner than any other types of organizations.

4. Results

In order to test the two null hypotheses of non-differences in workers' motivation between SEs and FPOs, we use the following regression:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 SE_i + \varepsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

where i denotes the individual. Y_i is the dependent variable (pro-social motivation or value congruence) of individual i, SE_i is a dummy for the affiliation of individual i in an SE that controls for the comparability between FPO and SE groups in terms of Y_i. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level. We use the same type of specification to compare the motivation of workers attracted to FPOs with the motivation of their counterparts attracted to WISEs and HCSOs.

However, while the absence of significant differences between workers of SEs (or HCSOs and WISEs) and FPOs allows us not to reject the null hypotheses, it is not enough to accept those hypotheses. Therefore, we apply the triangulation procedure highlighted by Cortina and Folger (1998) to go further. This procedure involves approaching the research question from several different angles. First, it consists in including as many measures as are required by the relevant operationalization of the constructs of interest to protect against the criticism

that measurement error in the form of incorrect manipulations created the lack of effect. In our research context, we then use an additional measure of person-organization fit proposed by Cable and Judge (1996); 'I have the feeling that my values match those of the employees of my organization'. The tests applied on these two different types of measures of the person-organization fit concept always reach the same conclusion, so only the results from the first type of measurement are reported below. Regarding pro-social motivation, we do not use any additional measures because the scale already combines different items and is scientifically validated. Cortina and Folger (1998) confirm that some constructs are largely agreed on, so that the validity of the measure of interest is not likely to be called into question. Secondly, the triangulation procedure advises including an additional independent variable in the model. If it can be shown that this additional variable has a significant effect on the dependent variable, then it provides evidences that dependent variable problems (confounding variables or measurement error, for instance) and sample size did not prevent a significant effect to exist. Hence, we conducted multivariate analysis in the form of regression that includes all the individual characteristics reported in Table 1. Each time, at least one of these individual characteristics has a significant effect on the dependent variable. Thirdly, we have to calculate the effect size values – standardized mean difference between the treatment group (SE, WISE or HCSO) and the control group (FPO) – and to construct confidence intervals to demonstrate that the hypothesized null effects do not appear to be trivial because of sampling error. The results are reported in Table 2.

The results show no significant difference in terms of value congruence and pro-social motivation between FPO and SE workers and between FPO and WISE or HCSO workers. Hence, it seems that SEs neither attract nor select workers with a motivation profile that would be specific compared with their counterparts in FPOs. Therefore, null hypotheses 1 and 2 cannot be rejected.

Further, we observe that the size of the effect of being hired by HCSOs on pro-social motivation is very low (according to Cohen, 1969) and even negative for person-organization fit. This means that fewer than 54% of the HCSO workers have a pro-social motivation above the mean of the FPO group of workers, more than 94% of the two groups (HCSO and FPO workers) overlaps, and there is a less than 53% chance that a person picked at random from the HCSO workers will have a higher pro-social than a person picked at random from the FPO group. In such conditions, we can reasonably accept the null hypotheses 1.1. and 1.2. for HCSOs.

The situation in WISEs is more complicated to interpret. Indeed, when adding individual characteristics in the value congruence regressions, the WISE coefficient becomes significant. In addition, the WISE effect size on value congruence is .23, which is a non-negligible value. One possible explanation may come from the observation that the fact of being unemployed before getting a job in this quasi-market is negatively and strongly correlated with the perceived person-organization fit (see Table 2), while WISEs hire more unemployed people than

Table 2. Selection effect on motivation, regressions results.

Coefficients (β)	P-O Fit (Ologit) (1)	P-O Fit (Ologit) (2)	P-O Fit (OLS) (1)	P-O Fit (OLS) (1)	P-O Fit (OLS) (2)	P-O Fit (OLS) (2)	P-S motivation (1)	P-S motivation (1)	P-S motivation (2)	P-S motivation (2)
Constant	–	–	5.54*** (.12)	4.77*** (.61)	5.54*** (.12)	4.65*** (.60)	5.76*** (.14)	5.33*** (.66)	5.76*** (.14)	5.32*** (.68)
SE	.35 (.26)	–	.15 (.15)	.26 (.17)	–	–	.09 (.18)	.10 (.17)	–	–
WISE	–	.47 (.31)	–	–	.27 (.18)	.37** (.17)	–	–	.08 (.21)	.11 (.19)
HCSO	–	.15 (.29)	–	–	–.04 (.20)	.06 (.23)	–	–	.11 (.21)	.07 (.23)
Woman	–	–	–	–.25 (.39)	–	–.21 (.37)	–	–.18 (.49)	–	–.17 (.50)
Age	–	–	–	.02** (0.01)	–	.02** (0.01)	–	.01 (.01)	–	.01 (.01)
Education level	–	–	–	.10 (.10)	–	.11 (.10)	–	–.01 (.12)	–	–.01 (.11)
Foreign origin	–	–	–	–.30 (.28)	–	–.31 (.28)	–	–.70*** (.23)	–	–.71*** (.23)
Home Cleaning	–	–	–	.30* (.16)	–	.37** (.17)	–	.37 (.33)	–	.37 (.33)
Unemployment	–	–	–	–.32** (.15)	–	–.31** (.15)	–	–.08 (.15)	–	–0.08 (0.15)
CPAS/FOREM	–	–	–	0.12 (0.18)	–	0.12 (0.18)	–	0.09 (0.22)	–	0.09 (0.22)
Previous experience	–	–	–	.27 (.17)	–	.26 (.17)	–	.43*** (.12)	–	.43*** (.12)
Couple	–	–	–	.20 (.21)	–	.23 (.20)	–	.22 (.14)	–	.22 (.15)
Number of kids	–	–	–	–.14** (.07)	–	–.14* (.07)	–	–.06 (.07)	–	–.06 (.07)
Effect size										
SE	.13	–	.13	–	–	–	.08	–	–	–
WISE	–	.23	–	–	.23	–	–	–	.08	–
HCSO	–	–.04	–	–	–.04	–	–	–	.10	–
95% Confidence intervals										
SE	[-.15; .41]	–	[-.15; .41]	–	–	–	[-.19; .36]	–	–	–
WISE	–	[-.08; .54]	–	–	[-.08; .54]	–	–	–	[-.23; .38]	–
HCSO	–	[-.39; .31]	–	–	[-.39; .31]	–	–	–	[-.25; .45]	–
N	217	217	217	209	217	209	217	209	217	209

Notes: Ordered logistic regression is considered regarding P-O fit. The others specifications are OLS regressions. *P*-value: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets. Effect size value and confidence intervals are calculated from the mean difference between the two groups. (1) SE Vs FPO, (2) WISE Vs FPO and HCSO Vs FPO.

Table 3. Selection effect on motivation, regressions results for people who were previously unemployed.

Coefficients (β)	P-O Fit (Ologit) (1)	P-O Fit (Ologit) (2)	P-O Fit (OLS) (1)	P-O Fit (OLS) (2)	P-S motivation (1)	P-S motivation (2)
Constant	–	–	5.46*** (.16); 5.28*** (.58)	5.46*** (.16); 5.11*** (.54)	5.76*** (.18); 6.85*** (.55)	5.76*** (.18); 6.94*** (.54)
SE	.17 (.28)	–	.18 (.20)	–	.04 (.23)	–
WISE	–	.25 (.30)	–	.30 (.19)	–	–.10 (.22)
HCSO	–	.03 (.40)	–	.00 (.25)	–	.06 (.24)
Woman	–	–	–.79* (.39)	–.72* (.38)	–.99*** (.29)	–1.03*** (.29)
Age	–	–	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)
Education level	–	–	.09 (.13)	.11 (.13)	–.08 (.15)	–.09 (.14)
Foreign origin	–	–	–.21 (.38)	–.20 (.39)	–.73** (.34)	–.73** (.34)
Home Cleaning	–	–	.29 (.21)	.37* (.20)	.03 (.38)	–.02 (.37)
CPAS/FOREM	–	–	–.04 (.22)	–.01 (.22)	–.07 (.24)	–.08 (.23)
Previous experience	–	–	.25 (.22)	.27 (.21)	.36** (.15)	.35** (.15)
Couple	–	–	.26 (.27)	.30 (.26)	.28 (.19)	.26 (.20)
Number of kids	–	–	–.19** (.09)	–.19** (.08)	–.05 (.08)	–.05 (.08)
Effect size						
SE	.05	–	.05	–	.07	–
WISE	–	.13	–	.13	–	.00
HCSO	–	–.08	–	–.08	–	.17
95% Confidence intervals						
SE	[–.30; .40]	–	[–.30; .40]	–	[–.28; .42]	–
WISE	–	[–.26; .51]	–	[–.26; .51]	–	[–.38; .39]
HCSO	–	[–.50; .35]	–	[–.50; .35]	–	[–.26; .60]
N	151	151	145	145	145	145

Notes: Ordered logistic regression is considered regarding P-O fit. The others specifications are OLS regressions. P-value: *$p < .10$; **$p < .05$; ***$p < .01$. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets. Effect size value and confidence intervals are calculated from the mean difference between the two groups. (1)SE Vs FPO, (2)WISE Vs FPO and HCSO Vs FPO.

Table 4. Selection effect on motivation, regressions results for people who were not previously unemployed.

Coefficients (β_j)	P-O Fit (Ologit)		P-O Fit (OLS)				P-S motivation			
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)
Constant	–	–	5.67*** (.19)	2.89*** (1.00)	5.67*** (.19)	2.94*** (.24)	5.77*** (.19)	1.88*** (.65)	5.77*** (.19)	1.95*** (.67)
SE	1.10** (.45)	–	.50** (.24)	.19 (.25)	–	–	.27 (.26)	.14 (.23)	–	–
WISE	–	1.40*** (.53)	–	–	.70*** (.24)	.30 (.24)	–	–	.42 (.30)	.27 (.24)
HCSO	–	.65 (.41)	–	–	.19 (.30)	.03 (.37)	–	–	.02 (.25)	–.05 (.39)
Woman	–	–	–	.57 (.37)	–	.30 (.24)	–	.90** (.33)	–	.91** (.35)
Age	–	–	–	.03** (.02)	–	.03** (.02)	–	.03** (.01)	–	.02** (.01)
Education level	–	–	–	.17 (.15)	–	.18 (.15)	–	.16 (.13)	–	.17 (.13)
Foreign origin	–	–	–	–.83*** (.28)	–	–.83*** (.28)	–	–.90*** (.28)	–	–.91*** (.27)
Home Cleaning	–	–	–	.39 (.44)	–	.39 (.45)	–	1.47*** (.24)	–	1.48*** (.24)
CPAS/FOREM	–	–	–	1.04** (.40)	–	.97** (.40)	–	.77* (.42)	–	.68 (.42)
Previous experience	–	–	–	.64** (.26)	–	.57** (.28)	–	.84*** (.24)	–	.75*** (.25)
Couple	–	–	–	–.25 (.29)	–	–.26 (.30)	–	–.07 (.24)	–	–.08 (.24)
Number of kids	–	–	–	.23* (.11)	–	.25* (.11)	–	.06 (.16)	–	.08 (.15)
Effect size										
SE	.49	–	.49	–	–	–	.24	–	–	–
WISE	–	.68	–	–	.68	–	–	–	.37	–
HCSO	–	.19	–	–	.19	–	–	–	.02	–
95% Confidence intervals										
SE	[.00; .98]	–	[.00; .98]	–	–	–	[–.25; .72]	–	–	–
WISE	–	[.12; 1.25]	–	–	[.12; 1.25]	–	–	–	[–.18; .93]	–
HCSO	–	[–.45; .08]	–	–	[–.45; .08]	–	–	–	[–.62; .65]	–
N	66	66	66	64	66	64	66	64	66	64

Notes: Ordered logistic regression is considered regarding P-O fit. The others specifications are OLS regressions. *P*-value: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. Standard errors are clustered by enterprise and are given in brackets. Effect size value and confidence intervals are calculated from the mean difference between the two groups. (1) SE Vs FPO, (2) WISE Vs FPO and HCSO Vs FPO.

FPOs (see Table 1). Therefore, in order to understand the mechanism behind such a result, we reproduce the same design on two subsamples: the previously unemployed and the others (see Tables 3 and 4). Regarding the unemployed subsample, no significant selection effect is observed in WISEs and the effect size on value congruence decreases to .13 and is even equal to zero for pro-social motivation. Conversely, we observe a strong and significant selection effect in WISEs for the second subsample regarding value congruence. The size of the WISE effect on pro-social motivation is also non-negligible even if it is not significant. It means that when WISEs hire non-unemployed persons, they select people with high value congruence with the organization (and high pro-social motivation). Therefore, when WISEs deviate from their initial mission of 'hiring the most vulnerable people on the labor market', it is only to hire people who bring a real added-value to the organization. Some semi-structured interviews were conducted with WISE managers in order to check that result. They highlight that hiring an unemployed person is more financially advantageous for the organization. However, sometimes they prefer to hire an employed person because 'he or she has the right values and the right vision' even if it is not cost-effective.

One reason identified by the literature to justify a non-selection effect of workers in low-skilled jobs regarding the organization mission is the asymmetry of information. Hence, we were interested in the workers' ability to identify the mission of their new organization among the following four options (see Table 5).

For each of these possibilities, future workers had to indicate their agreement with identifying it as the mission of their new organization on a seven-level Likert scale from 'not agree at all' to 'strongly agree'. SE workers identify clearly the mission of their new organization: WISE workers identify the aim of helping unskilled persons to become employed as the primary mission of their new organization while whose of HCSOs agree that the main mission of their organization is to provide home support to dependent persons. Both types of workers also agree that the mission of their organization is clearly not profit maximization. By contrast, new workers in FPOs think that the main mission of their organization is to provide a service to people who work and not to make a profit (even though

Table 5. Mission identification.

Workers	WISE	HCSO	FPO
N	86	54	77
Help no qualified persons to find a job (WISEs mission)	5.49 (1.77)	4.34 (2.14)	4.80 (1.95)
Given home support to elderly and vulnerable people (HCSOs mission)	4.89 (1.89)	5.83 (1.61)	4.92 (1.89)
Profit Maximization (FPOs mission)	3.36 (2.03)	3.31 (1.95)	4.46 (1.89)
Given household service to people in employment (control mission)	5.28 (1.87)	5.40 (1.72)	5.80 (1.61)

Notes: For each of these possibilities, housekeepers had to indicate their agreement (or disagreement) to identify these as being the mission of their new organization on a Likert scale of 7 levels from 'not agree at all' to 'strongly agree'.
Bold value= The mission that received the higher score from each category of workers (WISE, HCSO and FPO).
Underline value= The real social enterprise mission (for WISE and HCSO, their mission is determined by their respective public accreditation; for FPO, we make the supposition that their mission is "profit maximization").
Bold underline value= the workers have identified well their organization's mission.

they are the ones who attribute the highest score to this mission of profit maximization). This finding may be partly explained by the specificities of the sector (usually service provided at home and partially subsidized by the government) which leads most of the new entrants to perceive all service voucher providers as being of the 'social' type. This may explain why we observe that most of the new recruits seem to be relatively pro-socially motivated and to perceive a high congruence between their values and those promoted by the mission of their new organization (see Table 2).

5. Conclusion

The literature highlights that SEs attract people who are more pro-socially motivated than their counterparts in FPOs and who are ready to sacrifice a significant part of their wages to work for a social mission in which they believe. A pro-socially motivated person chooses to work for an SE because his/her altruistic values match the organization's values and mission (e.g. Ben-Ner et al., 2011; Besley & Ghatak, 2005; Handy & Katz, 1998). Further, the limitation of profit distribution functions as a sign of trust and ensures that the workers' efforts will increase the quality or the quantity of the services and not be turned into the owner's profit (e.g. Francois, 2007; Leete, 2006). However, the fact that SEs attract workers who are more pro-socially motivated and who perceive a higher fit with the mission of the organization than their counterparts in FPOs is challenged in the case of low-skilled jobs. On the one hand, SEs would have much more difficulty in attracting and selecting the most pro-socially motivated workers to fulfill low-skilled jobs because the adverse selection mechanism does not work properly and because of issues of asymmetry of information (Henry et al., 2009). On the other hand, workers seem to have less opportunity to fulfill their pro-social motivation through the perception of the social impact of their own work when performing low-skilled tasks (Devaro & Brookshire, 2007).

We therefore carried out an empirical study in the Belgian quasi-market of services vouchers to test the hypothesis of non-differences between FPOs and two types of social enterprises (HCSOs and WISEs) in the pro-social motivation and value congruence of workers hired to perform low-skilled jobs. In order to test these null hypotheses, we used the triangulation procedure developed by Cortina and Folger (1998). The null hypotheses are accepted for HCSOs: they do not hire people to fulfill low-skilled jobs who are more pro-socially motivated or who perceive higher value congruence with the organization than FPOs. We come to the same conclusion for people hired by WISEs and who were previously unemployed. However, it seems that a selection effect exists in WISEs when the sample is reduced to people who were not previously unemployed. In others words, when WISEs deviate from their mission by hiring a person who is not unemployed, they select workers who are highly motivated to achieve the organization's mission and who fit with the values promoted by the organization. Nevertheless, this

only concerns a small percentage of people hired by WISEs since their mission is centered on vulnerable workers.

The WISE managers explain that hiring some non-vulnerable workers who have a high level of pro-social motivation and value congruence is a real added-value for the organization even if it is not cost-effective (more vulnerable workers allow them to obtain subsidies). Indeed, even if labor donation is inapplicable for low-skilled jobs (Brolis & Nyssens, 2015), more pro-socially motivated workers should be ready to make greater efforts at work than their counterparts in FPOs, all other things being equal, because they perceive the importance of the social mission in which they believe. Moreover, and beyond the intensity of effort, the direction of effort is also crucial. Indeed, it is important that workers believe in (and understand) the organization's mission in order to behave in a way coherent with that mission.

6. Practical implications

This paper has demonstrated that is rather more complicated for SEs to hire the most pro-socially motivated workers to fulfill low-skilled jobs than to perform high-skilled jobs while the literature highlights that is essential for the successful functioning of most SEs to have a pro-socially motivated workforce (Handy & Katz, 1998; Hansmann, 1980). Therefore, SEs that offer a lot of low-skilled jobs need to invest in the processes of selection/attraction of people who are pro-socially motivated (or at least open-minded about pro-social goals at work) and, most of all, in the development of a work environment that favors workers' pro-social motivation to perform their low-skilled tasks.

In order to favor the attraction of workers who fit with their missions, SEs should provide accurate information about their values and goals to address the issue of asymmetry of information. Indeed, researchers have highlighted that sharing of information about organizational values (Cable, Aiman-Smith, Mulvey, & Edwards, 2000) and job roles (Wanous & Colella, 1989) with applicants occurs in the early stages of contact between workers and organizations, within the recruitment and selection processes (Cable & Yu, 2007). In particular, the development of workers' perception of fit with the organization starts during the recruitment process (e.g. Cable & Judge, 1996), which means providing information about the company in order to attract new employees that best fit (e.g. Breaugh & Starke, 2000).

In addition to attracting the 'right' workers, any enterprise must ensure that they adopt behavior consistent with its mission (e.g. Ben-Ner & Ren, 2015; Borzaga & Tortia, 2006), either by controlling or by encouraging their efforts. Regarding SEs, developing practices that sustain and favor workers' pro-social motivation is necessary since it is not always easy to attract people with values and motivation perfectly matching with the organization's mission, as demonstrated in this article. Even if more empirical proof is needed, the literature review made by Brolis and

Angel (2015) identifies the following characteristics of a work environment as a way to promote maintenance or/and development of pro-social motivation in SEs: contact (direct and indirect) with beneficiaries, accessibility of information about the mission and beneficiaries, motivational job characteristics (autonomy, task variety and creativity, task significance), mentoring and feedback, and positive organizational climate (recognition and organizational support, fair practices, and democratic participation and involvement in the decision process). Nevertheless, we have to point out that SEs should not be perceived as one standard entity; there is some heterogeneity between SEs (like between WISEs and HCSOs) which may in particular imply different management issues (e.g. Speckbacher, 2013).

If it is confirmed that some SEs are not able to attract or select pro-socially motivated workers, these SEs may also reasonably think of using monetary incentives to improve the extrinsic motivations of their workforce instead of implementing incentives structures that aims to favor the workers' pro-social motivation. Nevertheless, implementing efficient pay-for-performance incentives requires identifying relevant goals and being able to formulate specific expectations for workers, while observing and measuring their outcomes (Gibbons, 1998; Kerr, 1975). In SEs, those conditions are usually not met (Kaplan, 2001). Indeed, it is quite complicated to transform an SE's mission to provide collective goods into a quantifiable goal because such missions tend to be multiple, multidimensional, ambiguous and less tangible than profit maximization (e.g. Nair & Bhatnagar, 2011; Speckbacher, 2013). Moreover, pay-for-performance incentives would negatively affect the workers' pro-social motivation, including that of for people who are in higher skilled positions (e.g. Francois & Vlassopoulos, 2008; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Mosca, Musella, & Pastore, 2007; Speckbacher, 2013).

SEs which do not hire pro-socially motivated workers have then to make a clear choice, either to use pay-for-performance types of incentives to favor the extrinsic motivation of their workers, or to use incentives and practices that stimulate the pro-social motivation of their workers in low-qualified jobs while sustaining the motivation of those assigned to higher qualified jobs.

7. Proposition for future research

This article examines work motivation related to low-skilled job in SEs compared with FPOs. However, though the study is a necessary step in order to get an overall picture of work motivation in SEs, it must be complemented by additional empirical studies. First, the same design has to be reproduced in other contexts to confirm the findings of this research. Secondly, SEs are supposed to implement a work environment and incentive structures that favor and sustain pro-social motivation and the workers' commitment to the values pursued by the social mission (e.g. Speckbacher, 2013). Therefore, SE workers' motivation may evolve positively over time, even if they were not pro-socially motivated when entering their SE. However, this 'exposure effect' has never been empirically proven. Longitudinal

studies are then required to dissociate the effects of the selection process and the exposure process on the pro-social motivation and value congruence of workers in SEs. Particular attention would need to be paid to the qualification level required by the task since it seems to significantly affect the selection process. Further, additional studies are required to identify the practices and specificities of a work environment which are really important to sustain and favor workers' pro-social motivation and perception of value congruence in SEs.

Notes

1. The concepts used to describe organizations with a social mission vary from one country to another: *économie sociale et solidaire* in France; *économie sociale* and *entreprise à profit social* in Belgium; 'non-profit sector' in the US, 'voluntary sector' in the UK, etc. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon tradition, most social scientists who are rooted in the European tradition consider the 'third sector' to include not only non-profit organizations (associations) but also cooperatives, mutual societies, foundations and even new forms of social enterprises or, in other words, all organizations whose primary purpose is not profit maximization for shareholders. Given that the purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the underlying issues with these different concepts, we made the choice to use the generic term 'social enterprise'. For this research, we then define social enterprise as not-for-profit organizations that combine an entrepreneurial dynamic to provide goods or services with the primacy of their social aims.
2. Pro-social motivation is based on altruistic values (e.g. Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004; Penner, Midili, & Kegelmeyer, 1997) like empathy and helpfulness (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005), values of concern for others (e.g. Grant, 2007; Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004) and fairness (e.g. Lyons, Higgins, & Duxbury, 2010). In the SE context, De Cooman et al. (2011) confirm in a study of 13 service Belgian organizations that SE workers are more concerned about altruism than FPO workers.
3. Value congruence or the similarity between values of workers and the values of organizations refers to the concept of person-organization fit (e.g. Edwards & Cable, 2009).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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Appendix 1. The seven Likert scale of prosocial motivation (Grant, 2008)

Why are you motivated to do your work? (Grant, 2008)	Pour quelles raisons faites-vous ce travail? (adapted French version)
Because I want to help others through my work	Parce que je veux rendre service aux autres
Because I care about benefiting others through my work	Parce que je veux être utile pour les autres
Because I want to have positive impact on others	Parce que je veux aider les autres