## The Importance of Fertility Norms: New Evidence from France

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## The Importance of Fertility Norms: New Evidence from France

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#### Abstract

I enrich the findings according to which cultural proxies such as past total fertility rates in the country of origins or number of siblings have a sizable effect on the fertility choice of second generation migrants. I use the TeO survey that interviewed individuals established in France from different origins to investigate whether the effect of fertility norms fades away with assimilation in the host country. In particular I find that women who are in a relationship with a non-native, who were born to two migrant parents and whose family has settled in France more recently are more sensitive to the norm. Still, a significant effect of past fertility rates resists the introduction of many controls like characteristics of partners and religion, though with a smaller magnitude. Finally, by using a duration model, I document that the fertility norm has a positive effect on the hazard rate to have a third child but not for previous birth orders, which suggests some other determinants of fertility dominate for earlier births.

#### JEL Classification:

Keywords: Fertility - Norms - Duration - Birth spacing

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## 1 Introduction

Women's fertility has many potential determinants: her education, her wealth, norms and beliefs that influence her, the same characteristics for her partner as well as socio-economic environment that can be more or less favorable to parenthood etc. Fernandez & Fogli (2006, 2009) show that fertility norms, proxied by the past total fertility rate in the country of origin, influence positively and significantly the number of children of migrant women to the US controlling as much as possible for other determinants, such as education, income, age, number of siblings etc. However it is still not clear how these norms operate and in particular to whom they matter most. In this paper, I document on a French database that the effect of fertility norms decreases with the extent to which migrants assimilate in the host country. Indeed, I show that norms matter more for women in a relationship with a non-native, born to two migrant parents and whose migration history is more recent. This result has two implications: on the one hand, it means that fertility norms are very persistent as even women who tend to be more assimilated in the host country are sensitive to it; on the other hand, assimilation clearly mitigates the importance of these norms.

Fernandez & Fogli (2006, 2009) test the impact of fertility norms on a measure of competed fertility, but disregard the potential effect on birth spacing. One may think in particular that a high fertility is correlated with a low age at first birth. In this view, one would expect the fertility norm to affect the timing of all birth orders. I therefore enrich the findings by showing that a high fertility norm significantly accelerates the shift from 2 to more children, while it does not affect age at first birth and time to second birth. This is important because it means that women coming from countries where mean age at first birth is as different as Senegal and Germany still have their two first children roughly at the same age. I interpret this as suggestive evidence that other determinants, common across countries of origin, prevail for early birth orders. It also reinforces the idea that there exists a strong assimilation of migrants to local conditions, at least as far as early birth orders are concerned. This is particularly relevant to policy makers because of the potential effect of early first births on education decisions. In other words, a high fertility norm induces women to have 3 and more children but does not imply a lower age at first birth, which could potentially impact negatively their education decisions.

Somehow related, some authors have emphasized the role of religion to explain fertility differences across groups. Indeed, countries of ancestry need not be culturally homogenous and it may be the case that religious affiliation play an even greater role, at least as long as this religion may influence fertility choices. Religion may play a role for instance promoting sexual intercourse as a reproduction device only thus forbidding the use of contraception and abortion, but also discouraging women's work outside the household etc. For instance, Adsera (2006a) uses spanish data to show that in a secular society religion is a good predictor of fertility. I contribute to this literature by showing that controlling for religious affiliation matters a lot. First, being muslim is strongly associated with a higher fertility. Second, once controlled for religion, the effect of fertility norms reduces sharply. Last, interestingly enough, being muslim does not affect time to first and second birth, but only time to third birth, just like the fertility norm. This is an important finding because one may think that, if religion plays a role discouraging abortion and contraception, as well as work outside the household, it should accelerate all births. In turn, I observe that it has no effect on the two first births, suggesting that other determinants prevail for these decisions.

There are mainly two strands of related literature: one is about transmission of fertility norms across migrant generations and the other deals with the effect of religion on fertility. The fact that fertility choices may be influenced by norms has been mentioned by many authors who generally underline the difficulty and lack of immediate feedback of these decisions to explain the need to rely on a norm. Hinde (2003) for instance observes that, while economic pressure may have led the middle-class in England to lower fertility in the late nineteenth century due to economic pressure, this low fertility behavior may have spread to groups closely associated, like those employed in domestic services. The importance of fertility norms has furthermore been tested in several works: for instance, Munshi & Myaux (2006) show evidence that reproductive social norms can explain the inertia of fertility behavior and contraceptive use in rural Bangladesh. Another example can be found in Chong et al. (2008) who document that telenovelas, Brazilian soap operas, have played the role of a low fertility norm, specially among women who were the same age as the main characters. More closely linked to the current article are papers discussing the transmission across generations of such norms. Fernandez & Fogli (2009) shows that past female labor force participation and fertility rates in the country of origin significantly and positively affect current outcomes of second generation migrant women to the US. In Fernandez & Fogli (2006), cultural norms are shown to be robust to the inclusion of variables capturing personal experience such as the number of siblings a woman has. Blau et al. (2008) use a slightly different methodology as they use the past fertility rate of first generation migrants to the US to proxy the norm of the second generation migrants from that country. They find strong support for the transmission of fertility (among others) norms, but also for a large assimilation effect from the first to the second generation. My findings are in line with the results of this literature. However I document further the existence of several degrees of intensity of the norm as assimilation in the host country takes place. In particular, being born to a mixed couple or choosing a native partner hamper the influence of the norm. Additionally, I show that norms

only affect the hazard rate of entering the three and more children regime and not previous birth orders.

The second strand of literature I contribute to is that on fertility and religion. The potential impact of religion and religious practice on economic and demographic outcomes has long been mentioned. Lehrer (2004) reviews these mechanisms, among which she underlines the important impact of pro-natalist ideology of religions such as catholicism that raise the perceived benefit of having an additional child. Numerous papers like Adsera (2006a,b, 2007) show that, in a secular society, religion predicts both a higher fertility norm and actual fertility, while Baudin (2008) finds, on French data, that being a catholic is not a robust predictor. My contribution is to merge the two strands of literature as I show that fertility norms operate to a large extent through religion, although not exclusively. Muslims turn out to enter significantly different from each other in that respect. In turn, neither the fertility norm nor religion seem to affect robustly the age at first birth. Section 2 presents the data, Section 3 shows the results, Section 4 deals with the discussion of the identification strategy and the robustness checks, while Section 5 concludes.

## 2 Data, variables and sample selection

I use the TeO survey<sup>1</sup> that interviewed 21800 persons in total aged 18 to 60 residing in metropolitan France in late 2008. The main focus was put on first and second generation immigrants and people from the French overseas territories. The sample gathers 16500 immigrants (8200 first generation, 8300 second generation), 700 people from the French overseas territories and 700 whose parents were born there as well as a control group of 3900 French persons from metropolitan France. They were asked a wide range of questions that provide a lot of information on their characteristics (age, educational attainment, marital status, number of siblings, place of residence, religion), characteristics of their partner and parents as well as on their origin (country of origin, years in France). This data is specially interesting in two respects: it is among the very few surveys in France that report the country of origin of second generation migrants as well as religion, which are considered as sensitive data by the French regulations; it is moreover very rich in terms of information on parents and partners.

I construct a sample of women born in France from at least one non-French parent, who are in a relationship and have had only one. This way I abstract from the issue of single

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Trajectoire et origines (TeO) - version complète - 2008 - (2008) [fichier électronique], INED et INSEE [producteur], Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CMH) [diffuseur]

mothers and remarriage in order to focus on characteristics of the partner. Although potentially endogenous, I choose to control for education to estimate the effect of fertility norms for a given education level. In order to do so, I put a lower bound at age 25 as it seems a reasonable age to have completed education. This methodology amounts to consider that my variables of interest capturing fertility norms are exogenous to all other controls including education, assumption that I shall discuss further in Section 4. The rationale for excluding first generation migrants is to avoid the potential direct impact of migrating on fertility<sup>2</sup>. It furthermore allows to have a much more consistent measure of education as they faced the same education system.

I assign to each individual the country of birth of the foreign born parent and exclude those who have two foreign born parents from different countries<sup>3</sup>. I exclude those with only a region of birth for one of the ascendants (e.g. South America). I furthermore include a dummy that takes value one when both parents are foreign born in order to check whether being born to a mixed couple alters the intensity of the cultural norm. I assign to each country of origin its total fertility rate (TFR) in 1960. As suggested in Fernandez & Fogli (2006, 2009), this variable captures the norm that was in vigor in the origin country at the time the parents lived there. Individuals in my sample are aged 25 to 60, implying that their parents must have migrated at the latest between 1948 and 1983. I chose 1960 because it had observations for all the countries of origin in my sample. I however perform a robustness check assigning respectively the TFR in 1960, 1970 and 1980 to women born before 1965, 1975 and 1983 in order to pick up the fact that TFR has evolved very fast in countries of origin where the demographic transition was taking place at this period.

I use World Bank data that I complement with a UN source<sup>4</sup> that provides the TFR for French overseas territories in 1960<sup>5</sup>. I finally restrict my sample to origin countries for which I have 10 or more observations. A caveat in Fernandez & Fogli (2006, 2009) is that little is known about the history of migration of parents and partners. I therefore focus on women for whom I have information on the partner (whether a first or second generation migrant or a native, his education and age) and on the parents (education, year of arrival in France).

Another interesting feature of this database is that it mentions the age of children. I am thus able to study fertility of second generation migrant in a duration model. A duration model is

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ See mr2 (n.d.) for a discussion on disruption and catching-up effects of migration on fertility.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>They represent a very small amount of individuals.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1997, table 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Germany is treated as only one country, although it was split before 1990. World Bank data gives the TFR in both the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic of Germany and these are very similar, I therefore consider only the FRG figure.

not only more adapted to the study of fertility than OLS insofar as it is the result of sequential decisions and not a once and for all decision, it also allows to analyze different patterns in terms of birth spacing rather than only completed fertility. I focus on age at first birth, time to second and third births in order to maintain a reasonable sample size.

I obtain a sample with 1113 observations from 16 origin countries, for which Table 1 gives some summary statistics. Notice there is sizable variations in TFR in the country of origin (tfr60 from now on) from 2.03 in Germany to 7.33 in Algeria. Notice further that the distribution of tfr60 is rather bimodal with developing countries around 6 and European countries around 2.5. Number of siblings is systematically smaller than tfr60 for developing countries (in which I include French overseas territories), while it is not so for European countries, suggesting that there exists a self selection of low fertility individuals into migration from these countries. Another feature is that women from developing countries tend to be on average more educated and have more educated partners and parents. This is to be linked with the fact that migrants from developed are on average younger and that the average level of education has increased in the last decades. Associated to this, migration from developing countries is on average more recent than that from European countries. Finally, it seems that women from muslim countries are much less likely be atheist than those from other origins. I will discuss the potential bias that the endogeneity of these controls to fertility norms implies further in Section 4.

## 3 Results of the duration model

I use the Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the instantaneous hazard rate of going from one regime to the next. I consider four regimes: childless, one child, two children and three or more children<sup>6</sup>. The analysis time is therefore age at first birth, time between first and second birth, and finally time between second and third birth. Coefficients can alternatively be interpreted as affecting the probability of having one, two and three or more children conditional on the previous birth order having occurred. This model assumes that the hazard function  $\lambda$  is of the form given in equation (1) and I then estimate the coefficients by maximum likelihood.

$$\lambda(t \mid \text{norm} , X) = \lambda_0(t) exp(\beta \text{ norm} + \gamma X)$$
(1)

where  $\lambda_0$  is the baseline hazard and X a set of controls. "Norm" represents my variables of interest, namely tfr60 and number of siblings. Because tfr60 is the same for all migrants from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>I do not consider higher birth orders because it would considerably shrink the sample. In turn, I do not consider the age at which the relationship started because it is ill-measured (only age at marriage, nothing on age when the civil union took place).

	Nb of					partner	$\mathbf{mother}$	father	years in	migrant	no
origin	obs.	tfr60	siblings	age	educ	educ	educ	educ	France	partner	religion
Developing co	untries										
Guadeloupe	24	5.71	2.42	35.50	0.54	0.42	0.58	0.67	47.00	45.83	37.50
Martinique	18	5.60	3.00	30.94	0.50	0.39	0.89	0.78	40.22	44.44	26.67
Reunion	16	6.38	2.81	32.06	0.44	0.44	0.31	0.50	34.00	31.25	13.33
Algeria	196	7.33	5.57	34.91	0.30	0.28	0.24	0.20	47.64	62.76	23.32
Morocco	115	7.17	4.93	32.17	0.45	0.34	0.30	0.37	40.50	73.91	13.27
Tunisia	65	7.10	3.48	34.37	0.48	0.46	0.38	0.42	44.55	55.38	25.40
Senegal	11	6.60	6.00	31.09	0.45	0.36	0.27	0.45	38.55	72.73	9.09
Vietnam	28	6.96	3.75	32.54	0.79	0.68	0.82	0.86	43.21	21.43	62.96
Lao	11	5.99	6.82	28.36	0.55	0.45	0.18	0.55	30.09	72.73	80.00
Turkey	49	6.31	3.76	29.18	0.16	0.16	0.12	0.20	36.47	87.76	10.64
More advance	d countri	es									
Portugal	182	3.01	2.52	34.09	0.38	0.26	0.21	0.23	42.14	36.26	27.04
Spain	140	2.86	2.39	38.15	0.37	0.30	0.37	0.40	51.34	18.57	42.96
Italy	181	2.41	2.53	40.33	0.38	0.30	0.31	0.36	55.24	23.76	26.59
Germany	33	2.37	2.33	37.97	0.61	0.45	0.67	0.82	52.70	21.21	25.00
Belgium	23	2.58	3.00	38.04	0.39	0.39	0.57	0.65	52.91	13.04	42.86
UK	21	2.98	2.57	42.48	0.33	0.29	0.48	0.33	61.14	9.52	23.53
Total	1113	4.75	3.52	35.54	0.39	0.32	0.33	0.36	46.84	43.13	27.49

#### Table 1: Summary statistics

Partner's migration status gives the percentage of individual in the sample who are in a relationship with either a first or second generation migrant. Educ and partner's educ gives the percentage of individual with at least two years of college, while mother's and father's education gives the percentage of individuals who completed at least secondary education. Migrant partner gives the percentage of women with a non-native partner. Atheist reports the percentage of women declaring they do not have a religion or are atheist.

the same country, I cluster the standard errors at the country of origin level. As it can be understood from equation (1), the model leaves the baseline hazard unspecified and assumes that covariates have a constant impact on the hazard rate over the whole at-risk period (the coefficients are independent of time). Actually one may think in the case of fertility of both negative (the older women get, the less fertile they become) and positive (reaching the situation in terms of employment, housing etc. to raise a child might take time) time dependence. As in previous studies (Gutiérrez-Domènech (2008) e.g.), I stick to the Cox model as a reasonable approximation. I furthermore test the proportional hazard assumption and do not find evidence against it. Using a duration model has two main advantages with respect to straight OLS. On the one hand, it avoids to discuss what completed fertility actually is. For instance, Fernandez & Fogli (2006) include in the sample women aged 29 to 50 and control for age, while Jones *et al.* (2010) use a more restricted window of women aged 40 to 50 claiming that below that age fertility is not likely to be completed and that above the measure would be biased because differential mortality (across income groups for instance) affects the composition of the sample of interviewed women. The duration model instead uses all observations, even censored ones, to compute at each period the hazard ratio of exiting a given state. In other words, it means that the observation of a woman aged 27 without children is used to compute the hazard rate of switching from the childless to the one child regime at each age from 0 to 27. On the other hand, the duration model can be interpreted in terms of timing of births, at the expense though of a precise measure of completed fertility. Indeed, if the hazard rate of exiting the childless regime is positively affected by some co-variate, it also means that this co-variate affects negatively the time to first birth. This is interesting because if a woman decides to have more children, she may decide either to start earlier or to reduce birth spacing. It matters to distinguish the two phenomena, as early first births may affect for instance education decisions. In the remainder I will refer indifferently to either the timing or the hazard rate interpretation.

First I check the reliability of the methodology by implenting a test of the proportional hazard assumption on the hazard rate of third birth<sup>7</sup>. Regarding the proportional hazard assumption, I compare the predicted values of a simple Cox model without controls to a non-parametric estimation of the survival probability, namely the Kaplan-Meier survival curve. More precisely it is important to check that the Cox-model does not distort the data for both treatment and control groups. To do this, I divide first my sample into low versus high tfr60, which actually corresponds to developing versus more advanced economies as shown in Table 1. I test the robustness by looking at the comparison between low versus high number of siblings using the median. Figure 1 shows that the Cox model does not distort the data much compared to the Kaplan-Meier estimates in any of these cases.

I perform a second test to check that the effect of the variables of interest indeed does not vary with time, as it is assumed by the proportional hazard assumption. To this end, I show the predicted values of the Cox model with controls for the four groups (high versus low tfr60 and number of siblings). As depicted in Figure 2, these curves are roughly parallel, pleading in favor of the proportional hazard model. Indeed, it seems that these "treatments" (high tfr60 or number of siblings) affect the hazard rate roughly constantly over time.

Now, I turn to the results. I run for each birth order the same set of regressions. I first test in specification (1) the significance of tfr60 and siblings without further controls than region of residence, urban status and third degree polynomials in age. Urban status and region of residence pick up all the effects that local conditions could have such as price of housing or amenities. The third degree polynomial in age ensures that time varying economic conditions or public policies that affect a whole cohort are controlled for. Indeed, it has been shown that public policies were

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>The tests are conclusive for first and second birth as well but graphs are more legible for third birth.



Figure 1: Predicted values of the Cox model without controls versus Kaplan-Meier survival curves



Figure 2: Predicted values of the Cox model, treated versus non treated

at least partly responsible of the persistently high fertility in France compared to its neighbors<sup>8</sup>. Then I add controls for a set of variables that could arguably be endogenous. The rationale is to make sure that the mechanism is indeed the transmission of a fertility norm and not due to an omitted variable bias. I shall discuss further this strategy in Section 4. I consequently add up own education (a 5-position categorical variable) in (2). Then in (3), I include parental and partner's characteristics, that is to say parental and partner's education (which are 5-position categorical variables) as well as a third degree polynomial in age of the partner, migration status of the partner, the fact that both parents are migrants and years in France. Migration status of the partner reports whether the partner is native, first or second generation migrant. Years in France gives the number of years since the foreign-born parent arrived in France, the first arrived if both are foreign-born. I then construct dummies for whether migrations dates back to less than 40 years, between 40 and 50 and more than 50. These controls try to ensure that women in the sample are as comparable as possible, in terms of geographical location, migration history and age. Finally I add up dummies for religion in (4).

#### 3.1 Time to first and second births

Turning to the results on the timing of first birth given in Table 2, tfr60 is never significant whatever the specification. Contrary to previous studies looking at the total number of children, this result means that women with a high fertility norm do not have their first child earlier than others. This is quite surprising as one may have thought that the fertility norm would influence all childbearing decisions, including the first one. Another reason to think this result is surprising is that countries with a high TFR are certainly characterized by a lower age at first birth. I can therefore infer that there does not seem to exist a transmission of norm in terms of age at first birth.

The coefficient on siblings, in turn, is positive and significant in specification (1), which means that the hazard rate of going from the childless to the one child regime significantly increases with the number of siblings a woman has. Alternatively, one may say that the age at first birth decreases with siblings. However this effect is not robust to the introduction of education as a control. Just like the cultural norm, personal experience does not seem to matter for age at first birth.

As for the rest of the variables, as expected education is very significantly and negatively associated to the hazard rate of having a first child. For instance, the baseline hazard rate of having a first child for women educated up to secondary education is multiplied by exp(-0.989) =

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>See Baudin (2008) for a review.

0.372 for women with a master or more. Similarly, partner's education seems to decrease the hazard rate, meaning it tends to increase age at first birth of women. Parental education in turn does not matter significantly. Among the controls I add, being in a relationship with a non-native (first or second generation migrant) sharply increases the hazard rate of having a first child, while years in France, the fact of having two migrant parents or even religion do not have a significant impact. Indeed, only being jewish seems associated to a higher hazard of having a first child. Nevertheless, I have very few observations for this religion and most of these women actually come from Tunisia, which represent a very specific non-random sample of the jewish population in France.

I repeat the exercise on the time from first to second birth, which can be interpreted as the probability of having a second child conditional on having already one. I show the results in Table 8 in Appendix as they are very similar to those I just commented on. The only noticeable difference is that education is no longer significant, although it was a very strong determinant of age at first birth. My contribution is therefore to show that actually neither entry into motherhood nor time between first and second child are significantly impacted by fertility norms. Whatever the origin country, second generation migrant women choose a similar birth spacing pattern at an early stage. This might be due to the fact that other determinants of fertility like labor market conditions or the opportunity cost of having children dominate the fertility norm channel at least for the two first births. Indeed, tougher times to find a job may lead couples to postpone their entry into parenthood and somehow reduce total size of the cohort of children. Hoem (2000) for instance finds that high unemployment at the municipality level depresses entry into motherhood on panel data for Sweden from 1986 to 1997. Comparably, Hondroyiannis (2010) argues that uncertainty about macro-economic variables may be detrimental to child-bearing as responsible parents would not decide to have one more children if they were to face a high risk of unemployment or low income in the future. He uses a panel data of European countries to show that measures of economic uncertainty such as output volatility and the unemployment rate are negatively related to fertility rates. Additionally, one would ideally like to control for potential wage of women as a better measure of their opportunity cost than only education. Though desirable, these extensions fall outside the scope of this article mainly due to data limitation. In any case, it remains that my results go in the direction of hurdle models of fertility, similar to the one proposed by Miranda (2010), in which decisions to remain childless, having one or two children and having three or more are thought as separate regimes that have their specific determinants.

	(1	)	(2)	)	(3	)		(4)
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
tfr60	0.013	(0.013)	0.014	(0.011)	-0.011	(0.019)	-0.017	(0.029)
siblings	$0.028^{***}$	(0.007)	0.002	(0.008)	0.005	(0.009)	0.007	(0.009)
educ 1			-0.475***	(0.113)	-0.413***	(0.132)	-0.411***	(0.132)
2			-0.697***	(0.143)	-0.672***	(0.152)	-0.656***	(0.150)
3			-0.906***	(0.138)	-0.799***	(0.125)	-0.750***	(0.131)
4			$-1.186^{***}$	(0.137)	-1.014***	(0.140)	-0.989***	(0.145)
partner's educ 1					0.041	(0.097)	-0.010	(0.100)
2					$-0.297^{***}$	(0.111)	-0.320***	(0.116)
3					-0.091	(0.074)	-0.133*	(0.069)
4					-0.269**	(0.120)	-0.314**	(0.136)
father's educ 1					0.062	(0.076)	0.056	(0.088)
2					-0.065	(0.073)	-0.062	(0.089)
3					0.099	(0.139)	0.118	(0.137)
4					0.207	(0.169)	0.226	(0.149)
mother's educ 1					-0.059	(0.089)	-0.089	(0.094)
2					0.054	(0.170)	0.028	(0.187)
3					0.011	(0.142)	-0.016	(0.163)
4					-0.100	(0.252)	-0.109	(0.244)
1st gen. partner					0.377***	(0.089)	0.392***	(0.095)
2nd gen. partner					$0.405^{***}$	(0.076)	$0.377^{***}$	(0.093)
$40{<}50$ years in Fr.					0.006	(0.056)	-0.000	(0.059)
>50 years in Fr.					0.006	(0.084)	-0.037	(0.085)
2 migrant parents					0.009	(0.077)	-0.007	(0.070)
christian							0.075	(0.102)
muslim							0.109	(0.128)
jewish							$0.860^{***}$	(0.129)
bouddhist							0.482	(0.330)
Observations	1113		1113		1113		1055	
Pseudo $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.005		0.014		0.020		0.020	

Table 2: Time to first birth

Standard errors in parentheses. Education and partner's education are 5-level categorical variables: up to secondary, vocational training, high school graduate, up to bachelor, master and above. Parental education is also a 5-level categorical variable: no education, primary, secondary, high school graduate or vocational training, bachelor and above. Dummies for region of residence and urban status as well as third degree polynomial in age in all specifications. Third degree polynomial in age of the partner included in specifications (3) and (4).

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

#### 3.2 Time to third birth

The results I obtain change drastically when I turn to time to third birth. They are summed up in Table 3. The only difference in the model I estimate is that in specifications (3) and (4), I now control for the sex of the first to children. Indeed, it has been shown in Angrist & Evans (1998) that women with two children of the same sex were significantly more likely to have a third one due to a taste for diversity. I find that tfr60 is now always very strongly positive and significant. To give an idea, being from an origin country with a TFR in 1960 of 6 instead of 3 induces according to the specification between 27% and 71% more chances to have a three or more children conditional on having two. Siblings seems to have some effect but is less robust to the inclusion of more controls. This suggests that the fertility norm does not play a role in the timing of the two first births but does accelerate the decision to have a third child. This result allows to shed light on the decision making process of fertility. Indeed, it shows that norms influence completed fertility only by inducing women to decide to enter the three and more children regime but in no way does it induce women to enter earlier into motherhood.

Another interesting feature to underline is that education matters again. This again pleads the case for fertility decisions to follow a hurdle model, where one could distinguish the childless, low and high fertility regimes. Partner's migration status is not significant any longer, neither are years in France nor the fact of having two migrant parents. In turn, being muslim as well jewish turn out to be positive and very significant while christians have the same probability of having a third child than atheists. Indeed, the hazard rate for muslim for instance is more than twice as big as that for atheists or christians. Note also that the coefficient on tfr60 drastically drops when I include religious controls. This suggests that a large part of the transmission of the fertility norm goes through the religion channel and that Islam seems to be the most pro-natalist religion in France.

I now would like to know whether the effect of fertility norms could be magnified or hampered by some characteristics. To do so, I estimate the model in equation (2) where Y is successively migration status of the partner, whether both parents are migrants, years in France and education. I include the same controls as in specification (3) as adding religion dilutes most of the effects.

$$\lambda(t| \text{ norm }, X) = \lambda_0(t) exp(\beta_0 \text{ norm } + \beta_1 Y * \text{ norm } + \beta_2 Y + \gamma X)$$
(2)

The rationale for this is to explore whether the norm could have several degrees of intensity for women differently assimilated in the host country. As for education, one may think that more educated women may be less sensitive to a norm and rely more on other factors. In Table 4, I show  $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ , which is the marginal effect of the norm on the hazard rate of having a third child

	(1	)	(2)	)	(3	)		(4)
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
tfr60	$0.164^{***}$	(0.029)	0.162***	(0.029)	0.180***	(0.025)	0.082**	(0.037)
siblings	$0.040^{**}$	(0.020)	$0.036^{**}$	(0.018)	0.025	(0.026)	0.014	(0.031)
educ 1			-0.336**	(0.147)	-0.375**	(0.177)	-0.288*	(0.165)
2			-0.681***	(0.206)	-0.847***	(0.228)	-0.856***	(0.217)
3			-0.301	(0.208)	-0.389**	(0.195)	-0.318*	(0.171)
4			-0.601***	(0.191)	$-1.085^{***}$	(0.213)	$-0.934^{***}$	(0.210)
partner's educ 1					-0.365***	(0.133)	-0.349***	(0.119)
2					-0.090	(0.270)	-0.178	(0.284)
3					-0.027	(0.185)	-0.106	(0.240)
4					0.260	(0.206)	0.272	(0.185)
father's educ 1					0.275	(0.175)	$0.385^{**}$	(0.181)
2					0.279	(0.307)	0.229	(0.362)
3					0.280	(0.186)	$0.340^{*}$	(0.185)
4					$1.311^{***}$	(0.251)	$1.394^{***}$	(0.347)
mother's educ 1					-0.350*	(0.207)	$-0.315^{*}$	(0.189)
2					-0.147	(0.166)	-0.248	(0.229)
3					-0.238	(0.238)	-0.372	(0.253)
4					-0.309	(0.424)	-0.180	(0.606)
1st gen. partner					0.272	(0.172)	$0.292^{*}$	(0.155)
2nd gen. partner					-0.126	(0.186)	-0.149	(0.188)
40 < 50 years in Fr.					0.264	(0.202)	$0.359^{*}$	(0.196)
>50 years in Fr.					0.308	(0.240)	0.282	(0.238)
2 migrant parents					0.108	(0.146)	0.012	(0.166)
christian							-0.022	(0.127)
muslim							$0.769^{***}$	(0.172)
jewish							$0.954^{***}$	(0.248)
bouddhist							-0.117	(0.570)
Observations	627		627		627		590	
Pseudo $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.027		0.031		0.042		0.048	

Table 3: Time to third birth

Standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for region of residence and urban status as well as third degree polynomial in age in all specifications. Third degree polynomial in age of the partner, dummies for the sex of first two children and interaction term included in specifications (3) and (4).

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

	sibli	ngs	tfr	·60				
	$\operatorname{coeff}$	se	coeff	se				
native partner	$0.051^{**}$	(0.025)	0.098**	(0.034)				
1st generation partner	0.003	(0.066)	$0.275^{***}$	(0.084)				
2nd generation partner	-0.019	(0.032)	$0.318^{***}$	(0.064)				
Observations			627					
Pseudo $\mathbb{R}^2$		0	0.044					
one migrant parent	$0.064^{***}$	(0.025)	0.187	(0.133)				
both migrant parents	-0.023	(0.029)	$0.405^{***}$	(0.130)				
Observations			627					
Pseudo $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.045							
<40 years in France	-0.037	0.046	$0.341^{**}$	0.137				
$40{<}50$ years in France	-0.038	0.034	$0.424^{***}$	0.140				
>50 years in France	$0.095^{***}$	0.036	$0.285^{**}$	0.137				
Observations			627					
Pseudo $\mathbb{R}^2$		0	0.044					
educ 0	0.025	(0.032)	$0.159^{***}$	(0.048)				
1	-0.004	(0.058)	$0.147^{**}$	(0.046)				
2	-0.063	(0.103)	$0.367^{***}$	(0.127)				
3	0.084	(0.055)	$0.213^{**}$	(0.084)				
4	0.042	(0.029)	$0.159^{**}$	(0.077)				
Observations	627							
Pseudo $\mathbb{R}^2$		C	0.044					

Table 4: Time to third child, heterogeneous effects

Standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for region of residence and urban status as well as third degree polynomial in age and age of the partner, dummies for the sex of first two children and interaction term included in all specifications.

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

at all levels of the interacted variable Y.

First it appears that the effect of tfr60 is way stronger for women who chose a migrant partner, be it first or second generation. This means that women who choose a non-native partner are also more likely to be influenced by the cultural norm. An interpretation is that these women kept more links with their country of origin and that these links are revealed by the choice of their partner. It is also likely to be the case that some of these women were subject to forced marriages, decided by their parents. In all cases, as tfr60 remains significant for women married to a native, it does not seem that the effect is solely driven by the fact that the marriage market is highly assortative in terms of country of origin. Recall from Table 1 that close to half of the sample is married to a non-native. Instead it means that even for women married to a native, tfr60 remains significant although the coefficient is smaller, suggesting some bargaining about fertility happens between partners.

I then obtain that siblings becomes significant for women who have only one migrant parent while tfr60 is for two migrant parents. This suggests that the intensity of the cultural effect may vary depending on how much one family is deep-rooted in the host country. When this intensity diminishes (for one migrant parent families for instance), then siblings may become a predictor of fertility, while in two migrant parents' families, the effect of siblings is dominated by the cultural norm. I also find signs of various levels of intensity of the cultural norm also when I interact with years in France. It seems that tfr60 plays a greater role for families with a recent migration history. Indeed, the magnitude of the effect is significantly lower for women whose parents arrived more than 50 years ago in France. As regards education, contrary to what could be thought, there does not seem to exist decreasing effect of the norm. The coefficient for tfr60 is always significant and varies non-linearly with education, first increasing and then decreasing. The effect is significantly bigger for high school graduates with respect to all other education levels.

### 4 Discussion and robustness checks

In order to compare my results with previous literature and check their robustness, I will first replicate the exercise in Fernandez & Fogli (2006), then discuss the bias of controlling for endogenous variables and finally explore some alternative interpretations. Let me start by the replication exercise. To this end, I restrict the sample to women aged 35 to 60 so that the answer to the children ever born question gives a sense of completed fertility. I thus obtain 582 observations. I then regress by OLS the number of children on tfr60 and siblings without any further controls than region of residence, urban status and third degree polynomial in age (specifications (1)). In specification (2) to (3), I add controls for own, partner's and parents' education, as well as third degree polynomial in age of the partner. These are close to the preferred specifications in Fernandez & Fogli (2006). As the database also gives the number of years in France, the migration status of the partner, whether both parents are migrants and religion, I include controls for these variables in specification (5).

Table 5 gives the results. As in Fernandez & Fogli (2006), siblings and tfr60 appear to be positive and significant in specification (1). The magnitude of the effects is also similar to that found in Fernandez & Fogli (2006) who get coefficients between 0.08 and 0.13 for tfr60 and from 0.03 to 0.09 for siblings depending on the specification. My results differ slightly in that the coefficient on siblings looses significance and drops to close to zero when I add the controls for education while it remains weakly significant in the original article. Finally I find that tfr60

	The dependent variable is children ever born									
	(1	.)	(2)	)	(3)	)	(4)	)	(5	)
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
tfr60	0.082***	(0.021)	0.089***	(0.020)	0.090***	(0.023)	0.077***	(0.019)	0.018	(0.024)
siblings	$0.037^{**}$	(0.014)	0.018	(0.014)	0.013	(0.017)	0.012	(0.017)	0.014	(0.015)
education 1			-0.419**	(0.176)	-0.424**	(0.146)	-0.395**	(0.158)	-0.344**	(0.149)
2			$-0.519^{***}$	(0.148)	-0.500***	(0.138)	-0.494***	(0.161)	-0.441**	(0.165)
3			$-0.664^{***}$	(0.190)	$-0.659^{***}$	(0.182)	-0.648***	(0.201)	$-0.615^{***}$	(0.200)
4			$-0.645^{***}$	(0.188)	-0.683***	(0.167)	$-0.656^{***}$	(0.193)	$-0.571^{**}$	(0.208)
partner's educ 1					-0.128	(0.089)	-0.112	(0.113)	-0.089	(0.092)
2					$-0.492^{***}$	(0.163)	-0.461**	(0.168)	$-0.468^{***}$	(0.147)
3					-0.001	(0.125)	0.015	(0.128)	-0.047	(0.131)
4					0.019	(0.147)	0.037	(0.145)	0.029	(0.146)
mother's educ 1					-0.048	(0.098)	0.042	(0.120)	0.005	(0.111)
2					-0.321	(0.211)	-0.217	(0.242)	-0.303	(0.196)
3					-0.082	(0.212)	0.060	(0.259)	-0.008	(0.220)
4					-0.300	(0.321)	-0.127	(0.374)	-0.129	(0.336)
father's educ 1					0.017	(0.166)	0.025	(0.157)	0.008	(0.166)
2					0.280	(0.176)	0.277	(0.169)	0.245	(0.220)
3					0.106	(0.156)	0.122	(0.147)	0.121	(0.146)
4					0.174	(0.261)	0.222	(0.230)	0.319	(0.190)
1					-0.128	(0.089)	-0.112	(0.113)	-0.089	(0.092)
2nd gen. partner							$0.220^{*}$	(0.108)	0.183	(0.113)
1st gen. partner							0.284	(0.178)	0.217	(0.185)
$40{<}50$ years in Fr.							0.157	(0.171)	0.081	(0.188)
< 50 years in Fr.							0.238	(0.189)	0.113	(0.213)
2 migrant parents							0.138	(0.100)	0.069	(0.086)
christian									0.176	(0.135)
muslim									$0.572^{***}$	(0.181)
jewish									$1.704^{***}$	(0.374)
other									0.250	(0.261)
partner's age					x		x		x	
Observations	582		582		582		582		546	
$R^2$	0.099		0.141		0.192		0.208		0.265	
Standard errors in pa	rentheses.									

## Table 5: Completed fertility, OLS

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Controls for region of residence, urban status and third order polynomials in age in all specifications.

survives the introduction of further controls like years in France, dummies for the migration status of the partner and for whether both parents are migrants. However the effect of the cultural norm is washed out by the introduction of religious controls. The results are therefore largely comparable to those derived from the duration model, except they do not tell anything about birth spacing.

As in Fernandez & Fogli (2006, 2009), an endogeneity issue arises. Indeed, as already mentioned in the introduction, I choose to control for education but also a bunch of other characteristics although they could be thought as endogenous. I do so because I want to adopt the strictest possible view about fertility norms and shut down as many other channels as possible. I therefore include in my controls all variables that are correlated to both the explanatory variables (tfr60 and siblings) and the outcome in the same direction. I do so because failing to do it would introduce an upward bias on the coefficients of interest. For instance, if education is correlated negatively to both siblings and fertility, not controlling for it would result in the coefficient on the fertility norm being upward biased because it would pick up the effect of education on fertility. The same kind of argument applies to education and migration status of the partner or religion. Indeed, it turns out that having a non-native partner or being muslim is positively correlated to both tfr60 and fertility. Finding a significant effect of tfr60 once controlled for religion is therefore a sign that the fertility norm operates on top of the transmission of religious values. Notice that Blau et al. (2008) take the opposite standpoint stating that their preferred specification is not to control. Indeed they claim that norms may operate through the choice of studies or partners and that consequently controlling for such variables introduces a downward bias on the coefficient for the norm. For the reasons previously exposed, I do not choose to follow this methodology.

I check to what extent controlling for own education, education and migration status of the partner or religion might be important by estimating the following equation:

$$Z = \beta \text{ norm } + \gamma X + \epsilon \tag{3}$$

where Z is successfully a measure for own education, education and migration status of the partner and religion. I take these variables because they are the ones most robustly correlated to the fertility measures in my regressions (Tables 2.3 and 2.5). I want to make sure I only control for variables that are correlated in the same direction to both fertility and the co-variates of interest, tfr60 and siblings. More specifically, in specification (1) and (2) respectively, I use a Probit model and the left hand side variable is whether a woman or her partner completed bachelor education or more. Specification (3) is also a Probit and the outcome is the probability

	(1	(1)		(2)	(3)		(4	)	(5)	
	educ	ation	education		migration status		tfr60		being	
			of the	partner	of the p	the partner of the		artner	a muslim	
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
tfr60	0.032	(0.028)	0.035	(0.028)	$0.057^{**}$	(0.027)	0.107***	(0.023)	0.852***	(0.101)
siblings	$-0.044^{*}$	(0.023)	0.015	(0.023)	-0.057***	(0.021)	0.001	(0.010)	$0.057^{*}$	(0.030)
Observations	1048		1055		1055		1031		1113	
(Pseudo) $\mathbb{R}^2$	eudo) $R^2$ 0.275 0.233		0.310		0.719		0.712			

Table 6: Correlation between controls and variables of interest

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Standard errors in parentheses. Controls for region of residence, urban status and third order polynomials in age and age of the partner, own, parents' and partner's education, migration status of the partner, whether both parents are migrants, years in France and religion. In each specification, I exclude from the controls the variable that is on the left hand side.

to have a non-native partner. Specification (4) regresses by OLS the tfr60 of partners<sup>9</sup> on tfr60 of women and siblings. Finally specification (5) reports the results of a Probit model with being muslim as a dependent variable. I control for the full set of controls in each specification except the one I put as a dependent variable. Results are shown in Table 6.

What can be learnt from this Table is that tfr60 is correlated positively to variables that are themselves positively correlated to fertility: migration status of the partner and being a muslim, while it is unrelated to the other variables. Controlling for these variables can only reduce the coefficient on tfr60 and is therefore useful to decrease the omitted variable bias as much as possible. For siblings in turn, an issue could arise from the fact that it is negatively related to the probability to be in a relationship with a non-native, which affects positively fertility. Controlling for it could thus tend to bias upward the coefficient on siblings. I consider it is not such a concern as I do not find a significant effect of siblings anyway.

A comparable issue is that of teenage pregnancies. Indeed, one may argue that women entering motherhood at an early age are also more likely to receive subsequently less education, to find less easily a job, to have more children<sup>10</sup> etc. In order to avoid the possibility that my results are driven by the fact that tfr60 is a predictor of teenage pregnancies, I repeat the exercise excluding women who had their first child before 20. The results I described earlier still hold. The Tables (9 and 10) are in Appendix.

Finally, another criticism could be that the proxy I use for a fertility norm is nothing else

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>To build this variable, I assign to native partners the TFR in France in 1960, for first generation migrants, that of their country of birth, and for second generation migrant, that of their foreign born parent, or of their father if both parents are foreign born.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>See for instance Fletcher & Wolfe (2008).

	(1)		(2	)	(3	)		(4)
	ь	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
cons60	-0.405***	(0.100)	$0.241^{*}$	(0.140)	0.214	(0.222)	-0.050	(0.256)
siblings			0.023	(0.026)	0.001	(0.029)	-0.023	(0.037)
tfr60			$0.320^{***}$	(0.063)	$0.324^{***}$	(0.092)	0.090	(0.149)
geographic and age controls	x		x		x		x	
own education					x		x	
all other controls							x	
Observations	495		495		495		466	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.031		0.037		0.052		0.059	

Table 7: Time to third birth, including consumption norm

Standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for region of residence and urban status as well as third degree polynomial in age in all specifications. Third degree polynomial in age of the partner, education of the partner, education of parents, years in France, whether both parents are migrants, religion as well as dummies for the sex of first two children and interaction term included in specifications (4).

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

that the inverse of a consumption norm. In this view, migrants from high fertility country would actually import from their home country a low consumption norm. Indeed, it is a robust empirical finding that income (and therefore consumption) and fertility are inversely related across countries<sup>11</sup>. Additionally, there exists a vast literature about habit formation in consumption behavior. Artige *et al.* (2004) in particular uses the intergenerational transmission of such norm to explain reversal of fortunes across countries. One may therefore think that migrants are more able to transfer such kind of norm than fertility norms. Unfortunately the data does not allow me to disentangle clearly these two potential channels for the simple reason that consumption per capita and TFR are very much inversely related across countries (0.92 for the countries in my sample in 1960). I however assign to each country of origin its consumption per capita in 1960 and look at its robustness as a determinant of the hazard rate of having a third child. Results are shown in Table 7.

Specification (1) shows that indeed cons60, which is consumption per capita in the country of origin in 1960, seems quite strongly and negatively associated to the hazard rate of having three children or more. Nevertheless it is enough to add tfr60 to observe that the fertility norm seems more strongly related to the outcome. Finally while tfr60 remains significant in specification (3) and very close to significance in specification (4), the coefficient on the consumption norm goes to zero as further controls are included. I take this as suggestive evidence that what my proxy captures is indeed rather a fertility norm than a consumption norm.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>See Jones *et al.* (2010) for an interesting review.

A last issue is that my result could be driven by the fact that high tfr60 countries are also those developing countries from where migration is more recent and is less likely to be culturally integrated. To address this issue, I have tried to split my sample into high and low tfr60 countries and check whether the prediction of decreasing effect of the fertility norm with assimilation would still hold. Unfortunately the sample size reduces drastically when I split the sample and none of the variables of interest remain significant. I therefore cannot go further on that ground.

## 5 Conclusion

In this article, I have enriched the findings of Fernandez & Fogli (2006, 2009) on the importance of fertility norms in several directions. First using a unique dataset on second generation migrant women to France, I am able to find evidence of several levels of intensity of cultural norms. Indeed, on the one hand, I find that the cultural proxy survives the introduction of many more controls, such as partner's education and migration status, years in France and whether both parents are migrants as well as religion. On the other hand, the effect of this norm is larger for women who are not very much assimilated in the host country. By assimilated, I mean that these women are more likely to be in a relationship with a non-native, to be born to a two migrant couple, to belong to a family that has settled recently in France. Additionally, contrary to what could be thought from the studies looking at completed fertility, fertility norms influence only the decision to have three or more children. Entry into motherhood as well as spacing between the first two births are unaffected. It suggests that other determinants of fertility like the opportunity cost of having children and labor market conditions still dominate in the decisions of having the first two children.

An alternative interpretation is that tfr60 captures more generally a cultural distance from the host country. If one believes this cultural distance is relevant on the labor market and may be associated with a lower probability to find a job, then a higher tfr60 would be correlated with a lower opportunity cost of having children. In other words, women coming from high tfr60 countries would be more prone to have children because more discriminated against on the labor market.

Although quite appealing, these interpretations still raise questions: why is it the case that the tfr channel is significant only for the third birth? Can it be the case that women need time to realize they are discriminated against? Or does there exist a counteracting mechanism for early births? For instance, discrimination could also increase the uncertainty future parents face, which is shown to delay fertility<sup>12</sup>? In all cases, further research is needed to clarify the role of

 $<sup>^{12}</sup>$ See Hondroyiannis (2010).

culture versus other factors in determining fertility.

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## A Appendix

		(1)	(	2)	(3)			(4)
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
tfr60	0.032	(0.020)	0.033	(0.020)	0.024	(0.021)	0.016	(0.027)
siblings	0.012	(0.014)	0.012	(0.015)	0.007	(0.019)	0.005	(0.020)
educ 1			-0.032	(0.079)	-0.021	(0.090)	-0.000	(0.088)
2			-0.023	(0.104)	-0.041	(0.122)	0.004	(0.110)
3			-0.124	(0.156)	-0.180	(0.164)	-0.137	(0.152)
4			0.058	(0.094)	-0.040	(0.105)	-0.022	(0.095)
partner's educ 1					-0.052	(0.133)	-0.062	(0.119)
2					-0.152	(0.131)	-0.178	(0.144)
3					0.174	(0.147)	0.140	(0.137)
4					$0.315^{**}$	(0.124)	$0.325^{***}$	(0.122)
father's educ 1					0.066	(0.092)	0.013	(0.056)
2					0.038	(0.207)	-0.012	(0.204)
3					0.182	(0.159)	0.130	(0.160)
4					0.037	(0.149)	0.047	(0.158)
mother's educ 1					-0.079	(0.060)	-0.133**	(0.054)
2					-0.336**	(0.152)	-0.365**	(0.164)
3					-0.236**	(0.112)	-0.281**	(0.131)
4					-0.337*	(0.176)	-0.352**	(0.159)
2nd gen. partner					0.097	(0.077)	0.077	(0.076)
1st gen. partner					$0.195^{**}$	(0.085)	0.201	(0.132)
$40{<}50$ years in Fr.					0.104	(0.123)	0.085	(0.136)
>50 years in France					0.166	(0.144)	0.103	(0.141)
2 migrant parents					-0.003	(0.071)	-0.057	(0.084)
christian							0.144	(0.141)
muslim							0.195	(0.163)
jewish							$0.918^{***}$	(0.221)
bouddhist							0.473	(0.306)
Observations	875		875		875		832	
Pseudo $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.006		0.006		0.009		0.011	

Table 8: Time to second birth

Standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for region of residence and urban status as well as third degree polynomial in age in all specifications. Third degree polynomial in age of the partner and a dummy for the sex of the first child included in specifications (3) and (4).

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

	(1	1)	(2)	)	(3)	)		(4)
	Ь	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
tfr60	0.017	(0.015)	0.019	(0.014)	-0.008	(0.022)	-0.010	(0.031)
siblings	$0.021^{**}$	(0.008)	-0.002	(0.010)	-0.004	(0.012)	-0.003	(0.012)
educ 1			-0.364***	(0.125)	-0.305**	(0.145)	-0.310**	(0.145)
2			-0.562***	(0.163)	$-0.531^{***}$	(0.179)	$-0.516^{***}$	(0.181)
3			-0.743***	(0.135)	-0.637***	(0.138)	-0.592***	(0.148)
4			$-1.053^{***}$	(0.152)	-0.880***	(0.162)	-0.853***	(0.168)
partner's educ 1					0.050	(0.119)	0.001	(0.128)
2					-0.268**	(0.131)	-0.292**	(0.145)
3					-0.034	(0.080)	-0.078	(0.076)
4					-0.198	(0.142)	-0.243	(0.158)
father's educ 1					0.028	(0.081)	0.027	(0.095)
2					-0.032	(0.068)	-0.023	(0.083)
3					0.089	(0.149)	0.119	(0.146)
4					0.183	(0.156)	0.206	(0.139)
mother's educ 1					-0.105	(0.098)	-0.138	(0.103)
2					-0.020	(0.178)	-0.067	(0.187)
3					-0.061	(0.151)	-0.098	(0.166)
4					-0.211	(0.267)	-0.227	(0.262)
1st gen. partner					$0.344^{***}$	(0.089)	$0.348^{***}$	(0.089)
2nd gen. partner					$0.393^{***}$	(0.086)	$0.351^{***}$	(0.106)
$40{<}50$ years in Fr.					0.010	(0.066)	0.005	(0.072)
>50 years in Fr					-0.014	(0.085)	-0.055	(0.088)
2 migrant parents					0.025	(0.092)	0.012	(0.093)
christian							0.131	(0.100)
muslim							0.147	(0.117)
jewish							$0.853^{***}$	(0.155)
bouddhist							0.495	(0.364)
Observations	1046		1046		1046		993	
Pseudo $R^2$	0.005		0.012		0.017		0.019	

Table 9: Time to first birth, restricted sample

Standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for region of residence and urban status as well as third degree polynomial in age in all specifications. Third degree polynomial in age of the partner included in specifications (3) and (4). The sample at use here excludes women who had a first birth age 20 or earlier.

\* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

	(1	)	(2)	)	(3	)		(4)
	b	se	b	se	b	se	b	se
tfr60	$0.191^{***}$	(0.028)	$0.188^{***}$	(0.027)	0.202***	(0.025)	0.099***	(0.036)
siblings	$0.036^{*}$	(0.020)	$0.033^{*}$	(0.018)	0.017	(0.024)	-0.009	(0.031)
educ 1			-0.291	(0.197)	-0.376	(0.248)	-0.310	(0.270)
2			-0.613***	(0.197)	-0.780***	(0.250)	-0.806***	(0.269)
3			-0.253	(0.159)	-0.396**	(0.157)	-0.352**	(0.160)
4			-0.501**	(0.208)	$-1.024^{***}$	(0.300)	-0.915***	(0.292)
partner's educ 1					-0.423**	(0.167)	$-0.427^{***}$	(0.141)
2					0.009	(0.335)	-0.108	(0.377)
3					0.010	(0.196)	-0.075	(0.263)
4					0.383	(0.248)	$0.418^{*}$	(0.253)
father's educ 1					0.184	(0.207)	0.308	(0.220)
2					0.343	(0.355)	0.336	(0.408)
3					0.240	(0.301)	0.329	(0.338)
4					$1.247^{***}$	(0.274)	$1.383^{***}$	(0.352)
mother's educ 1					-0.458**	(0.194)	$-0.417^{**}$	(0.173)
2					-0.257	(0.198)	-0.453*	(0.252)
3					-0.223	(0.221)	-0.375*	(0.218)
4					-0.504	(0.379)	-0.397	(0.557)
1st gen. partner					0.208	(0.186)	0.152	(0.179)
2nd gen. partner					-0.145	(0.153)	-0.258	(0.179)
40 < 50 years in Fr.					$0.403^{*}$	(0.232)	$0.540^{**}$	(0.237)
>50 years					0.383	(0.233)	0.385	(0.255)
2 migrant parents					0.202	(0.147)	0.075	(0.197)
christian							0.049	(0.201)
muslim							$0.980^{***}$	(0.232)
jewish							$1.118^{***}$	(0.311)
bouddhist							-0.235	(0.706)
Observations	572		572		572		539	
Pseudo $\mathbb{R}^2$	0.033		0.036		0.052		0.061	

Table 10: Time to third birth, restricted sample

Standard errors in parentheses. Dummies for region of residence and urban status as well as third degree polynomial in age in all specifications. Third degree polynomial in age of the partner and dummies for the sex of first two children and interaction term included in specifications (3) and (4). The sample at use here excludes women who had a first birth age 20 or earlier. \* p < 0.10, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01 Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales Université catholique de Louvain

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