Ghins, Michel
[UCL]
This paper is devoted to an analysis of some aspects of Bas van Fraassen’s
views on representation. While I agree with most of his claims, I disagree on
the following three issues. Firstly, I contend that some isomorphism (or at least
homomorphism) between the representor and what is represented is a universal
necessary condition for the success of any representation, even in the case of misrepresentation.
Secondly, I argue that the so-called “semantic” or “model-theoretic”
construal of theories does not give proper due to the role played by true propositions
in successful representing practices. Thirdly, I attempt to show that the force
of van Fraassen’s pragmatic - and antirealist - “dissolution” of the “loss of reality
objection” loses its bite when we realize that our cognitive contact with real phenomena
is achieved not by representing but by expressing true propositions about
them.
- CHAKRAVARTTY A. (2007)
- DA COSTA N. (2003)
- GHINS M. (2009)
- Ghins M., Bas van Fraassen on Scientific Representation, 10.1093/analys/anq043
- NEWMAN M. H. A., I.—MR. RUSSELL'S “CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION”, 10.1093/mind/xxxvii.146.137
- MEYER A. J. P. (1995)
- SUPPES P. (2002)
- VAN FRAASSEN B. (1980)
- VAN FRAASSEN B. (2002)
- VAN FRAASSEN B. (2008)
- van Fraassen B. C., Reply to Contessa, Ghins, and Healey, 10.1093/analys/anq044
Référence bibliographique |
Ghins, Michel. Models, Truth and Realism : Assessing Bas Fraassen’s Views on Scientific Representation. In: Manuscrito : revista internacional de filosofia, Vol. 34, p. 207-232 (2011) |
Permalien |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/82069 |