Einy, Ezra
Haimanko, Ori
Orzach, Ram
Sela, Aner
We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an information advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses a dominant strategy. A dominant strategy is, in fact, unique, and is given by the conditional expectation of the common value with respect to his information field. Furthermore, when a bidder has information advantage, other bidders cannot make a profit.
Référence bibliographique |
Einy, Ezra ; Haimanko, Ori ; Orzach, Ram ; Sela, Aner. Information advantage and dominant strategies in second-price auctions. CORE Discussion Papers ; 2000/55 (2000) |
Permalien |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/4144 |