Teens, social media and fake news: A user’s perspective[[1]](#footnote-1)

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* 1. **1. INTRODUCTION**

Although disinformation is not a recent phenomenon, mass audiences, speedy online exchanges and bots in the world of digitized media affect the spread of fake news, leading to a growing political concern regarding its influence on citizens and democracy (European Commission 2018a). Across the world, a majority of citizens (56%) express concern about the importance of distinguishing “what is real and what is fake on the Internet” (Newman et al. 2020, p. 18). In Europe, 77% of young users claim to come across fake news at least once a week (European Commission 2018b: 12).

Given the intensity with which teens use social media (Anderson and Jiang 2018; Galan et al. 2019), they are often considered vulnerable when exposed to fake news (Herrero-Diz et al. 2020; Wagner and Boczkowski 2019, p. 875). Yet research shows that, among adults, older users were more likely to share fake news during the 2016 US presidential election than younger users (Guess et al. 2019). These contrasting results highlight the need to better understand the diversity in users’ interaction with fake news, especially teens, as they are at a key stage in developing political views. The circulation of fake news on social media is not linear, nor does it automatically lead to users’ disinformation.

This chapter proposes a users’ perspective approach to unravel how teens receive and perceive fake news on social media. It introduces and contributes to recent studies that analyze how young people interact with news and fake news to better understand their diverse perceptions of the phenomenon and their related practices (Marchi 2012; Galan et al. 2019). Drawing on focus groups comprised of high-school students in Brussels, we thus aim to understand how teens interact with news and fake news in their mediatized environment.

This chapter is divided into four main sections. Building on journalism and audience studies, the first section identifies three key research *foci* to help identify essential factors that shape how teens deal with fake news on social media. The second section describes our fieldwork. The third section presents the main outcomes by examining teens’ interactions with fake news. In conclusion, we draw upon insights gained from our research to sketch ways of addressing disinformation among teens.

* 1. **2. TEENS AND FAKE NEWS ON SOCIAL MEDIA: NEGOTIATION, NAVIGATION AND PERSONALIZATION**

Within journalism and audience studies, a growing body of literature highlights the influence of social media and personalized environments on how audiences interact with fake news. This work suggests three complementary research *foci* to better grasp how teens deal with fake news – their negotiated engagement with, and use of, fake news; the various strategies they deploy when navigating news; and their perceptions of content personalization.

A first suggestion of this literature is to further study how users negotiate the meaning of fake news and how they use it. The underlying assumption is that teens’ interactions with fake news on social media are not linear. Though teens may know that a news item is fake, this will not systematically prevent them from interacting with it, as their relationship with fake news, conspiracy theories and other cultural phenomena remains ambiguous. In fact, some teens gain valuable knowledge from fake news when it refers “to entertainment TV shows that parody network news, using satire to discuss public affairs” (Marchi 2012, p. 253). Some are particularly adept at detecting political messages in satirical videos on YouTube (Boywer et al. 2015). This discretionary interaction is not limited to fake news, it encompasses as a whole the influence of social media on teens’ daily social interactions. Though it has been widely demonstrated that social media affects young people’s daily life and social interactions (Boyd 2014), this influence is not straightforward and deterministic. For instance, with respect to “read” and “receipt” features on Messenger and WhatsApp, Gangneux (2020, p. 14) has demonstrated that young people often perform “small acts” to temper social expectations and interactions created by these platforms by adjusting permanent availability and reciprocity.

A second suggestion is to carry out more studies on how teens navigate social media *in reality* and how they develop their own tactics and strategies to deal with fake news. It is crucial not to limit research on users’ ability to identify formal criteria to detect fake news. In fact, though it may be important for users to understand the in-depth functioning of social media and the accuracy of news, this alone does not guarantee their adequacy in detecting fake news. Metzger et al. (2019, p. 329) demonstrate that formal evaluation training based on “online credibility evaluation” (e.g., evaluation of content and source reliability) that often takes place at school may be counterproductive to detect fake news if teens do not clearly understand its purpose. They suggest that “although such explicit training does appear to lead kids to do the right things to evaluate online information (i.e., use [of] more analytic evaluation strategies), doing so does not necessarily lead them to the right conclusions about digital information (i.e., disbelieving hoax sites)” (Metzger et al. 2019, p. 340). Indeed, such an approach does not take into consideration teens’ various thinking styles (e.g., flexibility). It is thus worth investigating the various strategies teens develop to navigate and select news. For instance, they may check embedded links to access a diversity of opinions, or they may rely on “trusted adults” such as teachers, relatives and personal social media connections (Marchi 2012). The intensive use of more visual platforms such as YouTube or Instagram calls for researchers to pay even greater attention to the ways news-credibility checks are performed (Nee 2019).

A third suggestion of this literature is to study the interrelatedness of fake news and content personalization by understanding the latter as a process among others at play in mediatized environments. Much of the news teens come in contact with on social media platforms is highly influenced by automated information recommendation systems. Though it has been argued that personalizing content based on user behavior would cause a scarcity of news diversity, thus facilitating the creation of “filter bubbles” (Pariser 2011), recent research demonstrates the limited impact of content personalization on individuals’ access to a diversity of information because users often use multiple platforms to access news (Bodó et al. 2018). The use of social media for news consumption is not synonymous with less diversity than editorial selection (Moeller and Helberger 2018). Still, it is crucial to have a better understanding of users’ awareness of how news is filtered on social media. For instance, even if teens show some degree of knowledge of news personalization and of the role of algorithms in news selection, they are generally unaware of less visible influences such as the “behind-the-scenes roles of engineers” (Powers 2017, p. 16).

In summary, the growing body of literature on the subject invites researchers to explore how teens interact with fake news on social media by paying attention to how they *negotiate* the meanings and uses of fake news, how they *navigate* social media and how aware they are of the role of *personalization* when accessing news.

* 1. **3. DEBATING NEWS AND SOCIAL MEDIA WITH TEENS IN BRUSSELS**

In keeping with the literature discussed above, our research focuses on fake news from a user perspective. We adhere to the idea that “phenomena of all sorts – including algorithms – can be ‘accessed’ via experience and the ways in which they make people feel” (Bucher 2017, p. 32). Research has indeed demonstrated that it is not necessary to grasp the complexity of the functioning of how social media platforms function to assess their influence on users (Bucher 2017; Lomborg and Kapsch 2019). Such an approach suggests exploring how social-media users relate to fake news in given mediatized environments rather than identifying generally applicable standards to assess the trustworthiness of news available on social media. It is important to not only understand teens’ ability to identify news veracity, but also how they decode and filter fake news on social media. In practice, this means designing and carrying out a fieldwork methodology that allows users to describe their everyday interactions with news (be it fake or not) and how they make sense of it.

To explore the relationship between platform systems and younger users (15 to 18 years old), we organized 16 focus groups in four schools and one “out of school” environment in Brussels (Belgium) between April and June 2019. At each location, we divided the group and carried out three or four focus groups simultaneously, each lasting approximately one hour and a half and comprising four to seven participants[[2]](#footnote-2). Given that the education system in Brussels tends to be socially segregated (Sacco et al. 2016), schools are largely composed of teens from similar socioeconomic backgrounds. To ensure diversity in data collection, schools with relatively different demographics were selected. This study complements research conducted in more polarized political environments such as the US, the UK or France, where trust in news is low (US 29%, the UK 28% or France 23% in 2020) in comparison to Belgium (45% in 2020, Newman et al. 2020). The “Reuters Digital News Report” confirms that “[a]lthough examples of disinformation are rare in Belgium, the issue has featured on the political agenda” (Picone 2020). Investigating teens’ interactions with fake news in such a different context offers an opportunity to identify recurrent factors that shape them.

The discussions that took place in the focus groups afforded interviewees the opportunity to compare their practices and made it possible for researchers to identify the common and dissimilar elements by analyzing the agreements and disagreements that emerged during interactions (Morgan 2010). Teens were invited to participate in two activities in which they discussed their uses of social media platforms, especially the reception of personalized content and access to news. The first activity consisted in placing the logos of social media platforms on an axis ranging from “little use” to “a lot of use” and on another from “use for entertainment” to “use for seeking news.” During the second activity, teens were invited to write on small cards recent events they recalled and to talk about how they came to learn about them. Discussions regarding fake news, news trust, news sources and diversity emerged from the debates between the teens and served to demonstrate how these issues are relevant to them[[3]](#footnote-3).

Finally, our analysis is based on an inductive thematic analysis similar to grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1994), meaning that several members of the research team identified themes and categories linked to fake news and then compared them. Based on this analysis, researchers listened again to all debates to identify significant excerpts and transcribed the most relevant ones.

**4. HOW TEENS INTERACT WITH FAKE NEWS IN A MEDIATIZED WORLD**

A qualitative analysis of the focus groups led to the identification of three general factors that shape teens’ interactions with fake news: negotiation, or how teens focus on news that interests them and impacts their emotions; the diversity of devices, platforms and trusted sources they use to verify content when navigating on social media; and their ability to modify personalized newsfeeds through small (in)actions.

* + 1. **4.1. Negotiation: news that interests or affects teens**

From the very outset of each focus group, teens spontaneously discussed what news is to them and how they define it. An unambiguous definition did not exist among interviewees. Most teens also expressed concerns about how to know what is real or not on the Internet and their interests varied greatly within and across groups. What news is and what kind of news matters varies greatly among teens: general current events such as global debates on climate change; hard news regarding killings in a specific country; soft news regarding influencers on social media or professional soccer players and even information regarding homework or what is happening in their schools or families – all this can be news. The excerpt below, in which teens compare practices, shows how interests play a central role in defining news. While respondents M2 and M3 considered stories on Snapchat published by newspapers not to be news because they are “useless,” another respondent (M1) responded by explaining that French and Belgian newspapers (*Le Monde*, *Le Soir*, *La Dernière Heure – La DH*) or sports newspapers (*L’Equipe*) publish news through stories on Snapchat. It is not so much the source that leads teens to consider content to be newsworthy, but their interests.

Focus group M (from school 4)

*M1*: Snap, uh... (to refer to Snapchat)

*M2*: There’s no news!

*Several participants including M1*: Yes, there is!

*M1*: Yes, now every paper has stories.

*M2*: Okay, but it’s useless stuff!

*M3*: I never look at it!

*M1*: You haven’t seen *Le Monde*’s story? It’s in the ‘Explorer.’ There’s also *L’Equipe*, *Le Soir*, *La DH*... all papers have a Snapchat account.

More generally, this excerpt also suggests that to teens news can be found in different formats: it can be uploaded by legacy media via Snaps stories; it can be accessed when vulgarized by YouTubers; it can also be instantaneously shared by parents and siblings on WhatsApp and Messenger and discussed with peers online or at school. Even if teens struggle to define what news is, this ambiguity reflects more the ubiquity of news in a digital society than their inability to detect fake news. With respect to interest, emotions also play a key role when interacting with news on social media. Indeed, as mentioned in several focus groups, teens rely not only on relatives or influencers they like, they also select the most valuable information based on the emotions they provoke. These emotions often include empathy, indignation, as well as joy and entertainment. Key markers such as “it affected me,” “it struck me,” “it shocked me,” “it scared me,” or “I click when it makes me laugh” were central to justify the news events chosen during the second activity organized in each focus group. Both positive and negative emotions play a role in news selection and circulation. For instance, while they talked, the teens showed different YouTube videos on their phones. Some explained they liked watching conspiracy videos because they made them laugh. This suggests that sharing fake news does not necessarily mean that teens believe it and that trustworthiness is not always the main criteria used for sharing it.

* + 1. **4.2. Navigation: verifying content and sources by diversifying platforms, technologies and trusted relationships**

Teens spontaneously offered numerous and detailed examples to explain how they interacted with fake news. Some explained, for instance, that they trusted the veracity of a specific dramatic event (the Notre Dame de Paris fire in April 2019) because photos and videos were published and shared on several platforms (mainly Snapchat and Instagram). In this excerpt, they also point their exposure to “fake news”.

Focus group E (from out-of school 2)

E1: Snapchat and Instagram also share information, so we can...

E2: Yeah

E1: We can... for example the Notre Dame fire in Paris, I saw that on Snap and Instagram

E2: Me, I heard about it on Instagram

E3: Yeah, me it was on Instagram, in my language, it was posted!

E4: But sometimes I find news, but, uh, sometimes I... it’s not reliable, sometimes...

E3: Yeah!

E4: It’s fake news[[4]](#footnote-4)!

E3: It’s bullshit!

E2: Yeah, you can't trust it.

E4: I’d rather read a newspaper, or something like that…

Researcher: How do you check whether something is reliable or not?

E2: I look on the Internet, I look for the sources they’re based on to get the information (other respondents agree) […]

Teens are also attentive to the origin of the content diffused on social media. For instance, some pointed out that if a politician posts information it can be misleading. In most groups, it was evident that school performs a key role in training teens to be critical when navigating news – to reflect on the origin of the information, for instance. Teens referred to discussions and exercises that took place at school, as illustrated by this comment: “*Before, I never paid attention* (referring to the need to check information on social media)*, it’s because of my history teacher that I check, otherwise, before I trusted everything I was told*” (focus group E, from out-of-school 2). The data collected also shows that focusing on source and content verification to detect fake news is often insufficient when trying to determine what is real or not on social media. In the following excerpt, when the researcher asked participants to explain how they verify information online, one interviewee (N2) asserted the importance of following trusted sources on their official page. Another (N1) reacted by specifying that it is complicated to identify trusted content in more ambiguous cases; for instance, when unreliable pages on Facebook share news already published by trusted sources. It becomes confusing to distinguish what is “true or false.”

Focus group N (from school 5)

Researcher: By cross-referencing sources on social networks or by using others? (referring to how teens verify news they receive on social media)

N1: On other social media. If I see a news clip on Instagram, I’ll go check Google and other sources, like *Le Soir* (a Belgian newspaper) and others.

N2: I don’t think it’s important on what social network you see a news item, but the page is important. What you will find on the official website of *La Une* (a public service radio), you will also find it on its Facebook page.

N1: I’m not talking about that! There are some pages that aren’t really trustworthy that will post a given bit of news, and so we don’t know if it’s true or false.

N2: Go check the source.

Overall, while teens demonstrate they know how to apply certain criteria learned for instance at school, they also express that it is often much more complicated in reality because they have to negotiate and make quick decisions when they navigate online. Interviewees’ hesitations and contradictions also show that it is challenging to define the criteria that should be used to detect what content is trustworthy. For many, while they are aware of mass audience influence, it remains tempting to equate a news post’s popularity (number of comments, likes or retweets) with its veracity.

In addition to the use of more formal criteria, teens also use a diversity of platforms to access information; from Instagram stories to YouTube videos, from news articles on Google to chats on Snapchat or WhatsApp. They constantly navigate a variety of news items presented in various ways on different platforms, allowing them to compare and discuss news. As a rule, they prefer Snapchat, Instagram, YouTube and search engines such as Google or Google News over Facebook or Twitter. Interviewees repeatedly confirmed that teens today tend to gravitate towards more visual platforms and private messaging apps. They prefer platforms where they can remain anonymous, on which they can control the audience that can interact with them, or where they can avoid relatives. They also appreciate how these online platforms allow them to access information quickly by offering short texts or videos. As a teen puts it, “*YouTube, one video, it takes five minutes, you can learn so much, I think that’s good, it’s better”* (focus group H, from school 3). This raises challenges, however, as fake news detection (e.g., checking embedded links) on visual content platforms is more complicated to implement (Nee, 2019).

In addition to multiple platforms, teens also use multiple devices and are exposed to news that circulates on different technologies. Specifically, their relationship to television in news selection and verification remains ambiguous. Teens describe a constant interaction between television and social media even if they often affirm that they did not watch TV themselves. TV generated varying reactions during the focus groups. Some teens were suspicious of news selection carried out by authorities such as professional journalists on television. Others explained that they trusted news published on social media only if they had also seen it on TV. Others considered this source of news limited in comparison to online information. In the following excerpt, one interviewee (A1) highlights how the Internet allowed her to access more information than TV. The embedded links available online are valuable to access a diversity of opinions. In contrast, news published on TV is seen as static. To the interviewees, news verification on TV is limited as it is impossible to jump to another link to compare it. Teens tend to enjoy the opportunity to actively interact with news. If they refer to television, it is often an online program (e.g., a documentary on Netflix). Overall, even if teens are critical of the news selection protocol on TV, it remains a way of verifying information:

Focus group A (from school 1)

*A1*: And that’s the point, social networks show everything and we choose what we like and we read what we want to read, while TV shows us what they want us to see. On networks, if I want to, I can click a couple of times and I’ll see a bunch of opinions on a subject or on a lot of other stuff.

*A2*: Yeah

*Researcher*: And you verified it where (talking to A2 about what was mentioned a few minutes before)?

*A2*: I simply checked on the Internet. I typed in ‘New Zealand Attack,’ I’d heard about another attack by right-wingers that happened a while back on Netflix (referring to the recently released documentary ‘July 22’ about the 2011 Norway attack) to the ... it came out not long before this attack (talking about the New Zealand Attack), so... it was the same link, it was the radical right […]

Beside the use of multiple platforms and technologies, teens are also part of a composite social structure made up of numerous individuals with whom they can discuss (fake) news. Several discussions showed that “receiving information from socially proximate sources can help to legitimate the veracity of information that is shared on social networks” (Tandoc et al. 2018, p. 139). Teens regularly mention teachers, parents and grandparents as trusted adults. For instance, a website could be trusted if suggested by a teacher. Teens also shared that they trust some influencers on social media and that they are well aware of their influence: “*if one day, if there’s a big influencer who’s going to talk about a particular subject, it’s going to have a massive impact!”* (focus group H, from school 3, H1). Teens mention that influencers talk about hard news (e.g., “Yellow vests*,*” “climate change,” “terrorist attacks” at the time of the focus groups, etc.). Some not only follow influencers they consider as legitimate, they also watch conspiracy videos (e.g., a video on pyramids and the use of electricity in their construction) they consider “stupid” and admit sharing them. While they find these videos entertaining, they also consider them potentially dangerous as they can influence political opinion: “*For example, in politics, why should we vote for Donald Trump?... I’ll come across videos that talk about that, and I agree, I find that pretty dangerous. I know that because my father is a computer scientist and he’s interested in the dangers on the net”* (focus group K, from school 4).

* + 1. **4.3. Personalization: influencing news feeds through small (in)action(s)**

When teens shared what news is to them, they often digressed and discussed the functioning of the different platforms, because in their opinion, they influence the shape news takes. They consider news selection to be bidirectional. For example, some teens discussed their capacity to influence news selection on social media through small actions (e.g., “like,” “click,” “follow,” or “unfollow” specific accounts; do active research on search engines).They explained that when they watch interesting videos on YouTube, they are likely to follow the related account to have access to similar content. A minority of teens defend the importance of following people with opposing views to check what they say about a topic and to help them gage the truth of information. In the following excerpt, one participant explains that it is crucial to consider a diversity of opinions to detect if something is false: *“I follow people with different opinions. I follow people from the right and the left, so I can see... when they agree, it means it’s true. Because we like to think that the other camp lies, when I see one camp saying that the other one is lying, I tell myself there’s probably a lie somewhere, anyway... I know where to look if we want to” (focus group M, from school 4).*

Inaction is also important to take into consideration as some teens prefer to remain “spectators” on social media to avoid excessive visibility. As highlighted in the excerpt below, teens are aware that small actions influence what is legitimate on social media, but they never comment on public profiles (e.g., celebrities) so as to avoid open conflict. Inaction is also evident when teens deliberately avoid “liking” a post or “following” an account to avoid being flooded with specific content.

Focus group A (from school 1)

A2: Everything we do influences something, even ‘likes’ even if you ‘like’ something, and other people ‘like’ it too, the person becomes a bit more popular, and this photo becomes popular, or, you comment, it can change a lot of things, you write a simple comment it can start fights...

A3: I never comment, especially not on stars!

Interviewees also demonstrated varying degrees of knowledge of how the systems, such as algorithms, influence their news access and news circulation. They demonstrated their awareness of these mechanisms when they compared their newsfeed to a friend or through references to the necessity of filters to manage the mass of news available online. They showed different levels of appreciation for these mechanisms depending on their expectations. While some appreciated existing filters because they reflect their own interests, others expressed a desire to have access to a greater diversity of opinions, but did not feel able to actively find this content, leading to a more passive acceptance of what appears on their newsfeed.

Focus group G (from school 3)

G3: It’s more interesting for us to have stuff we... what we usually look at...

Researcher: So, it doesn’t bother you?

G2: Me, sometimes, it bothers me.

Researcher: Really?

G2: I would like to discover new things, but I don’t know what to write in the search bar, so I prefer having something recommended.

Overall, most teens demonstrate an awareness of the influence of the technologies behind social media on news selection and prioritization. They understand that it is not only interactions between humans, but also interactions with forms of automation such as algorithms that influence news selection. However, understanding the in-depth functioning of such processes and influencing them remains challenging.

* 1. **5. CONCLUSIONS**

This chapter has explored how teens in Brussels perceive and interact with news and fake news on social media by comparing their practices and perceptions during focus groups. The choice of Belgium as a specific research site and its comparison to more recurrent fieldwork locations like the UK (Galan et al. 2019), the US (e.g. Leeder 2019) or even France (e.g. Mercier et al. 2015) contributes to the identification of recurrent trends shaping teens’ interactions with fake news. This, in turn, can help address disinformation among teens.

First, our study confirms that emotions are critical in news circulation. Brussels’ teens explain that emotions play a role in what news they are attentive to, which is an empirical finding also highlighted by previous studies focusing on fake news sharing on social media (Leeder 2019; Herrero-Diz et al. 2020). Emotions are also key in explaining why adults share fake news on social media (Marwick 2018). This suggests that the significance of emotions is not necessarily age specific. Additionally, the role of emotions in interacting with fake news should not be seen as intrinsically negative. In a context characterized by an ever-growing quantity of available information, encouraging teens to check news that affects them – be it hard or soft news – is a first step to raise their interest in detecting fake news. Indeed, research has shown that consumers tend to invest more time in verifying information if they feel empathy, indignation, disgust or joy regarding a current topic, or if they are able to link it to their daily life (Flintham et al. 2018).

Second, our study demonstrates the importance of recognizing that fake news identification is not an automatic process. As previously suggested (Metzger et al. 2019), teens should not only be trained to apply systematic and ready-made criteria based on verification of sources and content, they should also be encouraged to think critically when they face more ambiguous situations. For instance, this should encourage building training that would take into consideration the fact that satirical videos on YouTube can be a source of information, especially for those who would otherwise not be interested in news. Acknowledging that such sources can be a form of legitimate information in school training might be challenging because it blurs established, clear-cut lines between fake and non-fake news. Yet, it also provides a more accurate understanding of the multiple roles of fake news in our society and users’ ability to make sense of them. From this perspective, it is also important to take into consideration that interactions with fake news on social media take place within a complex social and technological environment. Indeed, our study shows that teens rely on a diversity of devices, platforms and trusted relationships both offline and online to compare news items. They filter news by juxtaposing it with trusted sources such as parents and teachers, but also influencers. Through these strategies, they equip themselves with cognitive means to disregard fake news about a current event. However, this does not mean they are always able or even willing to identify fake news.

Third, our empirical study confirms that teens should not be considered a homogeneous group and vulnerable as a whole. It has been extensively documented that teens consume news in a variety of ways (Galan et al. 2019, Mercier et al. 2017). Depending on their preferences, they develop various strategies to influence what news is proposed on their newsfeed, showing agency even where social media design assumes they are passive users. Indeed, our data demonstrates that scholarly attention should not only be directed towards teens’ online actions, but also their inaction. The latter are not always a sign of passivity towards (fake) news circulation and thus might have a central role in fighting disinformation or misinformation.

Last but not least, it is important to reflect on the limits of our study and of a user perspective approach. The fact that the empirical work is based on self-reported practices discussed by teens during focus groups does not allow for a comprehensive assessment of everyday practices in relation to fake news on social media. Even if a collective setting encouraged teens to analyze their practices, complementing such an approach with navigation data on actual practices would be necessary to evaluate if and how their behaviors might diverge from what they say. For instance, this research design cannot grasp the intensity of fake news exposure or users’ effective participation in the diffusion of fake news. While the study of these phenomena would require other methods and techniques, the approach proposed in this chapter provides a useful and complementary perspective to supplement quantitative analysis by offering insights on the diverse meanings and uses of fake news.

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1. We would like to especially thank the anonymous reviewers, Rocco Bellanova, Thibault Philippette and Helmut Obermeir for their suggestions on this chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. In this chapter, each of the 16 focus groups has been given a letter and participants are anonymized. As several focus groups were organized in the same location, we also specified the location (A-B-C, school 1; D-E-F, school 2; G-H-I, school 3; J-K-L-M, school 4; N-O-P, school 5). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The data presented in this chapter was collected within the framework of a larger study focusing on teens’ perception of social media and algorithms. It was conducted within the framework of the project “ALG-OPINION” (algorithms and opinion), funded by the Brussels Region (Innoviris), Belgium. For more information, please consult the following website https://www.algopinion.brussels/. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Note that French-speaking teens commonly use English terms like “fake news,” “like” and others when referring to social media. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)