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Strongly Rational Sets for Normal-Form Games

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Grandjean, Gilles J. [USL-B] Mauleon, Ana [USL-B] Vannetelbosch, Vincent [UCL]

We introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player’s set of recommended strategies contains all actions she may rationally select in every coalition she might belong to, for any belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to exist and are compared with other well-known solution concepts. We provide a dynamic learning process leading the players to play strategies from a minimal strong curb set only.

Type de document Article de périodique (Journal article) – Article de recherche
Type d'accès Accès libre
Année de publication 2017
Langue Anglais
Information sur le périodique "Economic Theory Bulletin" - Vol. 5, no. 1, p. 35-46 (2017)
Peer reviewed oui
Editeur Springer
issn 2196-1085
Statut de la publication Publié
Affiliations UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
USL-B - Centre de recherche en Economie (CEREC)
USL-B - Autre
UCL - SSH/IRIS-L/CERE - Centre de recherche en économie
UCL - Autre
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Référence bibliographique Grandjean, Gilles J. ; Mauleon, Ana ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. Strongly Rational Sets for Normal-Form Games. In: Economic Theory Bulletin, Vol. 5, no. 1, p. 35-46 (2017)
Permalien http://hdl.handle.net/2078.3/176946