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A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings

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Isaac, Tanguy [UCL]

We reconsider the model used by Serrano and Yosha (1993) who were interested in information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. We prove that there exists an additional equilibrium not detected in the original paper and show that this equilibrium is characterized by incomplete revelation of information which was not the case of the other already identified equilibria of the model.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article) – Article de recherche
Access type Accès interdit
Publication date 2011
Language Anglais
Journal information "Mathematical Social Sciences" - Vol. 61, no. 3, p. 152-156 (2011)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Elsevier BV * North-Holland ((Netherlands) Amsterdam)
issn 0165-4896
Publication status Publié
Affiliation UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Keywords Information revelation ; Asymmetric information ; Decentralized trade
Links
Bibliographic reference Isaac, Tanguy. A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings. In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 61, no. 3, p. 152-156 (2011)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/94878