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Nested potentials and robust equilibria

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Uno, Hiroshi [UCL]

This paper introduces the notion of nested best-response potentials for complete in- formation games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).

Document type Document de travail (Working Paper)
Access type Accès libre
Publication date 2011
Language Anglais
Collection CORE Discussion Paper - 2011/9
Affiliation UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Keywords incomplete information ; potential games ; robustness ; refinements
Links
Bibliographic reference Uno, Hiroshi. Nested potentials and robust equilibria. CORE Discussion Paper ; 2011/9 (2011)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/75233