Fedele, Alessandro
Mantovani, Andrea
[UCL]
We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementarity activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources or by hiring a consulting firm. In the former case the choice of coordination is not verifiable by the bank and a moral hazard problem arises, while in the latter information is symmetric. The role of consulting services is thus to mitigate the informational problem. Without consulting, the firm does not coordinate and either
obtains no funding or the surplus of the project is not maximized.
Bibliographic reference |
Fedele, Alessandro ; Mantovani, Andrea. Complementarity, coordination, and credit. ECON Discussion Papers ; 2004/27 (2004) |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/4746 |