Le renversement cognitiviste et les théories de la conscience

In this article the A. takes into account the particular relationship within contemporary cognitive science between theories of consciousness and theories of intentionality, in the sense that the problem of consciousness has become a side-issue in the study of intentional processes in cognitive systems. These processes are formalised in terms of computational procedures which define their own semantical environment(intentional content) and their own goals(intentional directedness). Through the study of some recent works within cognitive science, the A. shows that the identification of a theoretical model of intentionality does not depend solely on scientific criteria, but allows for different interpretations of intentionality to subsist within cognitive science. Acknowledging this fact, the A. shows how the reliance of the intentional operations upon a representational and a functional context implies a criticism of reductionism, without reproducing a dualism between conscious experience on the one hand and computational mechanisms on the other.