De Clippel, Geoffroy
Minelli, Enrico
We study Myerson's incomplete information bargaining solution under the assumption of verifiable types. For the case of an informed principal, in which one individual has all the bargaining power, we provide exact characterizations both from the non cooperative and from the cooperative perspective. We then show that the axiomatic characterization can be extended to the case in which both individuals have some bargaining power. Myerson's approach also suggests a new definition of the core that refines Wilson's coarse core. We argue that this refinement captures an important aspect of negotiation at the interim stage.
Bibliographic reference |
De Clippel, Geoffroy ; Minelli, Enrico. Two-person bargaining with verifiable information. CORE Discussion Papers ; 2002/63 (2002) |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/4307 |