Aswal, Navin
Chatterji, Shurojit
Sen, Arunava
In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem.
We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three and four.
Bibliographic reference |
Aswal, Navin ; Chatterji, Shurojit ; Sen, Arunava. Dictatorial domains. CORE Discussion Papers ; 1999/40 (1999) |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/4052 |