Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures

Herings, Jean-Jacques [Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Bedrijfskunde] Mauleon, Ana [FUSL] Vannetelbosch, Vincent [UCL]

We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. As a novelty, we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It randomly selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device.

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Document type	Article de périodique (Journal article)
Access type	Accès libre
Publication date	2003
Language	Anglais
Journal information	"International Journal of Game Theory" - Vol. 32, no. 4, p. 519-531 (Août 2003)
Peer reviewed	yes
Publisher	Springer (Heidelberg, Germany)
issn	0020-7276
Publication status	Publié
Affiliations	Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Bedrijfskunde - Universiteit Maastricht UCL - EUEN/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Keywords	Coordination games ; Coordination failures ; Rationalizability ; Matching devices
Links	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400174[DOI] http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/23292[Handle]

See also
	[boreal:5590]	Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination