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Paths to stability for overlapping group structures

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Mauleon, Ana [USL-B] Roehl, Nils [University of Paderborn] Vannetelbosch, Vincent [UCL]

We study the stability of overlapping group structures where each group possesses a constitution that contains the rules governing both the composition of the group and the conditions needed to leave the group and/or to become a new member of the group. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on preferences that guarantees the existence and the emergence of constitutionally stable group structures. We show that although more blocking power for the individuals might enlarge the set of constitutionally stable group structures, it could happen that the society will never reach a stable group structure.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article) – Article de recherche
Access type Accès libre
Publication date 2019
Language Anglais
Journal information "Journal of Mathematical Economics" - Vol. 83, p. 19-24 (2019)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Elsevier BV
issn 0304-4068
Publication status Publié
Affiliations UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
USL-B - Centre de recherche en Economie (CEREC)
Keywords overlapping group structures ; constitutions ; stability ; blocking power
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Bibliographic reference Mauleon, Ana ; Roehl, Nils ; Vannetelbosch, Vincent. Paths to stability for overlapping group structures. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 83, p. 19-24 (2019)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/215688