Three essays on economics : information aggregation, pension schemes and economic growth

The dissertation can be divided into two parts. The first part is composed of one chapter focusing on information aggregation in a game theory model; the second part is composed of two chapters focusing on the link between pension schemes and economic growth. In Chapter 1, we define renegotiation-proof equilibria when players indirectly communicate through a public signal aggregating their private information. The result is of particular economic interest, as in most of economic activities prices aggregate and partially reveal the private information of each economic agent. In Chapter 2, we study the relation between pension schemes and financial intermediation in an overlapping generations model with Schumpeterian growth and consumption shocks. We show that a financial intermediary may be unable to adequately isolate consumers from the shocks, making a funded pension scheme equivalent to a research and production subsidy for the economy. In Chapter 3, we propose a new hybrid pension scheme. In recent years, governments have phased out pay-as-you-go pension schemes in favour of funded ones. Instead of dropping the intergenerational transfers of the pay-as-you-go pensions, we propose to invert them. Resources would flow from old generations to young ones, as if it were a system of public bequests. We show that the public bequests scheme outperforms the canonical pension schemes.