User menu

Accès à distance ? S'identifier sur le proxy UCLouvain

Marked Mix-Nets

Primary tabs

download
  • Open access
  • PDF
  • 344.84 K
Pereira, Olivier [UCL] Rivest, Ronald L. [MIT, Cambridge]

We propose a variant mix-net method, which we call a “marked mix-net” . Marked mix-nets avoid the extra cost associated with verifiability (producing a proof of correct mixing operation), while offering additional assurances about the privacy of the messages, compared to a non-verifiable mix-net. With a marked mix-net, each mix-server adds an extra secret mark in each ciphertext, and the input ciphertexts are made non-malleable but still re-randomizable (RCCA). Marked mix-nets appear to be a good fit for the mix-net requirements of voting systems that need a mix-net for anonymity but where correctness is guaranteed through independent mechanisms. Our work investigates applications to STAR-Vote, but other applications could be explored, e.g., in Prêt-à-Voter, Selene or Wombat.

Document type Communication à un colloque (Conference Paper) – Présentation orale avec comité de sélection
Access type Accès libre
Publication date 2017
Language Anglais
Conference "Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2017 International Workshops, WAHC, BITCOIN, VOTING, WTSC, and TA", Sliema (Malta) (07/04/2017)
Peer reviewed yes
Host document M. Brenner, K. Rohloff, J. Bonneau, A. Miller, P.Y.A. Ryan, V. Teague, A. Bracciali, M. Sala, F. Pintore, M. Jakobsson ; "Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2017 International Workshops, WAHC, BITCOIN, VOTING, WTSC, and TA"- p. 353-369 (ISBN : 978-3-319-70277-3)
Collection Lecture Notes in Computer Science - 10323
Publisher Springer
Publication status Publié
Affiliation UCL - SST/ICTM/ELEN - Pôle en ingénierie électrique
Links
  1. Abe Masayuki, Kiltz Eike, Okamoto Tatsuaki, Chosen Ciphertext Security with Optimal Ciphertext Overhead, Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2008 (2008) ISBN:9783540892540 p.355-371, 10.1007/978-3-540-89255-7_22
  2. Adida, B.: Advances in cryptographic voting systems. Ph.D. thesis. MIT (2006)
  3. Aumann Yonatan, Lindell Yehuda, Security Against Covert Adversaries: Efficient Protocols for Realistic Adversaries, Theory of Cryptography ISBN:9783540709350 p.137-156, 10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7_8
  4. Bayer Stephanie, Groth Jens, Efficient Zero-Knowledge Argument for Correctness of a Shuffle, Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2012 (2012) ISBN:9783642290107 p.263-280, 10.1007/978-3-642-29011-4_17
  5. Bell, S., Benaloh, J., Byrne, M.D., DeBeauvoir, D., Eakin, B., Fisher, G., Kortum, P., McBurnett, N., Montoya, J., Parker, M., Pereira, O., Stark, P.B., Wallach, D.S., Winn, M.: STAR-vote: a secure, transparent, auditable, and reliable voting system. USENIX J. Election Technol. Syst. (JETS) 1(1), 8 (2013)
  6. Ben-Nun, J., Fahri, N., Llewellyn, M., Riva, B., Rosen, A., Ta-Shma, A., Wikström, D.: A new implementation of a dual (paper and cryptographic) voting system. In: E-VOTE (2012)
  7. Benaloh, J., Jones, D., Lazarus, E.L., Lindeman, M., Stark, P.B.: Soba: secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audit. In: EVT-WOTE 2011. USENIX (2011)
  8. Boneh Dan, The Decision Diffie-Hellman problem, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (1998) ISBN:9783540646570 p.48-63, 10.1007/bfb0054851
  9. Bulens, P., Giry, D., Pereira, O.: Running mixnet-based elections with helios. In: Shacham, H., Teague, V. (eds.) Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections. USENIX (2011)
  10. Canetti Ran, Krawczyk Hugo, Nielsen Jesper B., Relaxing Chosen-Ciphertext Security, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003 (2003) ISBN:9783540406747 p.565-582, 10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_33
  11. Chase Melissa, Kohlweiss Markulf, Lysyanskaya Anna, Meiklejohn Sarah, Verifiable Elections That Scale for Free, Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2013 (2013) ISBN:9783642363610 p.479-496, 10.1007/978-3-642-36362-7_29
  12. Chaum David L., Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms, 10.1145/358549.358563
  13. Chaum David, The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability, 10.1007/bf00206326
  14. Culnane, C., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S., Teague, V.: vVote: a verifiable voting system. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 18(1), 3:1–3:30 (2015)
  15. Elgamal T., A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms, 10.1109/tit.1985.1057074
  16. Lundin David, Ryan Peter Y. A., Human Readable Paper Verification of Prêt à Voter, Computer Security - ESORICS 2008 (2008) ISBN:9783540883128 p.379-395, 10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5_25
  17. Okamoto Tatsuaki, Pointcheval David, The Gap-Problems: A New Class of Problems for the Security of Cryptographic Schemes, Public Key Cryptography (2001) ISBN:9783540416586 p.104-118, 10.1007/3-540-44586-2_8
  18. Pedersen Torben Pryds, A Threshold Cryptosystem without a Trusted Party, Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’91 ISBN:9783540546207 p.522-526, 10.1007/3-540-46416-6_47
  19. Phan Duong Hieu, Pointcheval David, OAEP 3-Round:A Generic and Secure Asymmetric Encryption Padding, Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2004 (2004) ISBN:9783540239758 p.63-77, 10.1007/978-3-540-30539-2_5
  20. Popoveniuc, S., Stanton, J.: Undervote and pattern voting: vulnerability and a mitigation technique. In: Preproceedings of the 2007 IAVoSS Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2007) (2007)
  21. Ren Jian, Wu Jie, Survey on anonymous communications in computer networks, 10.1016/j.comcom.2009.11.009
  22. Ryan Peter Y. A., Rønne Peter B., Iovino Vincenzo, Selene: Voting with Transparent Verifiability and Coercion-Mitigation, Financial Cryptography and Data Security (2016) ISBN:9783662533567 p.176-192, 10.1007/978-3-662-53357-4_12
  23. Sako Kazue, Kilian Joe, Receipt-Free Mix-Type Voting Scheme, Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT ’95 (1995) ISBN:9783540594093 p.393-403, 10.1007/3-540-49264-x_32
  24. Sampigethaya K., Poovendran R., A Survey on Mix Networks and Their Secure Applications, 10.1109/jproc.2006.889687
  25. Shamir Adi, How to share a secret, 10.1145/359168.359176
  26. Terelius Björn, Wikström Douglas, Proofs of Restricted Shuffles, Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2010 (2010) ISBN:9783642126772 p.100-113, 10.1007/978-3-642-12678-9_7
  27. Tsoukalas, G., Papadimitriou, K., Louridas, P., Tsanakas, P.: From helios to zeus. USENIX J. Election Technol. Syst. 1(1), 1–17 (2013)
  28. Verificatum (2015). http://www.verificatum.org/
  29. Verificatum: complexity analysis of the verificatum mix-net vmn version 3.0.2 (July 2016). http://www.verificatum.com/files/complexity-3.0.2.pdf
  30. Wikström Douglas, Simplified Submission of Inputs to Protocols, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (2008) ISBN:9783540858546 p.293-308, 10.1007/978-3-540-85855-3_20
  31. Wikström, D.: Electronic election schemes and mix-nets (2015). http://www.csc.kth.se/~dog/esearch/
Bibliographic reference Pereira, Olivier ; Rivest, Ronald L.. Marked Mix-Nets.Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2017 International Workshops, WAHC, BITCOIN, VOTING, WTSC, and TA (Sliema (Malta), 07/04/2017). In: M. Brenner, K. Rohloff, J. Bonneau, A. Miller, P.Y.A. Ryan, V. Teague, A. Bracciali, M. Sala, F. Pintore, M. Jakobsson, Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security, FC 2017 International Workshops, WAHC, BITCOIN, VOTING, WTSC, and TA, Springer2017, p. 353-369
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/192446