Agrell, Per Joakim
[UCL]
Gautier, Axel
[USL-B]
This paper proposes an alternative model for capture that it is not based on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self-enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm-produced signal, saves information gathering cost and the firm enjoys higher information rents.
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Bibliographic reference |
Agrell, Per Joakim ; Gautier, Axel. A Theory of Soft Capture. In: The Scandinavian journal of economics, Vol. 119, no. 3, p. 571-596 (2017) |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/178583 |