Tax Incidence on Competing Two-Sided Platforms: Lucky Break or Double Jeopardy

We consider the effects of taxes for competing two-sided platforms. We first detail how a platform passes a tax increase on its prices. Adding price competition, we study next how the tax effects profits. Because of the strategic implications of the cross-side external effects, the tax increase may end up increasing the profit of the taxed platform (lucky break) or, conversely, reducing it twice (double jeopardy).

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Document type	Document de travail (Working Paper)
Access type	Accès libre
Publication date	2016
Language	Anglais
Affiliation	UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
Keywords	Two-sided platforms ; taxation ; pass-through
Links	http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/173903[Handle]

See also
	[boreal:188080]	Tax incidence on competing two-sided platforms