"Infinite Responsibility" and the Pitfall of Negation: A Deleuzian Critique of Levinas

In this paper I argue that Levians’ idea of infinite responsibility implies the reduction of otherness to substance, hence – contrary to Levinas’ endeavor – to the Self and its horizon. I shall show that Levinas’ idea draws on Blanchot’s mechanism of worklessness (désœuvrement) which in turn explicitly draws on Gide’s mechanism of retroaction and the mise en abyme – a story that doubles itself within itself – which the latter accounts for. I shall contend that a false picture of mise en abyme in general and worklessness in particular, combined with an imprudent reaction against Nietzsche’s denouncement of “guilt”, brought Levinas to two interrelated misconceptions. First, of the act of responsibility as inherently futile. Second, of repetition as “mechanical”, comprising instances which are allocated to pre-established loci upon a plenitude: A totalitarianism which fits badly with Levinas’ pursuit of otherness. Deleuze, on the other hand, drawing the correct lesson from the mise en abyme, established that an instance of repetition – reconstituting all previous ones – brings a “tailor-made” ground along; it generates the very ground upon which it emerges. Accordingly, in a Deleuzian ethics, the Other – despite, or rather due to being absolute – has no existence prior to the act of attending to the Other and his needs. The act is therefore “fated to succeed”.