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Market composition and experience in common-value auctions

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Goertz, Johanna [UCL]

This study investigates whether market composition affects individual bidding and the aggregate market in first-price sealed-bid common-value auctions. It compares all-inexperienced markets with only inexperienced bidders, all-experienced markets with only experienced bidders, and mixed markets with both types. On average, there is no market-composition effect for both experienced and inexperienced bidders. When controlling for gender, a market-composition effect appears for inexperienced subjects: Men bid more aggressively in mixed than in all-inexperienced markets, and women bid more aggressively in all-inexperienced markets. On the aggregate level, the all-inexperienced market is the most aggressive with highest winning bids; the all-experienced market is the least aggressive. The mixed market is in between: Both experienced and inexperienced win auctions in this market, but experienced bidders win less auctions than they should. © 2011 Economic Science Association.

Document type Article de périodique (Journal article) – Article de recherche
Access type Accès restreint
Publication date 2012
Language Anglais
Journal information "Experimental Economics" - Vol. 15, no. 1, p. 106-127 (2012)
Peer reviewed yes
Publisher Springer New York LLC
e-issn 1573-6938
issn 1386-4157
Publication status Publié
Affiliations UCL - SSH/LIDAM/CORE - Center for operations research and econometrics
University of Guelph - Department of Economics
Links
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Bibliographic reference Goertz, Johanna. Market composition and experience in common-value auctions. In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 15, no. 1, p. 106-127 (2012)
Permanent URL http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/161010