User menu

investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model

  • Open access
  • PDF
  • 1.15 M
  1. Anderson, S., and Devereux, M. (1988): ?Trade Unions and the Choice of the Capital Stock.?Scandinavian Journal of Economics 90: 27?44.
  2. Baldwin, C. Y. (1983): ?Productivity and Labor Unions: an Application of the Theory of Self-enforcing Contracts.?Journal of Business 56: 155?185.
  3. de la Croix, D., and Licandro, O. (1995): ?Underemployment, Capital Irreversibility and Growth under Trade Unionism.?Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97: 385?399.
  4. Devereux, M., and Lockwood, B. (1991): ?Trade Unions, Non-binding Wage Agreements, and Capital Accumulation.?European Economic Review 35: 1411?1426.
  5. Eberwein, C., and Kollintzas, T. (1995): ?A Dynamic Model of Bargaining in a Unionized Firm with Irreversible Investment.?Annales d'économie et de statistique 37/38: 91?115.
  6. Espinoza, M. P., and Rhee, C. (1989): ?Efficient Wage Bargaining as a Repeated Game.?Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 565?588.
  7. Grout, P. (1984): ?Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts.?Econometrica 52: 449?460.
  8. Hoel, M. (1990): ?Local versus Central Wage Bargaining with Endogenous Investments.?Scandinavian Journal of Economics 92: 453?469.
  9. Manning, A. (1987): ?An Integration of Trade Union Models in a Sequental Bargaining Framework.?Economic Journal 97: 121?139.
  10. ? (1994): ?How Robust Is the Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union.?Journal of Labour Economics 12: 430?459.
  11. van der Ploeg, F. (1987): ?Trade Unions, Investment and Unemployment: a Non Cooperative Approach.?European Economic Review 31: 1469?1492.
Bibliographic reference Fagnart, Jean-François ; Germain, Marc. investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model. In: Journal of Economics, Vol. 66, no.3, p. 223-247 (NaN)
Permanent URL