Ghins, Michel
[UCL]
After a brief presentation of what I take to be the representational démarche in
science, I stress the fundamental role of true judgements in model construction. The success
and correctness of a representation rests on the truth of judgements which attribute properties
to real targeted entities, called “ontic judgements”. I then present what van Fraassen
calls “the Loss of Reality objection”. After criticizing his dissolution of the objection, I offer an
alternative way of answering the Loss of Reality objection by showing that the contact of our
models with reality is grounded on the truth of ontic judgements. I conclude by examining
the consequence of this view on the issue of scientific realism.
Bibliographic reference |
Ghins, Michel. Scientific Representation and Realism. In: Principia : revista internacional de epistemologia, Vol. 15, no. 3, p. 461-474 (3) |
Permanent URL |
http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/137294 |