The effectiveness of the leniency program

The aim of this thesis is to explore the effectiveness of the leniency program of the European Commission (EC) into the deterrence of cartels. In this paper, we compare the effectiveness of the different antitrust instruments of the European competition authorities to break cartel. The first outcome of this study is to introduce the competition policy in the European Union. It is completed with the definition of the cartels; we explain why it is important to deter the collusion among firms. Also, we introduce the different types of collusions that the firms can organise in order to acquire more profit. In this study, we focus on the tacit collusion and explain with a model how the firms behave in this type of collusion. In the second outcome, we introduce the instruments that the EC require to investigate and deter the cartels: the leniency program, the settlement, the ex-officio methods, and the whistleblowing program. Also, we describe the synergy created by these instruments in order to break the cartels. The third outcome is the empirical study. In order to seize the effectiveness of the leniency program of the EC, we have to collect information about the cases of cartels from the European competition authorities. We analyse the data concerning the following variables: the utilization of the different tools, the basic amount of fines, the duration of the cartels, the duration of the investigation, the geographical location of the infringements and the number of firms into the cartels. Then, we compare the results of the correlations between the tools and these variables in order to show the effectiveness of the different tools. We conclude this study with a discussion of the result from the different variables.