A stochastic equilibrium model for short-term electricity market design

The significant influx of renewable electricity has profoundly changed the electricity market. The demand for electricity generation by traditional power plants is more variable. To meet these new peaks of demand, the number of gas-fired plants, able to turn on very quickly to meet the sudden need for electricity, should increase. Unfortunately, the opposite happens. Gas power plants go bankrupt because their profitability has declined since the arrival of renewable energy. They are not paid fairly for the valuable services they provide to the electricity market. In this master thesis, one will try to better describe the short-term electricity market to ultimately be able to repair this inconsistency. The short-term electricity market is described as a non-cooperative game involving four agents. One makes the unit commitment more realistic by describing it in a risky environment. The financial risk is evaluated using the good-deal pricing. A heuristic method to obtain the optimal decisions of these agents is presented. Finally, our method is applied to two exercises.