"Together we stand : group cognitions as strategies to deflect the negative impact of discrimination"

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ABSTRACT

Dans cette thèse, nous nous penchons sur les effets que peut avoir la discrimination sociale sur le bien-être des personnes qui en sont victimes, et en particulier, sur les stratégies psychologiques que ces dernières mettent en œuvre pour s'en protéger. Parmi les cognitions qui susceptibles de faire office de "tampon", certaines sont liées directement à l'appartenance groupale et donc potentiellement spécifiques à l'expérience de discrimination. Dans une première partie théorique, nous nous attardons sur une définition précise des concepts qui nous intéressent et décrivons en détail la littérature pertinente à notre sujet. Le premier chapitre traite de la notion de discrimination en elle-même, et de ses différences avec des concepts voisins, tels la stigmatisation, le bas statut et la privation relative. L'objectif de cette première section est de préciser notre objet d'étude. Dans un second chapitre, nous abordons la multitude de données existant sur les...

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PARTIE EMPIRIQUE
Chapter 1 : Personal discrimination as a motivation to assert and increase ingroup coherence.

Introduction

Sadly enough, being discriminated against is the daily burden of a great many individuals belonging to so-called stigmatized groups. Whether they are women, Black people, homosexuals or members of other minority or low-status groups, people have to face prejudice and devaluation because of their group membership. Researchers in social psychology have long taken a close look at the experience of these people and especially the way they act and live with the difficulties linked to their position in society (Allport, 1954; Dion, 1975; for a review, see Crocker, Major & Steele, 1998).

Even though some authors stress the protecting effect of occasional attributions to prejudice (Crocker & Major, 1989), most studies show that pervasive discrimination has a negative impact on psychological well-being (for a review see Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a). Numerous explanations have been provided to explain this finding: exclusion (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a), relative deprivation (Walker & Smith, 2002), social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981), reflected appraisals, the impact of self-fulfilling prophecies (Jussim, Palumbo, Chatman, Madon, & Smith, 2000), lack of control (Ruggiero & Taylor, 1995) (see Crocker, Major & Steele, 1998, for a review). Being the recurrent target of prejudice by a dominant outgroup remains a painful experience, partly because the target can not see the end of it.

Notwithstanding the evidence of a negative effect of perceived personal discrimination, several authors have shown that discriminated individuals use a wide range of strategies to deal with their ordeal. Echoing some early proposals, the picture of a resilient stigmatized individual has tended to emerge over the last few years (Allport, 1954; Major, McCoy, Kaiser, & Quinton, 2003; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a). Perhaps most illustrative of this revival of interest for the idea that people have some resources in front of discrimination, Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey (1999; see also Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a) have shown that a possible buffer between perceived discrimination and well-being could be identification with the ingroup. Recent studies by Branscombe, Schmitt and colleagues (e. a. Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999; Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt & Spears, 2001; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a, Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz & Owen, 2002) have highlighted the protective effect of group identification among stigmatized group
members belonging to numerous categories (African Americans, women, elderly people, people with piercing, foreign students...). Whereas perceived personal discrimination is positively related to identification, identification is also positively linked to well-being, thereby attenuating the negative impact of discrimination on well-being. The main explanation for this pattern of findings is that discrimination amounts to exclusion from the dominant group. Because human beings need inclusion (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), targets of discrimination replace acceptance from the wider social group by inclusion within the ingroup: They identify more strongly with the ingroup. This higher level of identification, in turn, neutralizes the negative impact of exclusion (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a).

In the present studies, we wish to go one step further in the investigation of the protective effect of identification. We propose that inclusion within the ingroup could be evidenced by perceptions of the group itself next to attitudes toward the ingroup (e.g., identification). One aspect would be to perceive high levels of social support within the ingroup, as this should directly counteract outgroup exclusion. Another important aspect could be perceptions of group efficacy or the belief that the group will be efficient in acting against oppressive outgroups. As it turns out, both these perceptions are encompassed within the concept of entitativity. Entitativity has been defined as what makes an aggregate of people, a group (Campbell, 1958). It is composed of several features that have originally been divided into two dimensions. Next to the dimension of “similarity” (homogeneity, proximity, clear boundaries) is the dimension of “organization” (organization, common fate, common goals) (Campbell, 1958; Wilder & Simon, 1998; for a collection, see Yzerbyt, Judd & Corneille, 2004). In recent research, these dimensions have evolved into what is sometimes referred to as “essence” and “agency” (Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004). A group can be entitative on either of those two dimensions or on both.

Entitativity is a threatening feature of outgroups, as it appears to reveal efficiency (Dasgupta, Banaji & Abelson, 1999). At the same time, it seems to be a positive feature of ingroups because an entitative group fills people’s needs better than non-entitative ones (see Yzerbyt et al., 2000). For example, homogeneity, the similarity between group members, can be perceived as evidence of solidarity and social support, especially in minority groups (Simon, 1992). Doosje, Ellemers and Spears (1995) also suggested that ingroup homogeneity could be positively related to the likelihood of collective action. Similarly, the broader concept of entitativity has been related to the perception of a stronger group, better able to protect its members against threats (Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004; Castano, 1999, 2004; Yzerbyt et al., 2000). Moreover, there is some evidence that high identifiers are prone to perceive their
group as highly entitative (Castano, 1999; Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003). To sum up, we propose that entitativity should be related to perceptions of personal discrimination, and, in turn, protect well-being, as it accounts for the perception of a safe haven of acceptance and of a power to eradicate oppression.

If entitativity is a key element in dealing with discrimination, people should be motivated to preserve the unity of the group. As a matter of fact, disunity has been shown to tamper with group goals (Abrams, Marques, Randsley de Mouria, Hutchinson, & Bown, 2004). In our studies, we relied on the black sheep effect as well as the overexclusion effect to evaluate people's willingness to protect the coherence of their group. Overexclusion (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992; Yzerbyt, Leyens & Bellour, 1995) arises when people have to decide whether a target person does or does not belong to the ingroup. The reasoning is that when someone has been mistakenly categorized into the group, this can be potentially devastating for the group’s entitativity and value. Indeed, the potentially unacceptable behaviors or characteristics, the lack of homogeneity, the absence of shared group goals constitute serious threats to the group. Individuals who derive an important part of their social identity from a particular group membership, e.g. high identifiers, should then be particularly cautious about whom they accept into the group, and in doubt, reject ambiguous targets: they “over-exclude”, as they reject more people than needed (for more recent evidence, see Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon & Seron, 2002). For obvious reasons, the overexclusion effect can be seen as a means to protect, restore, or reach higher entitativity.

The black sheep effect has been even more often documented than the overexclusion effect (see Abrams et al., 2004, for a recent review). When people are asked to rate deviants, they evaluate more negatively deviants of their own group than deviants of the outgroup (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). They also exclude them psychologically from the group and perceive their group as more cohesive afterwards. As it is the case for the overexclusion effect, the idea is that excluding deviant group members enables high identifiers to protect the image of their ingroup by distancing the rest of the group from the “bad ones” (Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002). Abrams and colleagues (2004) also argue that this phenomenon serves the function of reasserting the validity of group norms.

In sum, we argue that people perceiving high levels of discrimination should be prone to apply such strategies as overexclusion and the black sheep effect in order to protect the buffering role of their group membership. Both strategies are indeed subtle ways to protect a coherent ingroup, that we posit crucial in efficaciously dealing with the pain of discrimination.
Study 1: The Black Sheep Effect.

The black-sheep effect can be seen as providing an indirect way to reaffirm the value of the group as a whole. Indeed, a black sheep effect emerges when an ingroup member does not seem to reach the standards set in order to be a good ingroup member. He is then more harshly judged by its fellow ingroup members than an outgroup member doing the same “bad” thing would. This stringent evaluation serves to protect the group, as the deviant is psychologically excluded from the ingroup, he is set apart, too far away to taint the rest of the suddenly more coherent ingroup. This effect is supposed to arise especially either when the group is under threat or among high identifiers for whom the group’s value is very important. What we wanted to see in the present study was whether perceived discrimination could lead people to become harsher with deviants, because of their need for a strong coherent ingroup, that could both emotionally support them and promise them a greater efficacy in changing the stigmatizing situation.

To test this idea, we decided to measure perceived discrimination and then to present female participants with profiles of ingroup members who advocated different positions regarding the issue of women. One was constructed to reflect feminist (or non-traditional views), one was traditional, and the last one was ambiguous. Considering the general attitudes of female university students, we expected that the traditional profile would be considered deviant, and that people perceiving higher levels of discrimination would be especially harsh towards it. We also expected discrimination to interact with identification so that high identifiers would be the harshest of the lot. We especially designed deviants pertaining to the issue of women’s rights in order to maximize the possibility that these would be perceived as potentially dangerous for group goals. It is thus also possible that the feminist profile will be negatively evaluated by people perceiving low levels of discrimination, as they do not perceive the need for militancy anymore.

Pretest

To construct profiles that our participants would have to evaluate, we first created a fake gender attitude questionnaire, inspired by existing ones. However, it was much simpler, because we wanted evaluators to be quickly able to determine if the respondent had traditional, feminist or ambiguous attitudes. Questions that were retained are presented in the
Table 1. We designed a scale composed of four levels, where fake participants had supposedly crossed squares under the labels “do not agree at all”, “do not agree”, “agree” and “totally agree” for each of our ten items, thus making their pattern of results rather graphic. Table 1 also presents the answers of the six profiles we subsequently constructed.

Table 1. Questions of the fake questionnaire and pattern of the six profiles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Do not agree at all</th>
<th>Do not agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Totally agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I would prefer working for a man than a woman.</td>
<td>F1</td>
<td>F2, A1, A2</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>T2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. It is normal that a family adapts first to the professional obligations of the man.</td>
<td>F1</td>
<td>F2, A2</td>
<td>T1, T2</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Men are intrinsically more courageous than women when a danger comes about.</td>
<td>F2</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>F1, T2</td>
<td>A1, A2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I believe that having children is the biggest realization of a woman.</td>
<td>F1</td>
<td>F2, A1, A2</td>
<td>T1, T2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. It bothers me when a man is interested in a woman only because she is pretty.</td>
<td>T2, A1, A2</td>
<td>F1, T1</td>
<td>F2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Men will always be the dominant gender.</td>
<td>F2</td>
<td>F1, A1, A2</td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I believe that the husband should always have the last word when a couple makes a decision.</td>
<td>F1, F2, A2</td>
<td>T1, T2, A1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Women should be ready to oppose men to defend their rights.</td>
<td>T1, T2, A1, A2</td>
<td>F1, F2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Women can handle pressure as well as men when there is a decision to make.</td>
<td>T2</td>
<td>T1, A1</td>
<td>F2, A2</td>
<td>F1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I believe that many TV adverts present a degrading image of women.</td>
<td>T1</td>
<td>T2, A2</td>
<td>F1, F2</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Over the years, we have had numerous opportunities of polling female students about their gender attitudes.
Nine males and 9 females rated the six profiles on whether they were sexist, feminist, and whether they seemed to encourage gender discrimination against women. Gender of the profile was not mentioned. Results are presented in Table 2 and show that all profiles are perceived as we intended.

### Table 2: Mean scores for profiles on pre-test variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feminist 1</th>
<th>Feminist 2</th>
<th>Ambiguous 1</th>
<th>Ambiguous 2</th>
<th>Traditional 1</th>
<th>Traditional 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sexist</strong></td>
<td>3.06a</td>
<td>3.22a</td>
<td>4.11b</td>
<td>4.17b</td>
<td>6.67c</td>
<td>6.44c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feminist</strong></td>
<td>5.56a</td>
<td>5.89a</td>
<td>3.89b</td>
<td>3.50b</td>
<td>1.56c</td>
<td>1.44c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Encourage</strong></td>
<td>2.56a</td>
<td>2.78a</td>
<td>4.33b</td>
<td>4.22b</td>
<td>5.89c</td>
<td>5.61c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For each row, means with the same letter are equal. Other differ at $p < .05$.

### Method

#### Participants.

A total of 99 female second year psychology students took part in the study in exchange for course credits.

#### Procedure.

Participants were run in groups of 4 to 6 participants. Upon their arrival, they were told that the experiment would be twofold. First, they would have to answer a general opinion questionnaire about their feelings on gender discrimination. After that, they would have the opportunity to earn extra credits by helping with the encoding of experimental data. They were told that first year students had answered a questionnaire, and that the experimenter needed blind judges to evaluate them. All of them accepted to help and they each received a package of six randomly sorted profiles, with an instruction sheet asking them to form an impression of each person in turn and then answer a number of questions. When they had finished, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.

#### Material.

The first questionnaire comprised several measures. The response format for most of the items was a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (= agree not at all) to 7 (= totally

They are generally rather feminist even though they don’t accept to be labelled as such.
agree) on which participants had to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with the statements presented.

Four items assessed personal discrimination compared to the average man. An example is “Compared to the average man, I have been personally affected by prejudice against my gender”. We computed an index of perceived personal discrimination ($\alpha = .79$).

Twelve items tapped identification with women. Four dealt more precisely with evaluative identification (e. a. “I think that women don’t have much they can be proud of”), four items measured behavioral identification (e. a. “Whatever happens, I will remain on women’s side”) and the four last ones assessed cognitive identification (e. a. “To describe myself, I would certainly refer to the fact that I am a woman”). However, a principal component analysis did not reproduce this a priori distinction and yielded a much more complex four-factor solution, explaining 59% of the variance. The first factor explained 28% of the variance and comprised five items of self-definition and similarity to other ingroup members. As we wanted to keep our measure of identification as straightforward as possible, we decided to keep only those five items of identification and they had together an acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .78$).

The profiles that participants had to rate had been ostensibly filled in by different students, ranging in age from 18 to 19 years old. Three were males, three were females. Within each gender, one had traditional attitudes, one had ambiguous attitudes and one had feminist attitudes (gender was randomized so that every profile was presented as being male or female an equal number of times). The distinction between the two versions of each profile type was not significant on any of the rating variables, we thus collapsed all the profiles depending solely on gender and type of attitudes. In this paper, we will only discuss results pertaining to the female profiles.

Participants had to rate each of them on various questions, using 7 point Likert scales ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 7 (= totally). Three questions assessed gender typicality. Participants had to indicate the extent to which they believed that “this person is typical of his/her gender group”, “this person is representative of his/her gender group” and “his/her

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120 Using different pens, colors and writing styles.
opinions are very frequently found in his/her gender group”. We computed a typicality rating by averaging those three items (depending on the profile: \( \alpha \) between .87 and .94). The three next questions dealt with perceived similarity with the self. Participants indicated the extent to which they thought that they “could agree with this person on many themes”, “would have the same perspective than this person on many questions” and “would answer globally like this person to the questionnaire”. We computed a perceived similarity score by averaging those three items (depending on the profile, \( \alpha \) between .93 and .97).

Finally, participants rated their general appreciation of the target, answering the following items: “Your opinion of this person is positive”, “You think you would like this person” and “You feel a kind of antipathy towards this person” (reverse coded). We collapsed those three items into a single appreciation score (depending on the profile, \( \alpha \) between .72 and .82).

**Results.**

The score of personal discrimination was very low (\( M = 2.36 \)). Identification with the group was marginally related to personal discrimination (\( r = .19, p < .07 \)) (\( M = 4.92 \)). Means of the profile ratings can be found in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Traditional Target</th>
<th>Ambiguous Target</th>
<th>Feminist Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Typicality</strong></td>
<td>3.10 (1.47)</td>
<td>3.95 (1.44)</td>
<td>5.28 (1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appreciation</strong></td>
<td>3.52 (1.22)</td>
<td>4.43 (1.16)</td>
<td>5.75 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resemblance</strong></td>
<td>1.83 (0.97)</td>
<td>3.35 (1.76)</td>
<td>5.72 (1.26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to look at simple effects of the two independent variables and their interaction with profile type, we conducted a series of repeated measures ANOVAs, with identification, perceived personal discrimination, and their interaction, as continuous between-subject variables and type of profile as a within-subject variable, on all five evaluations separately.

**Typicality of the target**

Identification affected the perceived typicality of the target, \( F(1,99) = 3.99, p < .05, \beta = .21 \). High identifiers feel that the target is more typical of the group than low identifiers,
whatever the profile. None of the other simple effects or interaction terms reached significance.

**General liking of the target**

Identification also affected the general liking of the target ($F(1,99) = 4.71, p < .05, \beta = .23$). High identifiers generally appreciate the profile more than low identifiers. The main effect of type of profile was significant ($F(2,198) = 6.25, p < .005$). The feminist target was more appreciated than the ambiguous target which was more appreciated than the traditional target. As expected, there was a significant interaction, albeit marginally so, between type of profile and personal discrimination ($F(2,198) = 2.81, p < .07$) such that the more participants perceive personal discrimination the less they appreciate the ambiguous profile ($\beta = - .25, p < .02$).

**Resemblance to the self**

There was a significant main effect of type of profile ($F(2,198) = 5.80, p < .005$), such that people felt closer to the feminist target than to the ambiguous target and closer to the ambiguous target than to the traditional target.

The interaction between identification and personal discrimination was again marginally significant ($F(1,98) = 3.65, p < .06$). To decompose this interaction, we looked at the effect of personal discrimination for high and low identifiers, by computing an analysis at one standard deviation above the mean score of identification and one standard deviation below the mean score. This indicates that whereas high identifiers were not affected by perceived personal discrimination, low identifiers felt closer to the target when they perceived less personal discrimination ($\beta = - .40, p < .04$). Finally, and in line with our predictions, there was also an interaction between personal discrimination and type of profile ($F(2,198) = 3.13, p < .05$). The more people perceived discrimination the less close they felt to the ambiguous profile ($\beta = - .23, p < .04$).

**Discussion.**

The deviant profile, namely the traditional one, was judged as less likable and less similar to the self than the two other ones. There was no specific effect of identification or personal discrimination on evaluations of this profile. High identifiers tended to be more positive than low identifiers on all profiles: they liked them more and felt they were more typical of women than low identifiers did.
Considering the feminist profile to be the “typical” profile, the ambiguous profile can also be considered as a deviant profile, though less so than the traditional one. Perception of discrimination influenced both liking and feelings of personal resemblance to the ambiguous profile: the higher the perception of personal discrimination, the less people liked and felt similar to the ambiguous profile. It might be possible that a difference between people perceiving high levels of discrimination and people perceiving low levels of discrimination appears on the ambiguous target because the traditional target is unanimously rejected by the participants, whatever their perceptions, as being “beyond acceptance” even for moderate individuals. The ambiguous target is then perceived by discriminated individuals as someone who should assert her opinions either to join the “good” women or the “bad” ones, and as such, is perceived more harshly.

No differences between high and low perceivers of discrimination appeared for the feminist target. It seemed possible that low perceivers would like her less as she is an advocate of intergroup “conflict”. However, as we did not name her as “feminist”, it is thus likely that she was not perceived as a militant individual but rather as a non-traditional woman. Studies have shown that the label “feminist” carries an additive meaning that can lead to more negative perceptions by itself (Williams & Wittig, 1997) and that non-traditional women and feminist women are distinct subgroups (Cameron & Lalonde, 2001).

Considering the rather positive results of this first study -discrimination does indeed impact upon judgment of deviant group members- we decided to proceed to a second test of our general hypothesis by modifying three aspects of our design.

First of all, we decided to move on to overexclusion, a phenomenon supposed to assert ingroup coherence like the black sheep effect. Rather than punishing deviants, overexclusion can be seen as a prevention method, as it amounts more or less to rejecting people that are at risk of becoming deviants. We thus expect to find similar results to those we obtained this time with the black sheep effect, namely that people perceiving high levels of personal discrimination will exclude ambiguous members more readily than people perceiving low levels of discrimination. Secondly, we wanted to explicitly measure perception of ingroup entitativity. More importantly, we decided to manipulate discrimination rather than measuring it. This might seem trivial, but perceptions of personal discrimination have very rarely been manipulated. General feelings of group discrimination (or identity threat, more generally) are usually impacted upon through manipulative texts, and as group discrimination and personal discrimination are related, these manipulations might also influence personal discrimination. However, as group discrimination and personal discrimination are distinct perceptions, we...
wanted to use a direct manipulation of personal discrimination. Experiments dealing with attributions to prejudice manipulate singular events that can be read as reflecting discrimination on behalf of an individual. However, as we have explained elsewhere, those unique encounters with others’ prejudice are hardly similar and comparable to pervasive feelings of being a recurrent target of discrimination. We thus believe that this type of experimental paradigm will not be of use either.

**Study 2: Overexclusion**

In this second study, we manipulated perceived personal discrimination through a event listing task. Female participants were asked to write down a number of gender discriminating events that had happened to them. We used a technique based on the accessibility heuristic (Schwartz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer, & Simons, 1991). Whereas participants in a first ‘easy accessibility’ condition had to write down a small number of events, they had to write a large number of events in the ‘hard accessibility’ condition. Next, they were asked a series of questions regarding their perceived level of personal discrimination. The rationale founding this procedure is that when participants experience little difficulty to complete the task (remember three events) and then asked to evaluate themselves on a trait related to the task, they should reflect on the easiness they had to recall events, and conclude that they highly possess the trait. On the other hand, when they have to recall more events, this is more difficult, and as such, they should conclude that they do not possess the trait. In our case, that they are not discriminated. This is because the ease of recall is expected to exert an impact on participants’ evaluation of their standing regarding the measure at hand (here, personal discrimination). Thus, the hard accessibility condition should amount to low levels of perceived discrimination whereas the easy accessibility condition should lead participants to perceive high levels of personal discrimination. We also had a control condition where no event-listing task was given.

In Branscombe and Schmitt (2002)’s model, identification with the ingroup flows from perceptions of discrimination. Other studies have shown that identification could predict perception of discrimination (Operario & Fiske, 2001) as well as appraisal of threat (Ellemers, Doosje, & Spears, 1999). Discrimination, as an identity threat, could thus have a very different impact upon people depending on their prior level of identification (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Branscombe, Ellemers, Doosje, & Spears, 1999). In relationship to homogeneity and entitativity, threat has been shown to have a different impact on high and
low identifiers (Branscombe, Ellemers, et al., 1999; Yzerbyt & Castano, 1998). High identifiers are willing to protect their ingroup and perceive it as more homogenous when finding themselves under threat, whereas low identifiers de-identify further and stress heterogeneity within the group (Branscombe, Ellemers et al., 1999). We thus decided to use identification both as a moderator, by measuring it before our manipulation of discrimination, and as the expected buffer, by measuring it afterwards. We believe that increased entitativity and the use of overexclusion strategies could be specific to high identifiers who perceive high levels of discrimination.

As it was our first study testing the relationship between discrimination and entitativity, we did not include a measure of well-being. However, we included a measure of physical proximity in order to see if our manipulation increased affiliation needs with similar others.

To summarize, our main hypotheses were that high identifiers perceiving high levels of discrimination will show a) higher identification, b) higher entitativity and c) higher overexclusion scores than low identifiers or people otherwise perceiving low levels of discrimination (Hypothesis 1). Also, we predicted that high levels of overexclusion should be linked to higher levels of entitativity (Hypothesis 2). As overexclusion is supposed to re-assert the ingroup’s coherence, we measured entitativity both before and after the overexclusion task; hoping to see it raised afterwards.

Method

Participants.

A total of 77 female first year psychology students participated in the study in exchange for course credits.

Procedure.

Participants were run individually. Upon their arrival, the experimenter asked them to take a seat. She then gave a phone call in which she explicitly stated that her participant had arrived. She asked a fictitious interlocutor if the “other participant” was there too. After a couple of seconds, she hanged up and said that the experiment could start. This was made in order to make the actual participants believe that another subject was run at the same time. The experimenter then explained to participants that the experiment was in fact composed of three distinct parts and that they would have to perform very different tasks. The first one consisted in a simple questionnaire to fill in. Next, participants would perform a computer
task. Finally, the experimenter would fetch the other participant (another female student) and both participants would be requested to discuss a topic although it was indicated that more precise instructions would come at that time.

Participants then started to fill in the questionnaire. When participants turned to the manipulation page, the experimenter started a chronometer. After five minutes, the experimenter told to move on to the next pages of the questionnaire even if participants were not finished yet with the questionnaire. This was made to ensure that people did not have the time to fill in all the questions in the hard accessibility condition. There was no such page in the control condition.

Participants were then asked to sit in front of the computer and proceed with the overexclusion task. All instructions were given on the screen.

Next, the experimenter told participants that she had forgotten to give them a small questionnaire and handed it to the participant. This questionnaire comprised a series of additional identification and entitativity measures.

Participants were then told that they would have to discuss a topic with the other student whom the experimenter was about to fetch. In the experimental condition, participants learned that they had to pick randomly a topic and prepare it for a few minutes. Participants then picked a colored card (among 3) that systematically read “what would you do to deal with gender discrimination in Belgium?”. To prepare this topic, participants were invited to fill in a last questionnaire assessing the strategies they would prefer using. In the control condition, the experimenter told participants that they would pick the topic once the other student had arrived.

After five minutes (or immediately in the control condition), the experimenter told participants that she would go and fetch the other student and left the room. Just before leaving, she asked participants if they would not mind setting two chairs opposite each other in the center of the room, one for themselves and one for the other student. The experimenter returned after five minutes and asked participants to sit next to her desk, without moving the chairs. The participant was then thanked and debriefed. After participants had left, the experimenter measured the distance between the two chairs.

**Materials**

Unless stated otherwise, participants had to rate their agreement with each of the items on 7-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (= do not agree at all) to 7 (= totally agree). The
first questionnaire assessed both identification and entitativity. It also contained the manipulation.

Identification was measured with five items (e.g., “I identify with the group of women” and “I am proud to belong in the group of women” \(\alpha = .69\)).

As explained above, three different conditions were then introduced by means of the questionnaire. In the “easy accessibility / high discrimination” condition, participants were asked to think and write down three events of discrimination that had happened to them because they were females. For each event, they had to rate its negativity on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (= very negative) to 7 (= neutral). In the “hard accessibility / low discrimination” condition, participants were asked to record and rate 8 events of discrimination. There was no task in the control condition. Participants in all conditions were then asked to rate to what extent they were personally victims of gender discrimination, on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (= not at all) to 9 (totally).

Entitativity was assessed with 7 items, covering aspects of similarity, power, solidarity, common experience and goals and perceived “groupness” \(\alpha = .68\).

Over-exclusion was measured through a task presented on a Macintosh computer, with the SuperLab program. Participants were asked to sort handwritings as quick and accurate as they could according to whether they thought that the author was a male or female. 44 handwritten sentences, all reading “the carrots are cooked”, were randomly presented on the screen for as long as participants needed to take their decision about the gender of the writer. Those 44 sentences had been collected from 22 men and 22 women working in the department. Participants had to give their decision by pressing one of two keys. The computer did not give any feedback but merely recorded their answers and the time needed to answer.

The second questionnaire assessed again identification with 5 items (alpha = .74). Examples of items were “The fact that I am a woman is an important reflection of who I am” and “I believe that being part of the group of women is a positive experience”.

Entitativity was measured again with 7 items, covering aspects of similarity, power, solidarity, common experience and goals and perceived “groupness” \(\alpha = .78\).

A third questionnaire was only given to participants in the discrimination conditions and comprised four sentences describing ways in which people could deal with gender discrimination in Belgium, namely collective action, individual mobility, re-categorization, and social creativity. Participants first rated their agreement with each of them and then sorted
them in their preferred order. This was done in order to raise people’s awareness of gender
discrimination in Belgium. The answers to this questionnaire will not be discussed any
further.

Results.
Manipulation check

In order to see if our manipulation had an effect on perceived personal discrimination,
we computed a analysis of variance, with condition as the between factor, with three levels:
control, low level of discrimination (hard accessibility condition), high level of discrimination
(easy accessibility condition). The analysis was not significant, $F(2, 77) = 0.09$, ns.. Hard
accessibility individuals perceived the same level of personal discrimination ($M = 3.00$) than
participants in the easy accessibility condition ($M = 3.27$). Both were also equal to control
condition participants ($M = 3.11$). It seems that our manipulation failed to have the slightest
effect on perceived personal discrimination. Given this state of affairs, we decided to use our
measure of perceived personal discrimination as a non-manipulated continuous variable in
order to examine its relation with identification, entitativity, and over-exclusion.

Correlation analysis.

Table 4. Means and correlation coefficients (study 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Identification</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>5.58 (0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Perceived personal discrimination</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.23†</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>3.13 (2.00)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Entitativity</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.50***</td>
<td>.80***</td>
<td>3.96 (0.79)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Over-Exclusion</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>23.83 (3.69)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Identification 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>5.05 (0.81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Entitativity 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.74 (0.95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: †: $p < .1$ *: $p < .05$ **: $p < .01$ ***: $p < .001$.

We computed correlation coefficients for all our main variables (see Table 4). We
computed an overexclusion score by adding all the times people had answered “female” when
asked if a handwriting was male or female thus allowing a maximum score of 44. We also
recorded response time, but since this variable did not yield any significant results, we will not discuss it any further.

Identification and entitativity scores were highly interrelated, both before and after the overexclusion task. However, identification and entitativity appeared to be unrelated to either perceived discrimination or the overexclusion score. In contrast, overexclusion and perceived personal discrimination were marginally related, in the positive direction.

*Prediction of entitativity.*

We computed a regression analysis of entitativity with identification and perceived discrimination as predictors, as well as their interaction. The analysis was highly significant, $F(3, 71) = 5.04, p < .005$, adj. $R^2 = .15$. However, only identification was related to entitativity ($\beta = .37, p < .005$).

*Prediction of the overexclusion phenomenon.*

We regressed the overexclusion score on identification, discrimination, as well as their interaction. Although the omnibus analysis was not significant, $F(3, 74) = 1.27$, ns., perceived discrimination tended to predict over-exclusion but in a direction that was opposite to predictions, $\beta = .22, p < .08$. It seems that the more participants perceived personal discrimination, the more willing they were to say that the handwriting belonged to a female. We tried the same analysis with entitativity rather than identification as a predictor, but this yielded similar results.

*Impact of overexclusion on identification and entitativity.*

To check for the effect of the overexclusion task on identification, we computed a regression analysis with prior identification and the over-exclusion score as predictors of identification after the task. The analysis was highly significant ($F(3, 76) = 13.51, p < .0001$, adj. $R^2 = .33$). Prior identification was, as expected, related to identification after the task ($\beta = .59, p < .0001$). However, over-exclusion was also a significant predictor ($\beta = -.20, p < .05$), indicating that the more people categorized handwritings as belonging to outgroup members, the higher they identified with their ingroup afterwards. These effects were further qualified by a marginal interaction ($\beta = .17, p < .1$). To explore this interaction, we computed two separate regression analyses: one at one standard deviation above the mean identification score, one beneath it. This analysis showed that over-exclusion was not related to final
identification for high identifiers ($\beta = -.02$, n.s.). For low identifiers, however, the greater the overexclusion effect, the higher the identification ($\beta = -.37, p < .02$).

Because overexclusion was related to perceived discrimination, we ran a regression analysis in which we replaced over-exclusion with discrimination. The results were pretty similar: $F(3, 74) = 12.91, p < .0001$, adj. $R^2 = .33$ with identification retaining its massive effect ($\beta = .58, p < .0001$). Perceived discrimination was not related to participants’ identification after the task but the interaction was significant ($\beta = .24, p < .02$). We broke down the interaction by looking at regression equations at one standard deviation above and one standard deviation beneath the mean. Whereas high identifiers remained unmoved by the thought of discrimination, low identifiers had lower identification when they also perceived high levels of discrimination.

Entitativity was unrelated either to discrimination or over-exclusion, and was massively related to prior entitativity ($\beta = .81, p < .0001$).

**Seating distance**

We compared the distance that participants put between their seats depending on whether they believed they would later have to speak about discrimination or not. Because the manipulation was reinforced at that point, we used it as our main independent variable (discrimination versus control). This yielded a significant effect: $F(1, 75) = 3.92, p < .06$. When participants knew they would be talking about discrimination, they sat their chair closer to the fictional same-gender student ($M = 76.98$ cm) than when they do not know what will be the topic of their conversation ($M = 83.83$ cm). Neither perceived discrimination, identification, or entitativity qualified this effect, either directly or into an interaction term.

**Discussion**

In this study, we tried to manipulate the level of perceived personal discrimination in order to assess its impact on several dependent measures namely identification, entitativity, and over-exclusion.

We failed to impact on the level of discrimination that participants recorded. Of importance, the global level of perceived discrimination remained very low ($M = 3.13$ on a 9-point scale). A closer examination of the number of events people managed to write indicates that even participants in the 3-events condition often failed to record as many events as was required. It is possible that the female students that we polled are so unaware of gender
discrimination that even 3-events proved to be too difficult to remember, thereby preventing them from perceiving personal discrimination. Comparisons with the control condition, where no events had to be recorded indicate that this is not the case: control participants record the same amount of discrimination than others. We thus decided to use the discrimination item as a continuous factor, in order to see its relationships with the remaining variables.

Personal discrimination and identification with the ingroup appeared unrelated, which was, at first, rather surprising. However, other researchers have shown that among women, attitudes such as perception of discrimination and identification with the ingroup can be unrelated (Cameron & Lalonde, 2002) Entitativity is highly linked to identification but appears unrelated to discrimination as well.

We used both personal discrimination and identification (or entitativity) to predict overexclusion. Contrarily to our expectations and previous literature, only discrimination appeared to be related to over-exclusion and in the opposite direction than what was expected. Indeed, the more participants perceived discrimination, the more they categorized handwritings as belonging to females. So instead of rejecting others in an attempt to get the group together to face the threat, they seemed willing to get more people in it. Neither identification nor entitativity was related to the overexclusion score.

Identification following the task was affected by the overexclusion score in that the more participants classified writings as belonging to males, the more identified they were afterwards. This was further qualified by an interaction, indicating that this effect emerged among low but not high identifiers. Looking at the same relationship by replacing overexclusion with discrimination, we saw that the responses of high identifiers were not related to their level of perceived discrimination, whereas low identifiers who reported high levels of discrimination reported less identification than low identifiers who reported low levels of discrimination. This is consistent with the view that confronted with an identity threat, people will react depending on their prior level of identification and low identifiers will further de-identify (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999).

It is quite surprising that in our data, the more participants perceived personal discrimination, the more they categorized handwritings as belonging to ingroup members. It is possible that our overexclusion measure was not adequate. However, as overexclusion effects have been underlined with faces and voices, we conjectured that handwritings were likely to elicit the same kind of response from group members. Overexclusion arises only in cases of uncertainty, we thus conjectured that our handwritings might have not been ambiguous
Personal discrimination as a motivation to assert and increase ingroup coherence

enough. We then examined each writing separately and found that among the 44 handwritings, only 24 were identified as belonging always to the same gender by 70% or more of the participants. There was thus enough ambiguity to normally create the overexclusion effect. It is also possible that handwritings are less “personal” than faces or voices and elicit less feelings of encountering real persons, real potential ingroup members. As such, handwritings might be too “weak” to reveal the phenomenon. Moreover, importantly, most overexclusion studies have been conducted with ethnic groups for which there was some kind of conflict (Yzerbyt et al., 1995; Castano et al., 2002). It is thus also possible that gender groups have characteristics that render overexclusion less easy to emerge, either because of the absence of open conflict (and as such, erroneous categorization is less costly) or because gender lines are more clearly defined than ethnic lines, rendering the presence of traitors less likely.

Finally, our measure of identification was a composite of different facets. As noted elsewhere (e. a. Ellemers, Kortekaas & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Cameron & Lalonde, 2001), different dimensions of identification might have different relationships with specific behaviors or cognitions, that do not appear when identification is considered as a unitary concept.

General discussion

Our two studies aimed at seeing whether perceptions of discrimination would be associated with a tendency to reassert the coherence of the ingroup, either by rejecting deviants (study 1) or by excluding ambiguous members from the group (study 2). Our results do not exactly confirm our hypotheses but several interesting patterns have emerged.

In the first study, personal discrimination impacted on the evaluation of the ambiguous target. The traditional target, thought to be the most extreme deviant profile, was not rated more harshly by people who perceived high versus low levels of personal discrimination, maybe because this target was too negative. However, perceived personal discrimination was related to poorer appreciation of and less similarity to the ambiguous target. Data on the black sheep effect thus supports our prediction that people perceiving high levels of personal discrimination will be harsher with intermediate deviants than people perceiving low levels of discrimination.

However, in study 2, perceptions of personal discrimination had participants admit more people into their ingroup, rather than exclude them. It seems possible that the two phenomena, overexclusion and the black sheep effect, are differently related to
discrimination. Whereas discriminated people would be willing to include as many people as they can into their group, they would still exclude those who do not live up to their expectations. Indeed, legitimacy of the intergroup setting might be a key factor in explaining why our results do not mirror the expected pattern of threat effects (Branscombe, Ellemers, et al., 1999; Yzerbyt et al., 2000). In most threat experiments, the induced threat is a legitimate one: people are presented with a real (and thus legitimate) status difference (a. o., Doosje et al., 1995; Ellemers et al., 1999). They are said to be less intelligent or to have lesser power than members of another group. It might be that confronted with an unfair threat, like discrimination, people feel a need to open up the group to a maximum. As discrimination is exclusion, people might want to be sure not to leave any group member behind rather than excluding ambiguous ones. Because discrimination is unfair, the focus is on the prejudice of the outgroup, not on the bad habits of the ingroup. The quote says “Power is in numbers” and social movements are often measured to the number of participants that take the streets, not to who they were. The question of deviance within the group could thus be addressed later on. Further experiments are needed to investigate that question. We especially wish to explore legitimacy / illegitimacy perceptions and their impact on entitativity or coherence-maintaining strategies such as the black sheep and over-exclusion phenomena.

In neither studies did identification play its expected role. In the first study, identification appeared to be positively related to several measures, like typicality ratings. However, it was never related to harsher judgments. In the second one, identification had no impact on over-exclusion even though it was highly related to entitativity. This might be caused by our choice of target group. Literature often assume that high identifiers do want to fight for their group and are willing to improve its standing. Among women, people seem to be able to identify with very different meanings of group membership, depending on their attitude towards women’s rights and their current standing (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996). A classical social identity lecture of the intergroup situation would predict feminists to be the only high identifiers among women. However, women can also be highly identified to a very traditional role or identified with a non-traditional role while believing equality to be reached (and as such, without believing that subsequent action is needed or useful) (Cameron & Lalonde, 2001). Evidence for this specificity of women is the absence of strong links between identification and personal discrimination indexes, in both studies. This seems to be in opposition with Schmitt and colleagues (2002) who found positive link between discrimination and identification. However, in their study, group discrimination was used rather than personal perceptions. Moreover, a recent study by Redersdorff, Martinot and
Branscombe (2004) shows that only women working in male environments reproduce this link. As our participants are psychology students, surrounded by other females, it is probable that discrimination is their case is not related to identification as it is often not perceived at all. It might thus be necessary to measure women’s attitudes in order to divide high and low identifiers according to their personal views and beliefs concerning the current status of women. As mentioned earlier, the absence of open conflict between men and women might also explain why non-traditional women who do not condone feminist views, would not reject deviant ingroup members. It is thus necessary to expand these results by looking at other groups than women.

Finally, well-being must sooner or later be considered in relation to entitativity and coherence-maintaining strategies. This should allow us to see if those are really protective in the sense proposed by Schmitt and Branscombe (2002a) or if they just precede collective action tendencies, devoid of affective properties.